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ABSTRACT
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are now commonplace in power grids, man-
ufacturing, and embedded medical devices. Failures and attacks on these
systems have caused significant social, environmental and financial losses. In
this thesis, we develop techniques for proving invariance and privacy proper-
ties of cyber-physical systems that could aid the development of more robust
and reliable systems.
The thesis uses three different modeling formalisms capturing different as-
pects of CPS. Networked dynamical systems are used for modeling (possibly
time-delayed) interaction of ordinary differential equations, such as in power
system and biological networks. Labeled transition systems are used for mod-
eling discrete communications and updates, such as in sampled data-based
control systems. Finally, Markov chains are used for describing distributed
cyber-physical systems that rely on randomized algorithms for communica-
tion, such as in a crowd-sourced traffic monitoring and routing system. De-
spite the differences in these formalisms, any model of a CPS can be viewed
as a mapping from a parameter space (for example, the set of initial states) to
a space of behaviors (also called trajectories or executions). In each formal-
ism, we define a notion of sensitivity that captures the change in trajectories
as a function of the change in the parameters. We develop approaches for
approximating these sensitivity functions, which in turn are used for analysis
of invariance and privacy.
For proving invariance, we compute an over-approximation of reach set,
which is the set of states visited by any trajectory. We introduce a notion of
input-to-state (IS) discrepancy functions for components of large CPS, which
roughly captures the sensitivity of the component to its initial state and
input. We develop a method for constructing a reduced model of the entire
system using the IS discrepancy functions. Then, we show that the trajectory
of the reduced model over-approximates the sensitivity of the entire system
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with respect to the initial states. Using the above results we develop a sound
and relatively complete algorithm for compositional invariant verification.
In systems where distributed components take actions concurrently, there
is a combinatorial explosion in the number of different action sequences (or
traces). We develop a partial order reduction method for computing the reach
set for these systems. Our approach uses the observation that some action
pairs are approximately independent, such that executing these actions in any
order results in states that are close to each other. Hence a (large) set of
traces can be partitioned into a (small) set of equivalent classes, where equiv-
alent traces are derived through swapping approximately independent action
pairs. We quantify the sensitivity of the system with respect to swapping
approximately independent action pairs, which upper-bounds the distance
between executions with equivalent traces. Finally, we develop an algorithm
for precisely over-approximating the reach set of these systems that only
explore a reduced set of traces.
In many modern systems that allow users to share data, there exists a
tension between improving the global performance and compromising user
privacy. We propose a mechanism that guarantees ε-differential privacy for
the participants, where each participant adds noise to its private data before
sharing. The distributions of noise are specified by the sensitivity of the
trajectory of agents to the private data. We analyze the trade-off between
ε-differential privacy and performance, and show that the cost of differential
privacy scales quadratically to the privacy level.
The thesis illustrates that quantitative bounds on sensitivity can be used
for effective reachability analysis, partial order reduction, and in the design
of privacy preserving distributed cyber-physical systems.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In modern engineering systems, computers interacting with physical pro-
cesses have become commonplace. Many of these cyber-physical systems
(CPS) consist of distributed components that send physical or cyber sig-
nals to each other through a network. It is natural to view these systems as
networks of nodes and edges, where the nodes stand for computing units and
the edges are communication channels (see Figure 1.1). The evolution of the
state of a node over time is influenced by the states of its neighboring nodes.
Examples of such systems are abundant in automotive control systems,
embedded medical devices, and in building control systems. For instance,
a power network may be composed of nodes of generators, buses and loads.
The state of each node captures local quantities such as phase angle, voltage
and power consumption [1]. The evolution of these quantities is governed
by the power-flow equations. Another example is a distributed air-traffic
control system where each aircraft can be viewed as a node and the edges
model pairwise communication channels [2]. The states of an aircraft capture
its quantities such as position, velocity, attitude, which evolve according to
aerodynamic and flight control protocols. The design of these systems should
provide a high level of reliability as failures can cause huge financial, envi-
ronmental and social losses. An important research challenge is to develop
design and verification techniques for checking whether or not a given system
meets certain desirable requirements. The properties of CPS we study in this
thesis fall into the following broad categories.
Invariance. Invariance properties of the system are those that remain valid
all the time. Roughly, these properties capture the notion that nothing “bad”
can ever happen. For example, in the air traffic control system, aircraft
should never violate the minimum separation requirements [3]. In a smart
grid, the voltage should not exceed the design threshold [4]. Many safety
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Figure 1.1: A network view of a cyber-physical system. The nodes are
computing or physical components. Each node Ai has a state xi that
evolves overtime governed by difference equations or ordinary differential
equations (ODE). An edge from node Ai to Aj indicates the state of xi
affects the dynamics of Aj and vice versa.
specifications of CPS are expressed as invariance properties.
Security & Privacy. Security and privacy cover a broad range of concerns
for CPS. Roughly, a secure and private system should be able to protect
information from unauthorized access, use, modification, inspection, record-
ing, and destruction. One well-known security incident is the Stuxnet worm,
which targeted industrial software used to control nuclear fuel processing
plants [5]. The worm ultimately sabotaged and destroyed an Iranian facility
by introducing malicious control inputs to actuators controlling uranium cen-
trifuges. Other threats include violation of access rights [6], denial of service
attacks [7], and de-anonymization [8]. In this thesis, we focus on privacy of
users participating in a distributed system such as the navigation applica-
tions provided by Google maps and Waze [9]. In these systems, users share
data (such as location) for better system-level performance (such as routing
delay), but at the risk of compromising their privacy. The system is private
if adversaries cannot infer the user’s private data with high confidence, even
with access to the communication of the system.
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1.1 Formalisms
Cyber-physical systems can exhibit a broad range of behaviors due to the rich
interactions between computers and physical environments. Several mathe-
matical modeling frameworks for CPS have been proposed, such as hybrid
automata [10, 11, 12], hybrid Petri nets [13, 14], switched systems [15], differ-
ential dynamic logics [16], hybrid dynamical systems [17] and hybrid process
algebra [18]. In this thesis, we employ three formalisms that capture different
salient aspects of CPS.
Networked Dynamical System (NDS) is a formalism where each node
evolves according to ordinary differential equations (ODE) and an edge indi-
cates that the linked nodes communicate with each other. The communica-
tion between nodes may experience time delays. A trajectory (or execution)
of a networked dynamical system ξθ is the solution of the delayed differ-
ential equation with a given initial state θ. It is natural to model a large
class of CPS as networked dynamical systems such as power grid [19], swarm
robots [20], and embedded medical devices [21].
Labeled Transition System (LTS) is a standard state-machine model for
computer programs [22, 23, 24]. The nodes take actions to communicate with
each other and to update the local and shared states of the system. In our
formalism, the nodes may nondeterministically choose actions to be taken.
An execution of LTS ξτ is a sequence of states which are visited consecutively
by taking a sequence of actions τ .
Markov Chain (MC) is a formalism where each transition is chosen ac-
cording to a probability distribution. The Markov chain is a natural formal-
ism to capture stochasticity in CPS arising from diverse sources such as noise,
disturbance, stochastic dynamics and the coin-flip of algorithms. Specifically,
we use Markov chains to model a class of distributed control systems, where
participating agents cooperate to achieve local and global objectives.
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1.2 Sensitivity Analysis
As mentioned in Section 1.1, we use different formalisms to capture salient
features of different classes of cyber-physical systems. Any model in one of
these formalisms can be viewed in the following abstract way. Roughly, a
model specifies a mapping from a parameter domain to a space of trajectories
(or executions). The parameter domain may correspond to a set of initial
states, design choices, external inputs, or user data. Let ξd(t) be a trajectory
that is specified by some parameter value d. Roughly, the sensitivity of the
system captures the change in the trajectories as a function of the change in
the parameter, that is |ξd(t)−ξd′(t)|. For models with linear dynamics which
have analytical solutions, sensitivity can be derived by directly comparing
trajectories. For systems with nonlinear dynamics where explicit solutions
are generally absent, sensitivity can be estimated by statistical testing [25]
or numerical simulation [26].
In this thesis, we develop techniques to prove invariance and privacy prop-
erties of CPS, which both rely on computing bounds on the sensitivity of
the models in question. We compute the bounds of sensitivity with respect
to different parameters, and use them in two ways. In invariant verifica-
tion, we compute the sensitivity with respect to initial states and action
sequences. Our verification techniques involve generalizing a single trajec-
tory to over-approximate a set of trajectories with similar initial states and
action sequences. The bounds on the sensitivity determines how much gener-
alization is provably sufficient. In contrast, for designing differentially private
distributed systems, we compute the sensitivity with respect to the sensitive
data of agents participating in the system. A differentially private mech-
anism ensures that adversaries with access to the messages in a network
cannot infer the private data of individuals, such as initial state or control
objectives, with high level of confidence. The design of a differentially private
mechanism relies on adding noise to obscure the difference in the individuals’
trajectories when any agent changes its private data. Hence, the distribution
of noise depends on the sensitivity of agents’ trajectory to the private data.
We will summarize these approaches in the remainder of this introduction.
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1.3 Invariant Verification with Input-to-State
Discrepancy
The continuous evolution of states of CPS is usually modeled by ordinary
differential equations (ODE). A trajectory of the model is specified by its
initial state. Several recently developed approaches for invariant verification
of these systems with nonlinear ODEs combine numerical simulations with
static analysis to over-approximate the infinite number of behaviors of the
system [27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. The common idea of these approaches is as follows.
For a single initial state x, let ξx be the numerically computed trajectory from
x for a bounded time. Based on the continuous dependence of ξx on x, we
know that all the trajectories from neighboring initial states will be close to
ξx. With sensitivity analysis of the trajectories to the initial state, we get
quantitative bounds on the distance between neighboring trajectories. This
enables us to compute a tube around ξx, that contains all possible trajectories
from the neighborhood of x. By repeating this process for different initial
states, all reachable states from an initial set can be over-approximated and
the invariance properties can be verified.
Generalizing several of these properties, in [29] the authors introduced
the notion of discrepancy function as a continuous function (of the distance
between initial states and time) characterizing the convergence or divergence
rates of trajectories. It was shown that if a nonlinear, switched, or hybrid
system model is annotated with appropriate discrepancy function(s) then the
above approach of combining simulations and generalizations gives a sound
and relatively complete algorithm for verifying bounded time invariants.
A challenge for these methods is to come up with a discrepancy function,
which becomes increasingly difficult for larger models in which many compo-
nents interact [32, 30, 31]. In this thesis, we address this problem by propos-
ing a compositional approach for automatically computing discrepancy for
CPS. Consider a network A consisting of several interacting subsystems or
modules A1, . . . ,AN . Our solution has several parts. First, we introduce a
new type of input-to-state (IS) discrepancy function for the subsystems. An
IS discrepancy for Ai gives a bound on the distance between two trajectories
as a function of (a) their initial states and (b) the inputs they experience.
For any positive parameter δ > 0, using IS discrepancy of the modules we
syntactically construct a reduced N -dimensional reduced system M(δ). We
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show that the trajectory of M(δ) upper-bounds the distance of trajectories
of A with initial states from a δ-ball. Moreover, by choosing appropriately
small δ, the over-approximation computed by the above method can be made
arbitrarily precise, modulo the precision of the numerical simulation.
Using the above results we develop an algorithm for bounded robust in-
variant verification for cyber-physical system models that iteratively refines
initial set partitions (Algorithm 3.1). We show that the algorithm is sound
and is guaranteed to terminate whenever the model is robustly safe or unsafe
with respect to a given unsafe set. With a prototype implementation of this
algorithm, we verify invariance properties for models with both linear and
nonlinear dynamics [31, 33, 30]. Among these case studies are challenging
pacemaker-heart models, where a pacemaker is regulating a group of cardiac
cells [31]. Our implementation verifies such network with up to 8 cells and
32 continuous variables in a couple minutes.
1.4 Invariant Verification with Partial Order Reduction
The discrete behaviors of CPS are naturally modeled as transitions. For
models with discrete transitions, an execution depends on the sequence of
transitions it experiences. Hence, computing reach sets involves checking all
possible transition sequences. In concurrent models, the transitions taken
by different nodes (or processes) can be executed in different orders, which
leads to a combinatorial explosion in the interleaving of possible transition
sequences. Checking all these transition sequences explicitly is potentially
very expensive. In Chapter 4, we use a discrete formalism of cyber-physical
systems, namely labeled transition systems, to develop a theory of approxi-
mate partial order reduction for cyber-physical systems.
Partial order reduction was introduced in the context of model checking
to reduce the number of executions that needed to be checked [34, 35]. It
exploits the observation that some actions (or labels) can be executed in
arbitrary order without affecting the result. Precisely, two actions a and b are
independent if the resulting state would be the same regardless of the order in
which a and b are executed. With the independence relation, any set of action
sequences can be partitioned into a reduced set of equivalence classes, where
equivalent action sequences can be made identical by swapping consecutive
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independent actions. Many invariance properties have been shown to be
indifferent to equivalent action sequences. Hence, checking invariance for a
single execution suffices to infer it for all executions with equivalent action
sequences.
In the context of CPS, components often interact with a shared environ-
ment in the presence of noise and disturbances. Independent action pairs in
the conventional sense are rare, since those action pairs which lead to nearly
but not exactly identical states are ignored. Our work addresses this prob-
lem by connecting the existing partial order reduction methods with metrics.
First, we introduce the notion of ε-independent actions with a parameter ε
chosen by the user: two actions a and b are ε-independent if the resulting
states would be within ε distance regardless of the order in which they are
executed. Similar to the conventional POR techniques, the approximate in-
dependence relation defines an equivalence relation of action sequences. Ex-
ecutions that follow equivalent action sequences reach not exactly but nearly
the same final states. We present an algorithm to compute the upper bound
on the distance between these executions. With this result, from a single
execution, we can over-approximate the set of reachable states of executions
following a class of equivalent action sequences. In addition, we show that
by choosing small enough ε, the over-approximation can be made arbitrar-
ily precise. Our approach potentially leads to an exponential reduction in
complexity of the reach set over-approximation.
1.5 Differential Privacy for Distributed Control
Systems
In many CPS, data about the individual participating agents can help achieve
better system-level performance, but each individual’s private data must be
protected. Consider, for example, in a crowd-sourced traffic estimation and
routing application as provided by Google maps and Waze [36, 9, 37, 38]. By
explicitly exchanging information about their states, the agents could achieve
better performance (routing delay), but by sharing exact information about
their states they may give away too much information about their private
data, such as their initial position and desired path. Examples include peak
generation scheduling using consumption data obtained from smart electric
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meters [39] and data aggregation for a sensor network [40, 41].
The sensitive data of agents in a cyber-physical system can be their initial
states, final states or desirable trajectories. For a sensitive data set D, ξD de-
notes the corresponding trajectory of an individual agent. Although sharing
the exact trajectory ξD throughout the network with other agents improves
overall performance, it may leak the sensitive data of agents. One common
approach for private state sharing is for each agent to add noise drawn from
some carefully chosen distribution before sending. The effectiveness of such
an approach can be measured by the concept of ε-differential privacy that
developed in the study of databases [42, 43, 44, 45] and later extended to
dynamical systems [46, 47]. Roughly, ε-differential privacy ensures that the
probability distribution of the observation does not change substantially with
the change in the sensitive data corresponding to one agent. To ensure a cer-
tain privacy level ε, the noise distribution must depend on the sensitivity of
the trajectory ξD on the sensitive data D.
When noise is introduced to the system, the quality of communication de-
teriorates, influencing the performance of the system. In this thesis, we study
the trade-off between ε-differential privacy and performance, in the context
of discrete-time cyber-physical systems. Here, we measure the performance
of the system with the mean square distance between the actual trajectory
of an agent to its desired trajectory. For the discrete-time linear distributed
control systems, we establish the trade-off between ε-differential privacy and
the performance of the system. Specifically, the cost of privacy, namely the
increase in the mean square error of the trajectories of an agent from its
preference, up to T messages for a system with N agents is O( T
3
Nε2
) for stable
systems and can also grow exponentially with T for unstable systems.
1.6 Overview of the Thesis
The techniques developed during the course of this PhD research have led to
three main contributions to the analysis of cyber-physical systems.
(i) In Chapter 3, we propose an algorithm for verifying invariance of net-
worked dynamical systems with communication delays. We introduce
a notion of input-to-state (IS) discrepancy functions for components of
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networks and a method for constructing a reduced model M of a net-
worked dynamical system A using the IS discrepancy. Then, we show
that the trajectory of the reduced model M upper-bounds the distance
between trajectories of A with initial states close to each other. More-
over, the error can be made arbitrarily small modulo the precision of
numerical simulation. Using the above results we develop an algorithm
for bounded invariant verification of nonlinear networked dynamical
systems that iteratively refines initial set partitions. We show that the
algorithm is sound and complete for robust invariant verification.
(ii) In Chapter 4, we develop a partial order reduction method for infi-
nite state labeled transition systems. We introduce the notion of ε-
independent actions such that executing these actions in any order re-
sults in states that are close to each other. Then we define ε-equivalent
action sequences that swap ε-independent action pairs. We present
an algorithm to over-approximate reach sets of executions that take
ε-equivalent action sequences. We are also able to show that the over-
approximation can be computed up to arbitrary precision.
(iii) In Chapter 5, we propose a noise-adding mechanism that guarantees ε-
differential privacy for discrete-time networked cyber-physical systems.
Each agent masks its data with Laplace noise before sharing it with
others for a better system-level control. The distributions of noise are
specified by the sensitivity of the trajectory of agents to the sensitive
data. We analyze the trade-off between ε-differential privacy and per-
formance for linear cyber-physical systems. We show that the cost of
ε-differential privacy is proportional to the cubic of time horizon and is
inversely proportional to the number of participants and the square of
the privacy level.
Reading this thesis. Chapters 3 to 5 are parallel but all rely on the basic
definitions of Chapter 2. Each technical chapter has specific related work
(Sections 3.2, 4.2 and 5.2) and model formalism (Sections 3.3, 4.3 and 5.3).
Therefore the three technical chapters can be read independently.
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Chapter 2
PRELIMINARIES
Many networked cyber-physical systems (NCPS) exhibit both continuous and
discrete behaviors due to the complicated interactions between the comput-
ing units and the physical environment. In this thesis, we use several math-
ematical models with emphasis on different aspects of NCPS. In Chapter 3
we study networked dynamical systems, where the states evolve continuously
over a period of time governed by ordinary differential equations. In Chap-
ters 4 and 5, we introduce models of transition systems, where the states
change instantaneously due to discrete transitions. Despite their distinctive
syntaxes, these models share a common nature. Roughly, each of the models
has a parameter domain, whose precise definition may vary across contexts,
such as initial states, disturbances, action sequence, inputs, or control objec-
tives. Given the value of its parameters, a model specifies a trajectory. In
this chapter, we will introduce the notions used throughout the thesis.
2.1 Set, Metrics and Functions
For a natural number n ∈ N, [n] is the set of natural numbers {0, 1, . . . , n−1}.
For p ∈ [1,∞) ∪ {∞} and any x ∈ Rn, |x|p is the standard `p norm of x.
For a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, |A|p denotes the induced p norm of A, that is,
|A|p ∆= sup
|x|p=1
|Ax|p. Without a subscript, |x| and |A| can be viewed as |x|p
and |A|p for arbitrary choice of the constant p ∈ [1,∞].
For a vector x ∈ Rn and r ≥ 0, Br(x) ∆= {y ∈ Rn | |x − y| ≤ r} is an r-
neighborhood of x. For a set S ⊆ Rn, the expansion of S is Br(S) ∆= ∪
x∈S
Br(x).
For any i ∈ [n], xi stands for the ith component of the vector x. For a
compact set S ⊆ Rn and a δ > 0, a δ-cover is a set of points C ⊆ S where
the δ-neighborhood of C covers S, that is Bδ(C) = ∪x∈CBδ(x) ⊇ S.
For any function f we denote the domain and the range of f by dom(f) and
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range(f ). For any function f and a subset set of its domain S ⊆ dom(f), we
write the restriction of f to S as f d S : S → range(f ) such that (f d S)(x) =
f(x) for any x ∈ S. For a function f whose range is a set of functions, we
write f ↓ S such that for each x ∈ dom(f), f ↓ S(x) = f(x) d S.
For f, g : S → Rn with the same domain, we define f + g : S → Rn such
that (f+g)(x)
∆
= f(x)+g(x). Similarly, we define (f−g)(x) ∆= f(x)+g(x) and
max{f, g}(x) ∆= max{f(x), g(x)} similarly. For two functions f, g such that
dom(f) ⊇ range(g), the composition of f and g is f ◦g : dom(g)→ range(f )
such that f ◦ g(x) = f(g(x)). We write fg = f ◦ g for brevity. For any n ∈ N,
for any function f maps from a domain to itself, that is dom(f) ⊆ range(f ),
we define its nested form fn as ff n−1 for n ≥ 1 and f 0 being the identity
mapping.
A function f : Rn → Rm is smooth if all its higher derivatives exist. It is
said to be Lipschitz if there exists L > 0 such that |f(x)− f(y)| ≤ L|x− y|
for all x, y ∈ Rn. A function f : R≥0 → R≥0 belongs to class K, denoted
f ∈ K, if f(0) = 0 and f is strictly increasing. A class K function f belongs
to class K∞ if f(x) → ∞ as x → ∞. A function f : R≥0 × R≥0 → R≥0
belongs to class KL if (i) for any y ∈ R≥0, f(x, y) belongs to class K with
respect to argument x, and (ii) for any x ∈ R≥0, f(x, y)→ 0 as y →∞.
2.2 Time and Variables
We will use the notations from the hybrid input/uutput automaton (HIOA)
framework for modeling networked cyber-physical systems [11, 12]. A time
domain is a set T ∈ {R≥0,N}, where R≥0 is the continuous time domain and
N is the discrete time domain. Fixed any time domain T, an element of the
time domain t ∈ T is a time point. A time interval K ⊆ T is a subset of the
time domain if for any time points t, t′ ∈ K, any time point lies between t
and t′ is also included in K. A time interval K is left-closed (right-closed) if
it contains a minimum element (maximum element).
A variable is a name used to identify state components of a system and
communication channels between components. Each variable v is associated
with a type, type(v), which is the set of values v can take. A valuation
for a set of variables V , maps each v ∈ V with a value in type(v). For a
set of variables V , Val(V ) denotes the set of all possible valuations of V .
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Valuations are denoted by v,x,x′, etc. A variable v is real-valued if Val(v) is
an uncountable set of real numbers. A variable v is finite-valued if Val(v) is
a finite set. For a valuation v of V , the restriction of v to a set of variables
X ⊆ V is denoted by v.X ∆= v d X.
For a finite set of real-valued variables V with finite size |V | = n, a valu-
ation v can be viewed as a vector in Rn. Formally, an ordering of the set V
is a bijection O : V → [n] that specify each variable to an index. Fixing an
arbitrary ordering, a valuation v can be vectorized as a vector x ∈ Rn, such
that for any component i ∈ [n], xi is specified by the valuation of variable
with index i, that is xi = v(O
−1(i)). We write vec(v) = x if the ordering is
clear from the context. Using any vectorization, we translate the metric on
Rn to the space Val(V ), such that for any pair of valuations v,v′, the metric
|v−v′| ∆= |vec(v)− vec(v′)|. For r ≥ 0, Br(v) ∆= {v′ ∈ Val(V ) | |v−v′| ≤ r}
is the closed neighborhood with radius r centered at v. The notions of con-
tinuity, differentiability, and integration are lifted to functions defined over
sets of valuations in the usual way. For a variable v, the dynamic type of v,
dtype(v), is a set of functions from left-closed intervals of its time domain
K ⊆ T to type(v). Roughly, the dynamic type of a variable specifies how its
value can change overtime.
Example 2.1 (Variables). NCPS involves interaction between computing
systems and physical environment, hence models of these systems may have
variables with different static and dynamic types. In this thesis, we study
both real-valued and finite-valued variables evolving in both continuous and
discrete time domains. The real-valued continuous-time variables are useful
for modeling the evolution of physical quantities such as temperature, volt-
age, velocity, etc. On the other hand, variables of software usually update
in a discrete fashion. These variables can either be real-valued, such as the
measurements of physical quantities, or be finite-valued, such as timers.
2.3 Trajectories
Consider a set of variables V where each variable v ∈ V has an identical
time domain time(v) = T. A trajectory for a set of variables V describes
the evolution of the values of the variables over a time interval. Precisely,
a trajectory ξ of V is a function ξ : K → Val(V ), where K is a left-closed
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Figure 2.1: Example of trajectories of continuous-time variables. ξ1 in red
is a trajectory of real-valued continuous-time variables. ξ2 in blue is a
trajectory of finite-valued continuous-time variable.
interval of T with left endpoint equal to 0. For a subset of variables S ∈ V ,
ξ ↓ S : dom(ξ)→ Val(S) is a projection of the trajectory on variables S. We
say that a trajectory ξ is finite if dom(ξ) is upper bounded, closed if dom(ξ)
is (finite) right-closed. If ξ is finite, its limit time is the supremum of dom(ξ),
denoted as ξ. ltime. We write the first state as ξ. fstate = ξ(0). Also if ξ is
closed, we write the last state as ξ. lstate = ξ(ξ. ltime). For any d ∈ T and
any trajectory ξ, a trajectory ξ′ is the d-delayed trajectory of ξ if ξ′(t) = ξ(0)
for any t ≤ d, and ξ′(t) = ξ(t− d) for t− d ∈ dom(ξ). For brevity, we write
ξ′(t) = ξ(t− d) for all t ∈ dom(ξ′).
Example 2.2 (Trajectories). As we discussed in Example 2.1, we consider
four kinds of variables in this thesis. The variables associated with discrete-
time domain N update in steps. Trajectories of these variables can be seen
as sequences of valuations ξ = x0,x1, . . . ,xT . In contrast, continuos-time
variables evolve continuously in time. We present example trajectories of
continuous-time variables in Figure 2.1. ξ1 is a trajectory of a real-valued
continuous-time variable, which is piecewise continuous. In contrast, a tra-
jectory of a finite-valued continuous-time variable, ξ2, is piecewise constant.
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2.4 Measure and Product Measure
In Chapter 5, we will discuss privacy of CPS based on a probabilistic model.
The formulation and analysis of this problem involves measure theory. For
a set S, a σ-algebra on S is a collection of subsets F ⊆ 2S, such that (i)
F contains the empty set ∅ ∈ F , (ii) F is closed under complement and
countable union. The pair 〈S,F〉 is a measurable space. Any element A ∈ F
in the σ-algebra is a measurable set. A function µ : F → R≥0 is a measure
on the measurable space 〈S,F〉 if (i) the measure of empty set is 0, i.e.
µ(∅) = 0, and (ii) µ is countably additive, such that for any collections
{Ai}∞i=0 of pairwise disjoint sets in F , µ(∪∞i=0Ai) =
∑∞
i=0 µ(Ai). A measure
µ is a probability measure if µ(S) = 1. For a pair of measurable space
〈S,F〉 and 〈T,G〉, a function f : S → T is measurable if the pre-image of
any measurable set G ∈ G is measurable. That is, for any G ∈ G, the set
f−1(G) = {x ∈ S | f(x) ∈ G} is in F .
For a pair of measurable spaces M1 = 〈S1,F1〉 and M2 = 〈S2,F2〉, M =
M1 ×M2 = 〈S,F〉 is the product measurable space if (i) S = S1 × S2 is the
Cartesian product, and (ii) F is the complement and countable union closure
of F1×F2. Suppose measurable spaces M1 and M2 are respectively equipped
with measures µ1 and µ2. The product measure µ1 × µ2 is a measure on the
space M1×M2, where for any A ∈ F , µ1×µ2(A) =
∫
S2
µ1(A(y))dµ2(y) with
A(y) = {x ∈ S1 | (x, y) ∈ A}. We write µn as the product of n number of µ.
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Chapter 3
VERIFYING INVARIANCE WITH
INPUT-TO-STATE DISCREPANCY
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are becoming commonplace in safety-critical
applications. Many of these CPSs have geographically or computationally
distributed components, and the communication between components may
experience delays, which arise from transmission, processing, and buffering.
In this chapter, we model these distributed cyber-physical systems (DCPS)
as networked dynamical systems, where the states of the nodes evolve contin-
uously as solutions of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). To aid in the
design and development of such systems, we present algorithmic technique to
verify invariance for networked dynamical systems in this chapter. A stan-
dard method for invariant verification involves computing the set of states
visited by the trajectories (also called the reach set) of the system and check-
ing whether the reach set satisfies the invariance. The problem of computing
reach sets for a dynamical system is challenging because the initial set of
these systems can be uncountable. Hence the number of trajectories is also
uncountable, which makes explicit examination of all trajectories intractable.
Recently, several research groups developed simulation-based approaches
to attain reach set over-approximation and invariant verification of dynam-
ical systems [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 48]. Roughly, a simulation-based algorithm
computes the reach set of a dynamical system following several steps, as
illustrated in Figure 3.1. First, the algorithm computes a finite cover of
the initial set, each with a representative initial state. Then, for each cover
S, the trajectory from the representative initial state θ is numerically sim-
ulated, namely ξθ. Based on the continuous dependence of trajectories to
initial state, we know that all trajectories starting from the neighborhood of
θ are close to ξθ. With sensitivity analysis of the trajectories to the initial
state, we get quantitative bounds on the distance between trajectories from
the cover S and ξθ. This enables us to compute a tube around ξθ, that con-
tains all trajectories from the cover S. Repeating this process for all covers,
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Figure 3.1: Simulation-based reach set over-approximation.
we can over-approximate the reach set of the dynamical system.
The precision or the conservativeness of this bound impacts the quality of
the over-approximation. Ttherefore, the performance of verification with the
above strategy. For example, the Lipschitz constant of the dynamic func-
tion f gives a bound on the distance between the neighboring trajectories
that grows exponentially with time. Although checking Lipschitz continuity
is generally undecidable, for certain classes of functions Lipschitz constants
can be inferred from elementary functions [49]. Stronger notions like sensi-
tivity [27], incremental Lyapunov functions [50], and contraction metrics [51]
are used to obtain more practically useful bounds. In [29, 52], the authors
generalized the above notions to a concept of discrepancy functions, which
upper-bound the distance between trajectories using the distance between
their initial states.
3.1 Invariant Verification with IS Discrepancy
Functions
Central to simulation-based verification methods are the techniques for com-
puting discrepancy functions (or for that matter, sensitivity, contraction
metrics and incremental Lyapunov functions). However, there is no gen-
eral method for finding discrepancy functions statically from the syntactic
description of a dynamical system. One typically assumes a template poly-
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nomial for the candidate function and then solves an optimization problem
to find the coefficients. Recently in [48], the authors presented an on-the-fly
approach for computing a version of locally valid discrepancy function, which
only uses Lipschitz constants and Jacobian matrices.
However, both the static and the on-the-fly methods for computing discrep-
ancy functions face several challenges in verifying networked dynamical sys-
tems. First, finding these discrepancy functions becomes increasingly difficult
for larger networked dynamical systems in which many components interact.
For example, the standard static approaches assume a template polynomial
and solve for the coefficients. However the number of coefficients to solve can
grow exponentially with the number of variables [32]. Same problem exists
in the on-the-fly approach [48], which requires computing eigenvalues of Ja-
cobian matrices. In practice, eigenvalues becomes harder to compute as the
dimension of Jacobian increases. Second, none of the techniques we discussed
above can be directly applied to networks with signal delays, while delays
are pervasive due to message passing, buffering and computation. Last, in
designing networked dynamical systems, one often encounters networks that
have the same components but are interconnected in different topologies.
The existing methods can merely compute discrepancy functions for these
homogenous networks independently without utilizing their similarities.
In this chapter, we address these challenges by introducing a new com-
positional method for bounding distance between trajectories from initial
states that are close to each other. We propose the notion of input-to-state
discrepancy function (IS discrepancy function) for the components of the net-
work. Consider a networked dynamical system A composed with N nodes
{Ai}i∈[N ]. Roughly, an IS discrepancy function (Definition 3.4) for a compo-
nent Ai gives a bound on the distance between two trajectories of Ai as a
function of (a) their initial states and (b) the inputs they experience.
Using IS discrepancy of the modules we syntactically construct a reduced
N -dimensional dynamical system M(δ), where the parameter δ defines the
initial state of M . If the interconnections in the original network A has de-
lays then so do the interconnections in the reduced network. We show that
M(δ) has a unique trajectory µ, which gives the discrepancy of the original
network A. Precisely, µ upper-bounds the distance between any pair of tra-
jectories ξx and ξ
′
x of network A, where the initial states x and x′ are within
δ distance (Theorem 3.7). Thus, by simulating A and (the smaller) M(δ)
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we can compute the bounded-time reach set over-approximations of A. We
also show that by choosing appropriately small δ’s the over-approximations
computed by the above method can be made arbitrarily precise; modulo the
precision of the numerical simulations (Theorem 3.10).
Using the above results we develop an algorithm for bounded safety ver-
ification of nonlinear dynamical systems that iteratively refines initial set
partitions (Algorithm 3.1). We show that the algorithm is sound and is
guaranteed to terminate whenever the model is robustly safe or unsafe with
respect to a given unsafe set. Our experiments with a prototype implementa-
tion of the algorithm show that the approach achieves best performance when
verifying networks of stable modules with light inter-modular couplings.
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. First in Section 3.2 we
discuss related works. In Section 3.3, we formally introduce the model of
networked dynamical systems. We present the definition of the IS discrep-
ancy function in Section 3.4 and the construction of a reduced model with
IS discrepancy functions in Section 3.5. We develop an algorithm to com-
pute reach set over-approximation with the reduced model in Section 3.6.
The algorithm is then applied to verify invariance for linear and nonlinear
networked dynamical system models in Section 3.7.
3.2 Related Works
Invariant verification of cyber-physical systems has been actively studied in
the past two decades [53, 54, 11]. A most commonly used approach for verify-
ing invariance is through computing reach sets. Since the problem of comput-
ing precise reach sets of dynamical system is in general undecidable [55], many
researchers shift to techniques for over-approximating reach sets. Reach sets
of a nonlinear system can be over-approximated using abstractions, which
are interpretations of the original system with more behaviors and simpler
dynamics [56, 57, 58]. Examples of these abstractions include discrete tran-
sition systems [57] and multi-affine systems [56]. If an abstraction satisfies
the invariant, so does the original model. However, one cannot conclude the
inverse if the abstraction violates the invariant. To resolve that, counter-
example-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) procedure [58] is adopted
to construct finer abstractions. Although this technique has been successful
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in many invariant verification case studies, it suffers from the curse of dimen-
sionality as constructing abstractions often involves state space partitioning.
Simulation-based verification techniques over-approximate the reach set of
dynamical and hybrid systems using numerically simulated behaviors [59, 27,
29]. Finitely many simulations alone cannot prove the invariance property.
With sensitivity analysis, a single trajectory can embody trajectories with
neighboring initial states [27, 60]. This idea is then generalized to the notion
of discrepancy between trajectories, which enables a sound and relatively
complete invariant verification algorithm [29, 52, 48].
In [48], the authors developed an on-the-fly approach for computing a
local version of discrepancy that uses only the Lipschitz constants and stati-
cally computed Jacobian matrices. The approach requires estimating upper
bounds on the eigenvalue of the symbolically computed Jacobian of the whole
system. However, in this chapter, we focus on a compositional approach for
computing discrepancy function for networked systems. Our approach can
be combined with the on-the-fly computation for computing a local version
of IS discrepancy that uses only the Lipschitz constants and the Jacobian
matrices of the modules [61].
There has been recent work on verification of delayed differential equations
(see, for example, [62] and the references therein). The algorithm in [62] it-
eratively computes validated simulations of delayed differential equations as
sequences of Taylor over-approximations of time intervals, and verifies safety
property using SMT solvers. Part of its technique can be used in our ap-
proach as a mean for computing validated numerical simulations for delayed
differential equations. Our approach, in addition, involves systematically
generating numerical simulations to refine reach sets and dynamically rea-
soning about sensitivity of interconnecting networks.
3.3 Networked Dynamical System Models
Networked dynamical systems are built-up by composing smaller component
models. In this section, we define component models and the composition
operation. The composition operation we use can model the communication
delay between components.
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3.3.1 Dynamical System Modules
The dynamical system module is the building block for networked dynamical
systems. A dynamical system module is specified by a collection of ordinary
differential equations (ODEs), possibly with inputs, and a set of initial states.
For reducing notational overhead, we identify output variables with state
variables in this chapter but our results can be extended to systems where
outputs are distinct in a straightforward manner.
Definition 3.1. A dynamical module A is a tuple 〈X,U,Θ, f〉 where
(i) X is a set of variables called the state variables; valuations of X are
called states;
(ii) U is a set of variables called the input variables that are distinct from
the state variables;
(iii) Θ ⊆ Val(X) is a compact set of initial states;
(iv) f : R≥0×Val(X)×Val(U)→ Val(X) is called the dynamic mapping. In
addition, f is continuous in the first argument and Lipschitz continuous
with respect to the other two arguments.
As we discussed in Chapter 2, valuations of the state variables x ∈ Val(X)
and the input variables u ∈ Val(U) can be seen respectively as vectors in R|X|
and R|U |. The space of input signal (U) is the set of all continuous trajectories
of the input variables U . Fixing any input signal η ∈ U and any initial state
θ ∈ Θ, a trajectory of A is uniquely specified of A is ξθ,η : R≥0 → Val(X)
such that (i) ξ(0) = θ, and (ii) for any t ∈ R≥0, the derivative of ξ satisfies
the differential equation
ξ˙(t) = f(t, ξ(t), η(t)). (3.1)
As in Equation (3.1), we will suppress the subscripts of ξ when the depen-
dence on the initial state and the input trajectory are clear from context.
Safety verification problems commonly involve computing the set of trajec-
tories up to some bounded time T > 0. The (global) Lipschitz assumption of
the dynamic mapping f and the piecewise continuity of η guarantee that the
differential Equation (3.1) admits a unique global solution for interval [0, T ]
with any time bound T > 0 and any initial state θ ∈ Val(X). In case the
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trajectories of the system are confined to an invariant set S ⊆ Val(X), the
results in this chapter would hold for a locally Lipschitz continuous f with
L as the Lipschitz constant over S.
A module A without inputs (U = ∅) is said to be closed; otherwise, A is
open. The set of all trajectories of A with respect to a set of initial states
Θ′ ⊆ Θ and a set of input signals U ′ ⊆ U is denoted by T raj(A,Θ′,U ′). We
will drop the argument U ′ for closed modules. The components of modules
A and Ai are denoted by XA, UA,ΘA, fA and Xi, Ui,Θi, fi, respectively.
Example 3.1 (FHN). The FitzHugh-Nagumo (FHN) model [63] is a generic
model for excitable media and can be applied to cardiac cells. The model
has two state variables X = {x, v}, where x models the membrane voltage
of a cardiac cell and v is an internal variable. Initially, the variables x, v take
values in the ranges [1.4, 1.6] and [0, 0.2], respectively. The input variables
for an FHN model are U = {u1, u2, u3}, where u1 and u2 model the voltages
of two neighboring cells and u3 models the input pulse form a pacemaker.
The dynamic of the model is:
x˙ = −x3 + 1.1x2 − 0.12x− v + 0.01u1 + 0.01u2 + u3
v˙ = 0.005x− 0.01v.
(3.2)
Next, for a closed module A we define reachable states and safety. A state
x ∈ Val(X) is T -reachable if there exists a trajectory ξ ∈ T raj(A,Θ) and a
time t ≤ T such that the trajectory ξ(t) = x. The set of T -reachable states
is denoted by ReachA(Θ, [0, T ])
∆
= {ξ(t) | t ≤ T, ξ ∈ T raj(A,Θ)}.
Definition 3.2. For  ≥ 0 and time T ≥ 0, and an open unsafe set Unsafe ⊆
Val(X), A is -robustly safe up to T if B(ReachA(Θ, [0, T ])) ∩ Unsafe = ∅.
If there exists some  > 0 for which this condition holds, then A is robustly
safe up to T with respect to Unsafe.
3.3.2 Networked Dynamical Systems with Delays
Formally, the composition operation takes a collection of modules and defines
a new dynamical system by plugging-in or identifying the input variables of
one subsystem with state variables of another. The resulting system may still
have input variables that are not identified with any of the state variables.
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A collection of dynamical modules A = {Ai}i∈[N ] are compatible if they do
not share any of the state variables. That is, for any i, j ∈ [N ], Xi ∩Xj = ∅.
This condition merely prevents any unforeseen identification of states and
inputs. The collection is closed if ∪i∈[N ]Ui ⊆ ∪i∈[N ]Xi; that is, as a whole,
the network has no free input variable. In this chapter, we will develop
compositional techniques for analyzing closed networks.
In general, when the output signals from one module are plugged into the
input of another module, the latter may receive these inputs with some delay.
Delays arise from transmission, processing, and buffering. In this chapter,
we assume that all the signals from one module to another are identically
delayed. The signals from the first module to a third module may be delayed
by a different amount from the delay experience by the second module. This
is a reasonable assumption when the delays are dominated by module-level
effects as opposed to the individual variable-related effects.
For a collection of N modules {Ai}i∈[N ], a delay matrix d ∈ R≥0N×N gives
for each ordered pair (i, j) a non-negative time-delay constant d(i, j). All the
input signal from module Ai to module Aj experience the identical delay of
d(i, j). Now that we have defined dynamical modules and the delay matrix
for interconnecting them, we proceed to defining dynamic networks with
delays.
Definition 3.3. For a compatible and closed collection of dynamical modules
{Ai}i∈[N ], and a delay matrix d ∈ R≥0N×N , a networked dynamical system,
denoted by A = ‖d{Ai}i∈[N ], is the tuple 〈X,Θ, T 〉, where
(i) X = ∪i∈[N ]Xi,
(ii) Θ = {θ ∈ Val(X) | θ d Xi ∈ Θi, for each i}, and
(iii) T is a set of trajectories of A such that ξ ∈ T if and only if for each
i ∈ [N ], t ∈ R≥0,
ξ˙i(t) = fi(t, ξi(t), ηi(t)), (3.3)
where ξi = ξ ↓ Xi and for each input variable u ∈ Ui ∩Xj from j to i,
ηi(t) d u = ξj(t− d(i, j)) d u.
It can shown that any initial state θ ∈ Θ uniquely specifies a trajectory of
A. We refer readers to [64] for a general discussion on the existence and
uniqueness of solutions to delayed differential equations. Here we sketch the
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argument. Recall from Section 2.3 that, for any i, j ∈ [N ] and any time
t < d(i, j), we defined the time delay trajectory as ξj(t−d(i, j)) = ξj(0). For
a networked dynamical system A defined above, let dM = maxi,j d(i, j) be
the maximum delay and C = C([−dM , 0],R|X|) be the space of continuous
functions from [−dM , 0] to R|X|. Let Hξ,dM ,t ∈ C be the history of trajectory
ξ of length dM such that Hξ,dM ,t(s) = ξ(t + s), for all s ∈ [−dM , 0]. The
trajectories of the network defined in Equation (3.3) are solutions of the
delayed differential equation ξ˙(t) = f(t,Hξ,dM ,t) with f : R× C → R|X| such
that f is an aggregate of all the N Equations (3.3). Since each fi is continuous
in t and Lipschitz in the other arguments, we can check that f is continuous in
t and Lipschitz in Hξ,dM ,t.
1 From Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 in [64], for any initial
state θ ∈ Θ, a networked dynamical system A has a unique trajectory ξ.
With the set of trajectories T raj(A,Θ) as defined above, the set of bounded
time reachable states ReachA(Θ, [0, T ]) of the closed networked dynamical
system A is defined analogously to that of closed dynamical modules.
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(a) Network topology and dynamics, where cell 1 is
stimulated by the pacemaker and influences other cells.
(b) A trajectory of cell 1.
(c) A trajectory of cell 3,
with d(1, 3) = 100.
(d) A trajectory of cell 3,
with d(1, 3) = 150.
Figure 3.2: A networked dynamical system with three cells and a
pacemaker and its sample trajectories.
Example 3.2 (Pacemaker-Heart Model). We consider a network of car-
diac cellsA1,A2,A3 stimulated by a pacemaker, as illustrated in Figure 3.2(a).
The cardiac cells follow the FHN model presented in Example 3.1. The net-
work is defined by associating input of each cell Ai to the state of another Aj
with a non-negative delay di,j. The pacemaker is modeled as a rectangular
1The norm on the space C is the L∞ norm defined as |H| = supt∈[−dM ,0] |H(t)|.
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wave generator with period 450 and duty cycle 2. We simulate the network
by assigning the delays d(1, 2) = d(2, 1) = 70, d(2, 3) = d(3, 2) = 40 and
d(3, 1) = 100 with two different delay values of d(1, 3). A trajectory of cell 1
with d(1, 3) = 100 is plotted in Figure 3.2(b). Two trajectories of cell 3 with
d(1, 3) = 100 and d(1, 3) = 150 are plotted in (c) and (d), respectively. Not
only the trajectory of cell 3 is shifted in time due to different delay value,
but the shape of the trajectories also changes due to the combined inputs
from cells 1 and 2.
3.4 Input-to-State Discrepancy
In this section, we introduce the notion of input-to-state (IS) discrepancy
functions for dynamical system modules and present three approaches for
finding them. In Section 3.5, we will use IS discrepancy to develop the
approaches for computing over-approximations of reachable states.
3.4.1 IS Discrepancy and Witnesses
Roughly, input-to-state discrepancy (IS discrepancy) of a module A bounds
the distance between two trajectories of A in terms of different initial states
and different inputs.
Definition 3.4. For a dynamical module A = 〈X,U,Θ, f〉, a continuous
function V : Val(X)2 → R≥0 is an input-to-state discrepancy function if
(i) ∃ class-K functions α, α such that for any x,x′ ∈ Val(X), α(|x−x′|) ≤
V (x,x′) ≤ α(|x− x′|), and
(ii) ∃β : R≥0 × R≥0 → R≥0 of class-K in the first argument and a class-K
function γ such that for any pair of initial states θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, and pair of
input trajectories η, η′ ∈ T raj(U), and t ∈ R≥0,
V (ξ(t), ξ′(t)) ≤ β(|θ − θ′|, t) +
∫ t
0
γ(|η(s)− η′(s)|)ds, (3.4)
where ξ = T raj(A, θ, η) and ξ′ = T raj(A, θ′, η′).
(α, α, β, γ) are called the witnesses of the IS discrepancy function.
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The norm | · | is the standard p-norm with p ∈ [1,∞] chosen by the user.
In the rest of the chapter, we make a technical assumption that α−1 and γ
are Lipschitz, and β(·, ·) has a Lipschitz continuous derivative in the second
argument. These assumptions enable us to construct a reduced model with
well-defined trajectories in Section 3.5.1. The discrepancy function (and its
witnesses) bounds the maximum distance between two trajectories in terms of
the `2 distance between their input signals and their initial states. This type
of discrepancy function is motivated by the notion of incremental integral
input-to-state stability of dynamical modules [65], except that we do not
require that for any x ∈ R≥0 that β(x, t) in Equation (3.4) converges to 0 as
t→∞. We assume that the witnesses (α, α, β, γ) are Lipschitz continuous.
3.4.2 Finding IS Discrepancy
In what follows, we describe three well-known methods for obtaining input-
to-state stability proofs and here we note that they can be used to find IS
discrepancy functions.
Lipschitz Dynamics. For any dynamical module A with Lipschitz con-
tinuous dynamic mapping f and for any bounded time, we can find an IS
discrepancy function ofA for that time bound. This version of IS discrepancy
will be sufficient for bounded safety proofs. We note that the problem of com-
puting Lipschitz constant for a function is generally undecidable. However,
for many elementary functions such as trigonometric functions and polyno-
mial functions, the Lipschitz constant can be computed for any compact
set [49]. There are also some heuristics to estimate Lipschitz constant for
general functions [66].
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the dynamic mapping f of module A is Lipschitz
in both arguments with Lipschitz constant L. For any time bound T > 0,
V (x,x′) ∆= |x−x′| is a discrepancy function with witnesses (α, α, β, γ) where
α(|x−x′|) = α(|x−x′|) = |x−x′|, β(|θ−θ′|, t) = eLt|θ−θ′| and γ(|u−u′|) =
LeLT |u− u′|.
Stable Linear Dynamics. Suppose A has dynamic mapping f(x,u) =
Cx + Du, where C is a n × n matrix and D is a n × m matrix. If C is
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asymptotically stable, then its input-free trajectories converge exponentially
and we can get an IS dependency function with exponentially convergent
witness β.
Proposition 3.2. For linear module A with dynamic mapping f(x,u) =
Cx + Du with asymptotically stable matrix C, there exists λ > 0, such that
V (x,x′) = |x−x′| is a discrepancy function with witnesses (α, α, β, γ) where
α(|x−x′|) = α(|x−x′|) = |x−x′|, β(|θ−θ′|, t) = e−λt|θ−θ′| and γ(|u−u′|) =
|D||u− u′|.
The positive constant λ can be computed by solving Lyapunov equa-
tion [67].
Incremental Integral ISS Dynamics. The notion of incremental inte-
gral input-to-state stability (incremental integral ISS) of dynamical mod-
ules [65] is a generalization of the standard notion of input-to-state stabil-
ity [68, 69, 50]. A Lyapunov-like theorem of proving incremental integral ISS
as well as a converse Lyapunov theorem are presented in [65]. Given a proof
of an incremental integral ISS property of a module, we automatically get its
IS discrepancy function (with witnesses).
Definition 3.5. A dynamical module A is called incremental-integral-input-
to-state stable (δiISS) if there exists a class-K∞ function α, a class-KL func-
tion β and a class-K function γ such that, for any initial states θ, θ′ ∈ ΘA,
for any input signal η, η′ ∈ UA and any t > 0,
α(|ξ(t)− ξ′(t)|) ≤ β(|θ − θ′|, t) +
∫ t
0
γ(|η(s)− η′(s)|)ds, (3.5)
where ξ = T raj(A, θ, η) and ξ′ = T raj(A, θ′, η′).
Proposition 3.3. Given an incremental integral ISS module A with (α, β, γ)
as in Definition 3.5, then V (x,x′) = α(|x − x′|) is a discrepancy function
with witnesses (α, α, β, γ) where α(|x− x′|) = α(|x− x′|) = α(|x− x′|), and
β, γ given above.
Proposition 3.1 establishes an IS discrepancy function only using the Lip-
schitz constant of the dynamic mapping f . Although, computing Lipschitz
constants of arbitrary functions is undecidable in general, for certain classes
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of polynomial functions it can be estimated [49]. However, even if the dynam-
ics of the module is stable, IS discrepancy functions obtained by this method
have witnesses β and γ that grow exponentially with time. Incremental-
integral-input-to-state stability (Definition 3.5) can be proved by construct-
ing an incremental Lyapunov function [65]. For some dynamical models with
physical implications, the incrememtal Lyapunov function may capture the
energy of the system. However, constructing the incremental Lyapunov func-
tion is in general a non-trivial problem.
For modules with linear dynamics, IS discrepancy can be computed auto-
matically using Proposition 3.2. For nonlinear modules, we refer the readers
to Algorithm 2 of [61], which is an algorithm that computes a local version
of discrepancy function and witnesses that satisfy all these assumptions.
3.5 Small Approximations from IS Discrepancy
In this section we construct a scalar (one-dimensional) approximation for
each |Xi|-dimensional dynamical module Ai = 〈Xi, Ui,Θi, fi〉 (Definition 3.6)
in a network, using input-to-state discrepancy functions. For the sake of
a cleaner presentation, we develop the results for a network consisting of
two |X1| and |X2|-dimensional modules A1 and A2 with a two-dimensional
approximation. The general results follow by straightforward extension and
are stated in Section 3.5.4.
3.5.1 IS Approximation of ‖d{A1,A2}
Consider a closed networked dynamical system A = ‖d{A1,A2} composed
of two modules A1 = 〈X1, U1,Θ1, f1〉 and A2 = 〈X2, U2,Θ2, f2〉 and a delay
matrix d ∈ R≥02×2. The input signals U2 of A2 are obtained from X1 delayed
by d(2, 1) and the input signals U1 of A1 are obtained from X2 delayed by
d(1, 2). Let Vi be an IS discrepancy function for Ai, i ∈ {1, 2} with witness
(αi, αi, βi, γi). For any pair of initial states θ, θ
′ in ΘA, let ξ = T raj(A, θ)
and ξ′ = T raj(A, θ′) be the unique trajectories of the network A starting
from θ and θ′, respectively. We define θi = θ d Xi, θ′i = θ′ d Xi, ξi = ξ ↓ Xi
and ξ′i = ξ
′ ↓ Xi. From Definition 3.3, the restriction of ξi and ξ′i to Xi are
trajectories of Ai from θi and θ′i. From Definition 3.4, for every t ∈ [0, T ] the
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following holds:
V1(ξ1(t), ξ
′
1(t)) ≤ β1(|θ1 − θ′1|, t) +
∫ t
0
γ1(|ξ2(s− d(1, 2))− ξ′2(s− d(1, 2))|)ds,
V2(ξ2(t), ξ
′
2(t)) ≤ β2(|θ2 − θ′2|, t) +
∫ t
0
γ2(|ξ1(s− d(2, 1))− ξ′1(s− d(2, 1))|)ds.
(3.6)
Recall that when a trajectory ξ is evaluated at t < 0, we use the valuation
ξ(t) = ξ(0). Next, we introduce the key notion of a family of IS approxi-
mations for A. Each approximation is parameterized by non-negative reals
δ1, δ2 ≥ 0 and is a closed networked dynamical system M with two main
variables m1 and m2. As we shall see in Theorem 3.7, at any time t, m1 gives
an upper bound on the distance between two state trajectories of A1 that
start from neighboring states at most δ1 apart. Similarly, m2 gives an upper
bound on neighboring trajectories of A2. Of course, the distance between
two neighboring state trajectories of A1 depends on (a) their initial states
and (b) on the inputs they experience. These inputs in turn are delayed
versions of the state trajectories of A2. So, the dynamics of m1 (and m2)
takes into account the impact of both of these factors using the witnesses of
the IS discrepancy functions. Since β1 and β2 witnesses bound the impact of
initial states on the discrepancy as a function of time, the dynamics of m1
(and m2) are time varying.
Definition 3.6. For a pair of non-negative constants (δ1, δ2), the (δ1, δ2)-IS
approximation of a networked dynamical system A = ‖d{A1,A2} is a closed
networked dynamical system M = 〈XM ,ΘM , TM〉 where
(i) XM = {m1,m2},
(ii) ΘM = {θ} where θ d mi = βi(δi, 0), for i ∈ {1, 2}, and
(iii) for any trajectory µ of XM , µ ∈ TM if and only if
µ˙1(t) = β˙1(δ1, t) + γ1α
−1
2 (µ2(t− d(1, 2))),
µ˙2(t) = β˙2(δ2, t) + γ2α
−1
1 (µ1(t− d(2, 1))).
(3.7)
Here µi = µ ↓ mi and β˙i(δi, t) is a short hand for ∂∂tβi(δi, t).
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Recall from Section 2.1 that γ1α
−1
2 and γ2α
−1
1 are the function compositions
γ1 ◦ α−12 and γ2 ◦ α−11 , respectively. The dynamics of the closed reduced
network M is defined syntactically in terms of the IS discrepancy functions
of the dynamic modules A1 and A2 and the delay matrix. The witness
functions α−11 , γ1, etc., are Lipschitz continuous and Lipschitz functions are
closed under composition. Therefore, the delay differential Equation (3.7)
has a unique solution. Since M has a single initial state, it is completely
deterministic. Note that both the initial state and the dynamics of M depend
on the choice of the parameters δ1 and δ2. In Theorem 3.7 we relate m1 and
m2 with the divergence between trajectories of A1 and A2. Specifically, if
µ is the trajectory of a (δ1, δ2)-IS approximation then µi = µ ↓ mi(t) gives
an upper bound on the distance between the trajectories of Ai starting from
initial states that are at most δi apart.
3.5.2 Over-Approximation with IS Discrepancy
For any pair of non-negative reals δ = (δ1, δ2) and any state x ∈ Val(XA),
we define
Bδ(x) = Bδ1(x d X1)× Bδ2(x d X2)
as the product of the δi-balls around x d Xi. Given a pair of discrepancy
functions V = (V1, V2) for A1 and A2, a state m ∈ Val(XM) of M naturally
defines a sublevel set LV (m) ⊆ Val(XA)× Val(XA):
LV (m) = {(x,x′) | ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Vi(x d Xi,x′ d Xi) ≤m d mi}.
This set is the intersection of the (m d mi)-sublevel sets of Vi. For a state
x ∈ Val(XA) of A and a state m ∈ Val(XM) we define
BVm(x) = {x′ ∈ Val(XA) | (x,x′) ∈ LV (m)}
as the subset of states of A for which (x,x′) lies in the sublevel set defined
by m.
We will now prove a sequence of results that ultimately established in
Lemma 3.6 that the trajectory of M gives an upper bound on the discrepancy
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of A. That is, at any time t ≥ 0,
β1(|θ1 − θ′1|, t) +
∫ t
0
γ1(|ξ2(s− d(1, 2))− ξ′2(s− d(1, 2))|)ds ≤ µ1(t)
β2(|θ2 − θ′2|, t) +
∫ t
0
γ2(|ξ1(s− d(2, 1))− ξ′1(s− d(2, 1))|)ds ≤ µ2(t).
(3.8)
From the construction of M , we observe that at time t = 0, the above inequal-
ities hold. Moreover, the first derivatives of the right-hand sides upper-bound
those of the left-hand sides at time t = 0. However, this property at t = 0
does not immediately generalize to all t > 0. In our proof, we first construct
a strict upper bound of the left-hand sides of Equation (3.8) that holds for
all t, and then show that this bound converges to µ(·).
First, for any positive  > 0, we construct a pair of -factor trajectories
(µ1, µ2) with derivatives -close to the trajectory of µ in Equation (3.7) and
show that these trajectories strictly upper-bound the discrepancy functions
of V1 and V2.
For any δ1, δ2 ≥ 0 and any  > 0, a pair of trajectories µ1, µ2 : R≥0 → R≥0
are defined as solutions to the differential equations:
µ˙1(t) = β˙1(δ1, t) + γ1α
−1
2 (µ2(t− d(1, 2))) + , and
µ˙2(t) = β˙2(δ2, t) + γ2α
−1
1 (µ1(t− d(2, 1))) + , (3.9)
with µ1(0) = β1(δ1, 0) +  and µ2(0) = β2(δ2, 0) + . The right-hand side
of Equation (3.9) is Lipschitz, and therefore, the solutions µ1 and µ2 are
well-defined differentiable functions of time. For any two initial states of A,
θ, θ′, we define two differentiable functions g1, g2 : R≥0 → R:
g1(t) = µ1(t)− β1(δ1, t)−
∫ t
0
γ1(|ξ2(s− d(1, 2))− ξ′2(s− d(1, 2))|)ds,
g2(t) = µ2(t)− β2(δ2, t)−
∫ t
0
γ2(|ξ1(s− d(2, 1))− ξ′1(s− d(2, 1))|)ds.
(3.10)
Recall that ξ = T raj(A, θ) and ξ′ = T raj(A, θ′) are the trajectories of A
starting from θ and θ′. The following proposition states that if g1(t), g2(t)
are positive for all t ≥ 0, then the distance between trajectories ξ and ξ′ are
bounded by (µ1, µ2).
Proposition 3.4. Consider any non-negative pair δ = (δ1, δ2) and initial
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states θ, θ′ ∈ ΘA such that θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ). Let ξ = T raj(A, θ) and ξ′ =
T raj(A, θ′). Then, for any  > 0, t ≥ 0, if g1(t), g2(t) > 0, then
V1(ξ1(t), ξ
′
1(t)) < µ1(t), and V2(ξ2(t), ξ
′
2(t)) < µ2(t).
Proof. Here we prove the bound for V1; the bound for V2 follows by symmetry.
For any t ≥ 0, since g1(t) > 0, from Equatoin (3.10) we have
µ1(t) > β1(δ1, t) +
∫ t
0
γ1(|ξ2(s− d(1, 2))− ξ′2(s− d(1, 2))|)ds. (3.11)
From θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ), we have |θ1 − θ′1| ≤ δ1. Since β1(·, t) is a class-K function,
it follows that
β1(δ1, t) ≥ β1(|θ1 − θ′1|, t).
Thus, Equation (3.11) becomes
µ1(t) > β1(|θ1 − θ′1|, t) +
∫ t
0
γ1(|ξ2(s− d(1, 2))− ξ′2(s− d(1, 2))|)ds.
By applying Equation (3.6), it follows that
µ1(t) > β1(|θ1 − θ′1|, t) +
∫ t
0
γ1(|ξ2(s− d(1, 2))− ξ′2(s− d(1, 2))|)ds
≥ V1(ξ1(t), ξ′1(t)).
The next lemma establishes that we can drop the assumption about the
positivity of g1 and g2 and still arrive at the conclusion of Proposition 3.4.
Lemma 3.5. Consider any non-negative pair δ = (δ1, δ2), and initial states
θ, θ′ ∈ ΘA such that θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ). Let ξ = T raj(A, θ) and ξ′ = T raj(A, θ′).
Then, for any  > 0, t ≥ 0,
V1(ξ1(t), ξ
′
1(t)) < µ1(t) and V2(ξ2(t), ξ
′
2(t)) < µ2(t).
Proof. By Proposition 3.4, it suffices to prove that for all t ≥ 0, g1(t), g2(t) >
0. At t = 0, by Equation (3.10)
g1(0) = β1(δ1, 0) + − β1(δ1, 0) =  > 0.
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Similarly, g2(0) > 0. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ta > 0 is the
first time when g1(t), g2(t) > 0 is violated. From the continuity of g1, g2, we
have that the both of the following conditions hold:
(i) g1(t), g2(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, ta), and
(ii) g1(ta) = 0 or g2(ta) = 0.
Without loss of generality, we assume g1(ta) = 0. From the mean value
theorem, we know that there exists some time tb ∈ (0, ta) such that
g˙1(tb) =
g1(0)− g1(ta)
0− ta ≤ −

ta
< 0. (3.12)
We can bound the derivative g˙1(tb) as:
g˙1(tb) = µ˙1(tb)− d
dt
(
β1(δ1, tb) +
∫ tb
0
γ1(|ξ2(s− d(1, 2))− ξ′2(s− d(1, 2))|)ds
)
.
Plugging the right-hand side of Equation (3.9) into the above equation, it
follows:
g˙1(tb) = β˙1(δ1, tb) + γ1α
−1
2 (µ2(tb − d(1, 2))) + 
−β˙1(δ1, tb)− γ1(|ξ2(tb − d(1, 2))− ξ′2(tb − d(1, 2))|)
= + γ1α
−1
2 (µ2(tb − d(1, 2)))− γ1(|ξ2(tb − d(1, 2))− ξ′2(tb − d(1, 2))|).
(3.13)
From condition (i), we know g2(tb − d(1, 2)) > 0. It follows from Proposi-
tion 3.4 that
µ2(tb − d(1, 2)) > V2(ξ2(tb − d(1, 2)), ξ′2(tb − d(1, 2))). (3.14)
From Definition 3.4, we have V2(ξ2(tb), ξ
′
2(tb)) ≥ α2(|ξ2(tb− d(1, 2))− ξ′2(tb−
d(1, 2))|). Equation (3.14) yields µ2(tb − d(1, 2)) > α2(|ξ2(tb − d(1, 2)) −
ξ′2(tb − d(1, 2))|). Because γα−12 is a class-K function, it follows that
γ1α
−1
2 (µ2(tb − d(1, 2))) ≥ γ1(|ξ2(tb − d(1, 2))− ξ′2(tb − d(1, 2))|).
Combining the above equation with Equation (3.13), we have that g˙1(tb) ≥
 > 0, which contradicts Equation (3.12).
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Lemma 3.5 shows that for any  > 0, the -factor trajectories µ1 and µ2
give strict upper bounds on the distance between corresponding trajectories
of the original modules A1 and A2. In the following lemma, we show that as
→ 0, µi converges to the trajectory µ ↓ mi; recall that µ is the trajectory
of the IS approximation M . It follows that the trajectory µ indeed bounds
the divergence of any trajectories of A.
Lemma 3.6. Consider any non-negative pair δ = (δ1, δ2) and initial states
θ, θ′ ∈ ΘA such that θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ). Let ξ = T raj((A, θ)), ξ′ = T raj((A, θ′)),
and µ be the trajectory of A’s (δ1, δ2)-IS approximation M . Then for all
t ≥ 0,
(ξ(t), ξ′(t)) ∈ LV (µ(t)).
Proof. For brevity we write µ ↓ mi as µi. By integrating both sides of
Equation (3.7) with initial condition µ1(0) = β1(δ1, 0) and µ2(0) = β2(δ2, 0),
we have,
µ1(t) = β1(δ1, t) +
∫ t
0
γ1α
−1
2 (µ2(s− d(1, 2)))ds,
µ2(t) = β2(δ2, t) +
∫ t
0
γ2α
−1
1 (µ1(s− d(2, 1)))ds.
(3.15)
Similarly, by integrating Equation (3.9), we have
µ1(t) = β1(δ1, t) +
∫ t
0
γ1α
−1
2 (µ2(s− d(1, 2)))ds+ (1 + t),
µ2(t) = β2(δ1, t) +
∫ t
0
γ2α
−1
1 (µ1(s− d(2, 1)))ds+ (1 + t).
(3.16)
Define h(t)
∆
= |µ1(t)− µ1(t)|+ |µ2(t)− µ2(t)|. Plugging in Equations (3.15)
and (3.16) into the definition of h(t), we have,
h(t) ≤ 2(t+ 1) + ∫ t
0
|γ1α−12 (µ1(s− d(1, 2)))− γ1α−12 (µ1(s− d(1, 2)))|ds
+
∫ t
0
|γ2α−11 (µ2(s− d(2, 1)))− γ2α−11 (µ2(s− d(2, 1)))|ds.
(3.17)
We will bound the two integrals of above inequality in Equations (3.18)
and (3.19). The property of delay function implies that for any t ∈ [0, d],
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µ(t− d) = µ(0). By splitting the integral intervals, we have,
∫ t
0
|γ1α−12 (µ1(s− d(1, 2)))− γ1α−12 (µ1(s− d(1, 2)))|ds
=
∫ d(1,2)
0
|γ1α−12 (µ1(0))− γ1α−12 (µ1(0))|ds
+
∫ t−d(1,2)
0
|γ1α−12 (µ1(s))− γ1α−12 (µ1(s))|ds
≤ d(1, 2)|γ1α−12 (µ1(0))− γ1α−12 (µ1(0))|
+
∫ t
0
|γ1α−12 (µ1(s))− γ1α−12 (µ1(s))|ds.
(3.18)
By using the same trick, we rewrite the last term of Equation (3.17) as
∫ t
0
|γ2α−11 (µ2(s− d(2, 1)))− γ2α−11 (µ2(s− d(2, 1)))|ds
≤ d(2, 1)|γ2α−11 (µ2(0))− γ2α−11 (µ2(0))|ds
+
∫ t
0
|γ2α−11 (µ2(s))− γ2α−11 (µ2(s))|ds.
(3.19)
From the Lipschitz property of γ1α
−1
2 and γ2α
−1
1 , we can find a constant
L > 0 such that |γ1α−12 (µ1(t)) − γ1α−12 (µ1(t))| ≤ L|µ1(t) − µ1(t)| and
|γ2α−11 (µ2(t)) − γ2α−11 (µ2(t))| ≤ L|µ2(t) − µ2(t)|. Using the Lipschitz con-
dition with Equations (3.18) and (3.19), Equation (3.17) becomes
h(t) ≤ 2(t+ 1 + LdM) +
∫ t
0
Lh(s)ds,
with dM = max{d(1, 2), d(2, 1)}. By Gronwall-Bellman inequality [70], it
follows that
h(t) ≤ 2(t+ 1 + LdM) + 2L
∫ t
0
(s+ 1 + LdM)e
L(t−s)ds. (3.20)
It follows that for any t ∈ R≥0, the integral
∫ t
0
(s + 1)eL(t−s)ds is bounded.
Thus h(t) → 0 as  → 0, which implies both |µ1(t) − µ1(t)| → 0 and
|µ2(t) − µ2(t)| → 0 as  → 0. Using Lemma 3.5, and taking the limit of
→ 0, it follows that
V1(ξ1(t), ξ
′
1(t)) ≤ µ1(t) and V2(ξ2(t), ξ′2(t)) ≤ µ2(t).
That is, for any t ≥ 0, (ξ(t), ξ′(t)) ∈ LV (µ(t)).
34
Theorem 3.7 states that the reach set of any (large) networked dynamical
system A = ‖d{A1,A2} from a set of states can be over-approximated by
bloating an individual execution ξ of A by a factor that is entirely determined
by (a) IS discrepancy functions V1 and V2 of its (smaller) modules, and (b)
the trajectory µ of the reduced (two-dimensional) dynamical system M that
is its IS approximation.
Theorem 3.7. Consider a networked dynamical system A = ‖d{A1,A2}
with IS discrepancy functions V = (V1, V2). Let ξ = T raj(A, θ) for some
initial state θ ∈ ΘA. For any non-negative pair δ = (δ1, δ2) suppose µ is the
trajectory of the (δ1, δ2)-IS approximation M . Then, for any T ≥ 0
ReachA(Bδ(θ), [0, T ]) ⊆
⋃
t∈[0,T ]
BVµ(t)(ξ(t)).
Proof. This follows from the bounds on the distance between trajectories
established above. For any x ∈ ReachA(Bδ(θ), [0, T ]), there exists an initial
state θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ), a trajectory ξ′ = T raj(A, θ′) and a time t ∈ [0, T ] such
that ξ′(t) = x. It follows by Lemma 3.6 that (ξ(t), ξ′(t)) ∈ LV (µ(t)), and
therefore, x ∈ BVµ(t)(ξ(t)).
Theorem 3.7 establishes an over-approximation of the set of reachable
states from a δ-ball Bδ(θ). To compute the set of reachable states from a
compact initial set ΘA, we can proceed as usual by first computing a δ-cover
of ΘA, and then computing the union of reach sets of the covers using the
theorem.
Theorem 3.7 does not require A to be stable or any global property to
hold for the IS discrepancy functions. To use Theorem 3.7 we need to (a)
find IS discrepancy functions for the modules, and (b) compute individual
trajectories ξ of complete network A and µ of M . Fortunately, for large
classes of nonlinear dynamical systems there exist scalable numerical tech-
niques for (b). This is one of the motivations of this work. For linear and
some special classes of nonlinear systems (a) can be solved automatically (see
Section 3.4.2). For nonlinear models, we refer the readers to [61], where we
present an algorithmic approach for computing local versions of the discrep-
ancy function.
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3.5.3 Precision of the IS Approximation
The error in the over-approximation obtained from the reduced model is
determined by the trajectories of the reduced model. In the following, we
show that the over-approximation error can be made arbitrarily small with
sufficiently small but positive δ1, δ2.
Lemma 3.8. Consider any T > 0, t ∈ [0, T ], and a sequence of pairs of
positive reals δk = (δk1 , δ
k
2) converging to (0, 0). For the trajectory (µ
k) of
the corresponding (δk1 , δ
k
2)-IS approximation M
k, |(µk ↓ mi)(t)| → 0 for i ∈
{1, 2}.
Proof. Fix a T > 0 and δk = (δk1 , δ
k
2). This defines the (δ
k
1 , δ
k
2)-IS approxi-
mation Mk and its trajectory µk. We will prove that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
|(µk ↓ m1)(t)|+ |(µk ↓ m2)(t)| → 0,
as δk → 0. From here on, we drop the superscript k and use the notations
setup earlier: µi = µ ↓ mi, etc.
From the first row in Equation (3.15), applying the same trick as Equa-
tion (3.18), we have that
|µ1(t)| ≤ β1(δ1, t) + d(1, 2)|γ1α−12 (µ2(0))|+
∫ t
0
|γ1α−12 (µ2(s))|ds. (3.21)
From the Lipschitz property of γ1α
−1
2 , there exists some L > 0, such that
|γ1α−12 (µ2(s))−γ1α−12 (0)| ≤ L|µ2(s)−0|. Since γ1α−12 is of class-K, it follows
that
|γ1α−12 (µ2(s))| ≤ L|µ2(s)|.
From Equation (3.15), we observe that for i ∈ {1, 2}, µi(t) are non-negative
scalars. We drop the absolute value symbols | · |. Then Equation (3.21)
reduces to
|µ1(t)| ≤ β1(δ1, t) + d(1, 2)Lβ1(δ1, 0) +
∫ t
0
L|µ2(s)|ds. (3.22)
Since β1(δ1, t) is bounded in compact intervals, we define
CT1 (δ1) = sup
t∈[0,T ]
β1(δ1, t), (3.23)
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as the upper bound of the function β1(·, t) in interval t ∈ [0, T ]. It follows
from Equation (3.22) that
|µ1(t)| ≤ CT1 (δ1) + d(1, 2)Lβ1(δ1, 0) +
∫ t
0
L|µ2(s)|ds. (3.24)
Starting from the second row of Equation (3.15), and following similar steps
from Equations (3.21)-(3.24), we have,
|µ2(t)| ≤ CT2 (δ2) + d(2, 1)Lβ2(δ2, 0) +
∫ t
0
L|µ1(s)|ds. (3.25)
Summing up Equations (3.24) and (3.25), by applying the Gronwall-Bellman
inequality, we have
|µ1(t)|+ |µ2(t)| ≤ (CT1 (δ1)+CT2 (δ2)+d(1, 2)Lβ1(δ1, 0)+d(2, 1)Lβ2(δ2, 0))eLt.
For i ∈ {1, 2}, βi(·, ·) is a class-K function in the first argument, thus
βi(δ
k
i , 0)→ 0 and Ci(δki )→ 0 as δki → 0. It follows that, |µk1(t)|+ |µk2(t)| → 0
as δk → 0.
Proposition 3.9 follows from the fact that for i ∈ {1, 2}, for any x,x′ ∈ Xi,
αi(x− x′) ≤ Vi(x,x′) (Definition 3.4).
Proposition 3.9. For dynamical system A with discrepancy function V =
(V1, V2), fix any x ∈ XA. For any  > 0, there exists r > 0, such that
BVr (x) ⊆ B(x).
Using Lemma 3.8 and Proposition 3.9, the next theorem bounding the
error on the over-approximation of the reach set follows in a straightforward
fashion.
Theorem 3.10. Consider a closed dynamical system A = ||d{A1,A2} with
IS discrepancy V = (V1, V2). Let ξ = T raj(A, θ) for some initial state
θ ∈ ΘA. For any  > 0, there exists a positive pair δ1, δ2 > 0, such that for
A’s (δ1, δ2)-IS approximation M , for any T ≥ 0,⋃
t∈[0,T ]
BVµ(t)(ξ(t)) ⊆ B(ReachA(Bδ(θ), [0, T ])),
where µ is the unique trajectory of M .
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If the over-approximation obtained from Theorem 3.7 is not precise enough
to prove safety, then, we can refine the parameters δ1 and δ2. Then we can
compute BVµ(t)(ξ(t)) for each of the smaller partitions with higher precision.
This is the standard approach used in simulation-based verification [52, 31,
71]. In the next section, we present this algorithm in more detail.
3.5.4 Generalizing to Arbitrary Networked Dynamical
Systems
The approximation and its analysis presented in the previous section can
be extended to closed networked dynamical systems. Let {Ai}i∈[N ] be a
compatible closed collection of dynamic modules and d ∈ R≥0N×N be a delay
matrix. Let A = ||d{Ai}i∈[N ] be the corresponding closed dynamic network.
For any pair of trajectories ξ, ξ′ ∈ T raj(A,Θ), and for each i ∈ [N ], we
define ξi = ξ ↓ Xi and ξ′i = ξ′ ↓ Xi. The next definition gives a natural
generalization of Definition 3.4 to account for dynamical modules that take
inputs from more than one module in the network.
Definition 3.7. Let Ai = 〈Xi, Ui, θi, fi〉 be a dynamic module receiving
input signals from a collection of modules {Aj}j∈Ui∩Xj . An input-to-state
discrepancy function for Ai (in this environment) is a continuous function
Vi : Val(X)
2 → R≥0 with class-K witnesses (αi, αi, βi) and {γij}(i,j):Ui∩Xj 6=∅,
such that
(i) for any x,x′ ∈ Val(Xi), αi(|x− x′|) ≤ Vi(x,x′) ≤ αi(|x− x′|), and
(ii) for any pair of initial states θ, θ′ ∈ Θi and input signals ηij, η′ij ∈
Traj(Ui ∩Xj) from module Aj to Ai, for each t ≥ 0
Vi(ξi(t), ξ
′
i(t)) ≤βi(|θ − θ′|, t) +
∫ t
0
∑
j:Xj∩Ui 6=∅
γij(|ηij(s)− η′ij(s)|)ds,
where ξi and ξ
′
i are the trajectories of Ai from initial state θ (θ′ respec-
tively) and with input signal ηij (η
′
ij respectively) from module Aj.
The set {Aj|Xj ∩ Ui 6= ∅} is the set of modules that provide inputs to
module Ai. Definition 3.7 allows each Aj providing an input to Ai to have
a different witness γij to the discrepancy function Vi. This flexibility also
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permits the input signals from different modules to experience delays to dif-
ferent degrees. Generalizing Definition 3.6, the IS approximation of A is a
N -dimensional closed deterministic dynamical system M .
Definition 3.8. For any δ = (δ1, . . . , δN) ∈ RN≥0, the δ-IS approximation of
A = ||d{Ai}i∈[N ] is a dynamical network M = 〈XM ,ΘM , TM〉, where
(i) XM = {m1,m2, . . . ,mN},
(ii) ΘM = {θ}, where θ d mi = βi(δi, 0), for each i ∈ [N ], and
(iii) for any trajectory µ of XM , µ ∈ TM if and only if
µ˙i(t) = β˙i(δi, t) +
∑
j:Xj∩Ui 6=∅
γijα
−1
j (µj(t− d(i, j))),
where µi = µ ↓ mi.
The dynamics of the closed reduced network M is defined syntactically in
terms of the IS discrepancy functions of the constituent modules {Ai}i∈[N ]
and the delay matrix d. Once again, from the Lipschitz continuity of the
right-hand side it follows that the delay differential equation has a unique
solution. The IS approximation M of the original dynamical network A is an
N -dimensional system. The construction of M is defined syntactically only
using (a) information of individual modules (IS discrepancy functions etc.)
and (b) the topology and delay matrix for composition. An N -dimensional
analogue of Theorems 3.7 and 3.10 giving approximations of ReachA(Θ, [0, T ])
in terms of µ(·) can be proven essentially following the same steps.
3.6 Verification Algorithm
Theorem 3.7 gives us a recipe for verifying bounded time invariants (or safety
properties) of closed networks, only by numerically computing trajectories of
the whole network A and the trajectories of the statically computed reduced
IS approximation M . That is, detailed static analysis of the complete model
A becomes unnecessary in this method. In this section, we develop this idea
further and provide the details of the verification algorithm.
The algorithm involves simulations or numerical computation of trajec-
tories of dynamical systems. We proceed by first defining what we mean
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by simulations. Given a closed networked dynamical system A without de-
lay (d(i, j) = 0 for all i, j), an initial state θ, let ξ = Traj(A, θ) be the
actual trajectory of A from the initial state θ. For a step size τ > 0,
validated ODE solvers such as [72, 73, 74] compute a sequence of boxes
R1, R2, . . . , Rl ⊆ Val(XA), such that for each k ∈ [l], t ∈ [(k − 1)τ, kτ ],
ξ(t) ∈ Rk. For a desired error bound  > 0, by reducing the step size τ , the
diameter of Rk can be made smaller than . For delayed differential equa-
tions, there are existing techniques for numerical simulation [62, 75, 76, 77].
Several of these reduce the problem to simulating ODEs [78]. Specifically,
the simulations generated in [62] have validated error bounds. Our safety
verification algorithm assumes the availability of a subroutine Simulate for
computing numerical simulations that meet Definition 3.9.
Definition 3.9. Consider a closed network A, an initial state θ, a time
bound T , an error bound  > 0, and time step τ > 0. Let ξ = T raj(A, θ)
denote the trajectory of A from the initial state θ. A (θ, T, , τ)-simulation
trace is a finite sequence φ = 〈R0, t0〉, 〈R1, t1〉, . . . , 〈Rl, tl〉 where
(i) t0 = 0, tl = T , and ∀ k ∈ [l], tk − tk−1 ≤ τ ,
(ii) ∀k ∈ [l] and ∀t ∈ [tk−1, tk], ξ(t) ∈ Rk, and
(iii) ∀k ∈ [l], dia(Rk) ≤ .
In Algorithm 3.1 the subroutine Simulate(A, θ, T, , τ) (line 5,20) com-
putes a (θ, T, , τ)-simulation of the network A as defined above. For the
completeness of the algorithm, it is required that for any precision parame-
ters , τ > 0, a simulation trace fulfilling this condition can be computed.
The algorithm takes several inputs: (a) the system model A = ‖d{Ai}i∈[N ],
(b) the unsafe set Unsafe ⊆ Val(XA), (c) initial partition parameter δ0,
simulation parameter 0, and the time bound T , and (d) a collection of IS
discrepancy functions and witnesses for the modules {Vi, αi, αi, βi, {γji}} .
The algorithm proceeds as follows: The set C computed in line 2 is a finite
set of triples {(θc, δ, )}c∈|C|, such that {θc}c∈|C| is a δ-cover of the initial set
ΘA. Each θc is associated with a precision parameter  > 0 and positive
real-valued vector δ. For each triple (θ, δ, ) in the cover set C, the algorithm
first computes a simulation trace ψ = 〈R0, t0〉, . . . , 〈Rp, tp〉 containing the
trajectory ξ = T raj(A, θ) of the (large) networked dynamical system A
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Algorithm 3.1 Bounded verification algorithm
1: δ ← δ0; ← 0;R ← ∅;
2: C ← Partition(ΘA, δ, );
3: while C 6= ∅ do
4: for (θ, δ, ) ∈ C do
5: ψ ← Simulate(A, θ, T, , τ);
6: S ← BloatWithISD(ψ, d, δ, , τ, {Vi, αi, αi, βi, {γij}});
7: if S ∩ Unsafe = ∅ then
8: C ← C\{(θ, δ, )};R ← R∪ S ;
9: else if ∃k,Rk ⊆ Unsafe then
10: return (UNSAFE,R);
11: else
12: C ← C\{(θ, δ, )};
13: C ← C ∪ Partition(ΘA ∩ Bδ(θ), δ2 , 2)
14: end if
15: end for
16: end while
17: return (SAFE,R);
18: function BloatWithISD(ψ, d, δ, , τ, {Vi, αi, αi, βi, {γij}})
19: M ← ISApprox (δ, d, {Vi, αi, αi, βi, {γij}});
20: φ← Simulate(M, θM , T, , τ);
21: ρ← SupByTime(φ);
22: S ← BVρ (ψ);
23: return S;
24: end function
(line 5). Then the subroutine BloatWithISD bloats the trace ψ to get a tube
S (line 6). We claim that the tube S contains the set of states of A reachable
from the set of initial state Bδ(θ). Then the algorithm checks whether this
tube is safe or unsafe. If neither of these cases can be deduced then the part
of the initial set Bδ(θ) is further refined by adding a new partition to C.
The subroutine BloatWithISD is detailed in lines 18-24. First, an δ-IS
approximation M (line 19) is constructed following Definition 3.8. The
Simulate subroutine is then used again to compute a simulation trace φ =
〈Q0, t0〉, . . . , 〈Qp, tp〉 of the trajectory µ = T raj(M, θM), of the (smaller) re-
duced model M . Here we assume the time stamps of the sequence ψ match up
with that of φ. This can be achieved by using a fixed step solver or through
repeated simulations using smaller step sizes. The sequence ρ computed in
line 21 is a sequence of pairs 〈r0, t0〉, . . . , 〈rp, tp〉, where for each k ∈ [p], rk is
a non-negative real defined as rk = supm∈Qk |m|. In line 22, the sequence of
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sets {Rk} is bloated by the sequence of factors {rk} element-wise to construct
a tube S.
3.6.1 Analysis of the Verification Algorithm
We establish the soundness and relative completeness of the algorithm in
Theorems 3.11 and 3.12. Practical scalability of the algorithm is discussed
in Section 3.7.
Theorem 3.11. Algorithm 3.1 is sound. That is, if it returns SAFE then
A is safe up to T , and if it returns UNSAFE then A is unsafe.
Proof. Suppose the algorithm returns SAFE. For any cover (θ, δ, ) ∈ C,
S computed in line 22 is the union of a sequence of regions {BVrk(Rk)},
where ∪k∈[p]Rk contains the trajectory from θ and the sequence of rk up-
per bounds the trajectory of δ-IS approximation. It follows from Theo-
rem 3.7, that ReachA(Bδ(θ), [0, T ]) ⊆ S. Thus if S ∩ Unsafe = ∅, then
ReachA(Bδ(θ), [0, T ]) ∩Unsafe = ∅. The algorithm returns SAFE, if all such
covers are checked safe. It is straightforward to check that C captures a fi-
nite cover of the initial set
⋃
(θ,δ,)∈C Bδ(θ) ⊇ ΘA. Therefore, we conclude
ReachA(ΘA, [0, T ]) ∩ Unsafe = ∅.
Otherwise if the algorithm returns UNSAFE, there exists at least one set
Rk contained in the unsafe set Unsafe. It follows that for the trajectory
ξ = T raj(A, θ) and some t ∈ [tk−1, tk], ξ(t) ∈ Unsafe.
Theorem 3.12. Algorithm 3.1 is relatively complete. That is, if A is robustly
safe then Algorithm 3.1 terminates and returns SAFE and if A is unsafe then
it terminates and returns UNSAFE.
Proof. Suppose that for some ′ > 0, A is ′-robustly safe up to time T . It
follows from Definition 3.2 that
B′(ReachA(ΘA, [0, T ])) ∩ Unsafe = ∅.
It follows that line 8 is never executed. For any θ ∈ Θ, we will show that for
small enough refinement parameters δ,  > 0, for any k, dia(BVrk(Rk)) < ′.
From Proposition 3.9, we can show that there exists e > 0 such that for
rk < e,
BVrk(Rk) ⊆ B′/3(Rk). (3.26)
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From Lemma 3.8, there exists a δ > 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ], and all i ∈ [N ],
|µ(t)| ≤ e/2. For a simulation trace φ = 〈M0, t0〉, . . . , 〈Mq, tq〉 (line 20),
and  ≤ e/2, it follows from Definition 3.9 that for all k ∈ [q], the di-
ameter dia(Mk) ≤ e/2. Thus for any k ∈ [q], rk = supm∈Mk |m| ≤  +
supt∈[t′l−1,t′l] |µ(t)| ≤ e/2 + e/2 = e. It follows from Equation (3.26) that by
choosing δ ≤ d and  ≤ e/2, we have BVrk(Rk) ⊆ B′/3(Rk). Notice that
the diameter of Rk is bounded by the refinement parameter . By choosing
 = min{′/3, e}, it follows that
dia(B′/3(Rk)) ≤ ′/3 + dia(Rk) ≤ ′/3 + ′/3 < ′.
Thus, after a number of max{log( 0
min{′/3,e}), log
δ0
d
} refinements, the param-
eters δ,  are small enough to guarantee that S ∩ Unsafe = ∅. Thus the
algorithm returns SAFE.
On the other hand, suppose A is unsafe with respect to an open unsafe set
Unsafe. There exists an initial state θ, a time t ≥ 0 and a ′ > 0 such that
B′(ξ(θ, t)) ⊆ Unsafe. For the same number of refinement as the robustly
safe case, it can be shown that there exists an BVrk(Rk) ⊆ B′(ξ(θ, t)). It
follows that the algorithm returns UNSAFE.
3.7 Experimental Validation
We discuss experimental results from a prototype implementation of Algo-
rithm 3.1 in Matlab. We verify bounded time invariant properties of several
linear and nonlinear networked dynamical systems. First, we give a brief
overview of the different examples. Each module in the linear synchroniza-
tion examples (see [79] for detail) is a four-dimensional linear dynamical
system, and the overall system is composed of several modules in different
topologies. Through communicating with neighbors, the modules in the net-
work aim to reach synchronization to a common solution. We compute reach
sets for several such networks, both with and without delays. The nonlin-
ear water tank network example is a modified version of the one presented
in [59]. In this example, each module captures the water levels in a group of
tanks, that depends on the flows from other tanks. The nonlinear cardiac cell
network with delayed interconnections was shown in Examples 3.1 and 3.2.
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In the results presented here, the time bound is T = 20 seconds and the
running time is based on executing the procedure on an Intel i5-3470 CPU.
The columns in Table 3.1 present (i) the system being verified, (ii) the number
of total state variables, (iii) the number of modules, (iv) the number of covers
for the initial set, (v) the total number of simulation boxes generated, and
(vi) the running time of the algorithm. Our experimental results show that
the running time roughly scales linearly with the total number of simulation
boxes generated for both the original system A and its IS approximationM.
The number of simulation boxes generated is proportional to the product of
the total number of covers and the time bound. Fixing a compact initial set,
the number of covers generated depends on the level of precision needed to
prove (or disprove) safety, which further relying on the distance between the
unsafe set to the reachable states. From the linear synchronization examples,
we also observe that verifying time-delayed networks takes a longer time than
delay-free networks of the same dimensions, even if the algorithm produces
similar number of simulations boxes. One source of this difference is that
simulating a delayed differential equation is more expensive than simulating
an ODE.
Table 3.1: Experimental results. The columns represent: (1) the system
being verified, (2) # state variables, (3) # modules, (4) # covers of initial
set, (5) # total simulation boxes, and (6) run time.
Systems # V # N # C # sim RT (s)
Linear syn. I 16 4 128 45440 129.2
Linear syn. II 24 6 128 45649 135.1
Linear syn. delay I 16 4 64 23168 103.1
Linear syn. delay II 16 4 128 46304 205.8
Nonlinear cardiac delay I 6 3 16 6134 22.0
Nonlinear cardiac delay II 16 8 24 13563 42.5
Sample reach tubes computed for the linear synchronization example are
shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. The blue trace (center) is the simulation of the
actual system and the red lines give the upper- and lower-bounds computed
from the reduced model. These are networks of two four-dimensional modules
with linear dynamics x˙1 = A1x1 +B1u1 and x˙2 = A2x2 +B2u2. The modules
are connected with an inter-modular gain g > 0 and a delay d ≥ 0, such
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that u1(t) = gx2(t− d) and u2(t) = gx1(t− d). For a network with Hurwitz
A1 and A2, as seen in Figure 3.3, the diameter of the computed reach tube
(for the same size of the initial set) grows quickly with the gain, but less so
with delay. The computed reach tubes of networks with an unstable module
are illustrated in Figure 3.4. From the construction of the reduced model
(Definition 3.6), if a module is unstable with β˙i(δ, t) ≥ 0, the corresponding
state component µi of the reduced model is unstable. Thus, even though
the whole network may be stable, the reduced model will be unstable. In
Figure 3.4, the reach tube in (a), which is corresponding to a smaller delay,
is slightly thinner than the one in (b). From the trajectories (blue curves)
in Figure 3.4, the whole network corresponding to (a) is stable however the
reduced model does not capture this. This shows that our approach performs
relatively well when either the individual modules are stable or the inter-
modular gains are small.
(a) Reach tube for network
with delay d = 0 and gain
g = 1
(b) Reach tube for
network with delay d = 0
and gain g = 0.5
(c) Reach tube for network
with delay d = 10s and
gain g = 0.5
Figure 3.3: Reach tubes for network with stable modules projected on one
component of x1. A1 and A2 are both Hurwitz. The blue curve is a
trajectory, and the red curves outline a reach tube from a neighborhood.
Our implementation uses the built-in ODE solver of Matlab and these il-
lustrative experiments assume that the error bounds of the computation in
lines 5 and 20 are met by Matlab’s ODE solver, but in reality this may not
hold. However, from a sequence of sample simulation points, one can con-
struct a sequence of simulation boxes satisfying the rigorous requirements of
Definition 3.9 using methods such as the one presented in [80]. Alternatively,
for one could use a validated ODE solver such as CAPD [72] as in the C2E2
verificaiton tool [52].
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(a) Reach tube for network
with delay 0
(b) Reach tube for
network with delay 10s
Figure 3.4: Reach tubes for network with an unstable module projected on
one component of x1. A2 is Hurwitz while A1 is not. The blue curve is a
trajectory, and the red curves outline a reach tube from a neighborhood.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a verification algorithm to prove bounded time
invariance properties of (possibly unstable) nonlinear networked dynamical
systems with delayed interconnection. Our method uses numerical simu-
lations and IS discrepancy functions for the modules. IS discrepancy of a
module Ai, bounds the distance between two (possibly diverging) trajecto-
ries of Ai in terms of their initial states and inputs. It is closely related to
the notion of input-to-state stability that is well studied in control theory,
but an important distinction is that it does not require the subsystems or
the overall system to be stable. Consequently, our construction of the lower-
dimensional dynamical network M(δ) with the same delayed interconnection
that gives a bound on the divergence of trajectories of A, does not rely on any
global properties like small-gain of the interconnection nor stability of A, but
instead only uses the individual IS discrepancy functions and the numerical
simulations of A and M(δ). Further, we also show that by choosing appro-
priately small δ the over-approximations can be made arbitrarily precise; and
therefore our verification algorithm is sound and relatively complete.
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Chapter 4
PARTIAL ORDER REDUCTION-BASED
INVARIANT VERIFICATION
In this chapter, we continue with invariant verification for networked cyber-
physical systems (NCPS). In Chapter 3, we study a continuous model, namely
networked dynamical systems, where the states evolve continuously over
time. In contrast, here we focus on systems modeled by discrete time models
or labeled transition systems (LTS). In this model, nodes (or processes) take
actions to communicate with each other and to update the local and shared
states of the system. In a asynchronous network, the nodes runs concur-
rently and the actions may interleave arbitrarily. Thus, the number of the
possible action sequences can be extremely large. Similar to the invariant
verification approach we presented in Chapter 3, we study the reach set com-
putation problem for labeled transition systems. Computing the reach set
for such systems is challenging mainly for two reasons. First, like the model
of networked dynamical system (Definition 3.3), the set of initial states is
uncountable and the number of executions (or trajectories) is uncountable.
Hence explicit examination of every single execution is intractable. Second,
the number of action sequences, even from a single initial state, is large ow-
ing to the combinatorial explosion arising from concurrency. In some cases,
the number grows exponentially with the time bound. In this chapter, we
propose a verification method to address both challenges which exploits the
sensitivity of executions to the ordering of actions.
4.1 Enhance Partial Order Reduction with Metrics
Consider an asynchronous network consisting of N components. In the case
where each component takes an action independent of others, the entire net-
work can take N ! different action sequences or executions. Checking the
invariance property of the network then requires us to examine all these
47
possible action sequences. Partial order reduction methods were first in-
troduced in the context of model checking concurrent softwares to reduce
the number of action sequences needed to be explored in performing model
checking [81, 34, 35]. It exploits the fact that some pairs of actions taken
by different nodes may be commutative, and therefore the executions ob-
tained by swapping them need not to be explored both times. Precisely, two
actions a and b are said to be independent if from any state, the resulting
state would be the same regardless of the order in which a and b are exe-
cuted as illustrated in Figure 4.1a. This independence relation allows one to
define relation over the set of executions which swaps independent actions.
Equivalent executions from the same initial state reach the same final state.
If we can show that the invariance properties are indifferent to equivalent
executions, then checking invariance for a representative action sequence is
sufficient for proving it for the whole equivalent class.
Partial order reduction has proven to be a powerful tool in software veri-
fication. It has been successfully applied to a variety of distributed systems,
including leader election protocol [82], indexers [83], file systems [84], security
protocol [85] and distributed schedulers [86]. In [84], a file transfer protocol
with millions of states and transitions is verified in a matter of seconds using
a partial order reduction method.
The conventional partial order methods have two limitations that hinder
their application to cyber-physical systems. First, a pair of actions are con-
sidered independent only if they lead to exactly the same state regardless
of the order of their execution. Such exactly independent action pairs are
rare in CPS context, where the individual nodes often interact with a shared
environment in the presence of noise and disturbances. This makes the par-
tial order reduction methods ignore action pairs which lead to nearly but
not exactly identical states. Second, there is no way to reason about exe-
cutions with different initial states, even if they experience the same action
sequences.
In this work, we develop partial order reduction techniques that take ad-
vantage of information about the sensitivity of the transitions of the in-
dividual agents in the system to prune executions that are approximately
equivalent. First of all, we assume that there is a metric on the state space.
We introduce the notion of approximate independence of actions. Specifi-
cally, with a parameter ε ≥ 0 chosen by the user, two actions a and b are
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(a) Resulting states are exactly the
same for executing actions a and b in
any order.
(b) The states are indicated by vectors. Action
a rotate the state around x-axis for 20◦ and b
rotate the state around z-axis for 20◦.
Executing actions a and b in different ordering
result in states close to each other.
Figure 4.1: Exactly and approximately independent actions.
ε-independent if from any state, the resulting states are within ε distance
regardless of the order in which actions a and b are executed. An example
of approximate independent actions is illustrated in Figure 4.1b. Smaller
of the parameter ε, the final states after executing ε-independent actions in
any order are closer to each other. The conventional (exact) independence
relation, as illustrated in Figure 4.1a, is a special case of ε-independence re-
lation with ε = 0. With this extension, we can construct equivalent classes of
action sequences by swapping approximately independent actions. Although
executions that follow equivalent action sequences may not necessarily reach
the same final state, the final states should be close to each other.
Together with this approximate independence relation, we exploit the
continuity of the transition functions for approximating reachable states.
Roughly, the continuity of an action a captures the notion that executing
action a from two states that are close to each other, should result in states
that remain close. Using the continuity property, we are able to induc-
tively compute the distance between a pair of executions using the distance
between their initial states. Combining continuity with ε-independence re-
lation, though careful analysis which will be presented in Section 4.6 we can
quantify the distance between executions starting from initial states that are
close to each other and follow equivalent action sequences.
In a nutshell, partial order reduction is model checking that exploits rep-
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resentatives from equivalent classes of executions [23, 87]. The reduction
is more efficient if a larger size of equivalent class can be represented by a
particular execution. Now with the notions of ε-independent actions and
continuity, we expand the representation power of a single execution. We
will show examples in Section 4.8 that for models where the conventional
partial order reduction does not apply, our method can efficiently compute
an over-approximation of states reached by a class of executions close to a
given representative.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First in Section 4.2 we
discuss related works. In Section 4.3, we introduce a modeling framework
for infinite state systems and a notion of continuity of actions. Then in Sec-
tion 4.4, we introduce the notion of ε-independent actions and equivalent
classes of action sequences. In Sections 4.5-4.7, we gradually develop an al-
gorithm to compute over-approximated reach set of all equivalent executions
using a reduced set of action sequences. This algorithm is applied to ver-
ify invariance properties of a linear transition system and a heater control
system in Section 4.8.
4.2 Related Works
There are two main classes of partial order methods proposed in the last few
decades: persistent set methods and sleep set methods. For each state of
the system, the persistent/ample set methods compute a subset of enabled
transitions, the persistent set (or ample set), such that the omitted transitions
are independent to those selected [23, 82]. The reduced system which only
considers the transitions in the persistent set is guaranteed to represent all
behaviors of the original system. The persistent sets and the reduced systems
are often derived by static analysis of the code. More recently, researchers
developed the sleep set methods to avoid the static analysis [88, 89, 83].
These methods examine the history of actions taken by an execution and
decide a set of actions that need to be explored in the future. The set of
omitted actions is the sleep set. The persistent set and sleep set methods
can be used complementary [83].
In the context of cyber-physical systems, robustness analysis are devel-
oped to quantify the closeness of executions with disturbances. The authors
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of [90] presented an algorithm to compute the output deviation with bounded
disturbance. The algorithm combines symbolic execution and optimization
techniques. In [91], the authors introduce the robustness analysis to many
classic algorithms and proposed a automated framework to prove robustness
for softwares. Later in [92], this technique is extended to verify robustness
of networked systems.
4.3 Infinite State Transition Systems
We start this chapter by introducing a labeled transition system as a mathe-
matical model of concurrent NCPS. The state of the labeled transition sys-
tem can be finite-valued or real-valued, that is, they are hybrid. The states
evolve according to (possibly nondeterministic) actions and their correspond-
ing transition functions. This framework can capture distributed consensus
and flocking algorithms [93, 94, 95], clock synchronization protocols [96, 97],
and other distributed control systems [98, 99]. We define a discrete version of
discrepancy functions. Roughly, discrepancy functions we use here quantify
the continuity property for the transition functions of the system.
4.3.1 Labeled Transition Systems
We will study a class of infinite state transition systems where each variable
of the system either takes values in a finite set or is real-valued. The initial
set and the set of executions can be infinite.
Definition 4.1. A Labeled Transition System A is a tuple 〈X ∪L,Θ, A,→〉
where
(i) X is a set of real-valued variables and L is a set of finite-valued vari-
ables. Q = Val(X ∪ L) is the set of states,
(ii) Θ ⊆ Q is a compact set of initial states,
(iii) A is a finite set of actions, and
(iv) →⊆ Q× A×Q is a transition relation.
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A state q ∈ Q is a valuation of the real-valued and finite-valued variables.
We denote q.X
∆
= q d X and q.L ∆= q d L respectively, the continuous (real-
valued) and discrete (finite-valued) part of the state. As we discussed in
Chapter 2, the continuous part q.X can be seen as a vector in R|X| with
some fixed ordering. For δ ≥ 0 and q ∈ Q, we define the δ-neighborhood
of q as Bδ(q) ∆= {q′ ∈ Q : q′.L = q.L ∧ |q′.X − q.X| ≤ δ}. The norm
| · | is the standard p-norm with arbitrary p ∈ [1,∞] chosen by the user.
For any (q, a, q′) ∈→, we write q a→ q′. For any action a ∈ A we define
guard(a) = {q ∈ Q | ∃q′ ∈ Q, q a→ q′} as the guard of a, which is the set of
states where a can occur. An action a is deterministic if for any state q ∈ Q,
at most one state q′ ∈ Q satisfies q a→ q′. A deterministic action is specified
by a guard and a transition function. In this chapter we will overload the
name of an action a with its transition function. Thus for each q ∈ guard(a),
q
a→ a(q). In this chapter, we will make the following assumptions.
Assumption 4.1. All the actions in A are deterministic. For each a ∈ A
and any q, q′ ∈ Q, the transition function a : Q→ Q satisfies
if q.L = q′.L, then a(q).L = a(q′).L.
It is straightforward to see that any deterministic transitions system with
no real-valued variables (X = ∅) satisfies Assumption 4.1, where the transi-
tion function a(q) is defined as q′ if q a→ q′ and otherwise as q.
Let A∗ denote the set of finite action sequences (also called traces). For an
action sequence τ ∈ A∗, we denote by len(τ) ∈ N the length of τ . For any
for i ∈ [len(τ)], τ(i) is the i-th action in τ .
For a deterministic transition system, a state q0 ∈ Q and an action se-
quence τ = a0a1 . . . an−1 uniquely specify a potential execution as an alternat-
ing sequence ξ = q0, a0, q1, a1, . . . , an−1, qn where for each i ∈ [n] ai(qi) = qi+1.
We denote such a potential execution by ξq0,τ . An execution is a potential
execution such that (i) for i ∈ [n], qi ∈ guard(ai), and (ii) the first state
q0 is in the initial set Θ. For any potential execution ξ, trace(ξ) denote its
action sequence, that is trace(ξq0,τ ) = τ ∈ A∗. The length of ξ equals to the
length of its trace. For i ∈ [len(ξ)], ξ(i) = qi is the state visited by ξ after
the i-th transition. The first and last state on ξ are denoted respectively by
ξ. fstate = ξ(0) and ξ. lstate = ξ(len(ξ)).
For a subset of initial states S ⊆ Θ and a time bound T ≥ 0, we denote by
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Execs(S, T ) as the set of length T executions of the system from initial states
S. We denote by Traces(S, T )
∆
= {trace(ξ) | ξ ∈ Execs(S, T )} as the set of
length T traces that are taken by executions from S. We denote the reach
set at time T by Reach(S, T )
∆
= {ξ. lstate | ξ ∈ Execs(S, T )}. In this chapter,
we present an algorithm to over-approximate the reach set Reach(Θ, T ) using
partial order reduction.
1 automata Linear(n ∈ N, N ∈ N)
variables
3 x : Rn;
d : BN ;
5 initially
xi ∈ [−4, 4] for each i ∈ [n];
7 di := false for each i ∈ [n];
1transitions
ai for each i ∈ [N ]
3pre di = f alse
eff x := Aix ∧ di := true;
5a⊥
pre ∧i∈[N ]di:
7eff di := false for each i ∈ [N ];
Figure 4.2: Transition system of consensus.
Example 4.1 (Asynchronous Linear Transition System). An asyn-
chronous linear transition system is presented in Figure 4.2. The system
two vectors of variables, a real-valued vector x with valuations in Rn and a
Boolean-valued vector d. The set of action is {ai}i∈[N ] ∪ {a⊥}. The guard
and transition function of each action are defined by the precondition (pre)
and effect (eff) statements. For each i ∈ [N ], the action ai modifies x as Aix,
where Ai is an n × n matrix. The Boolean di’s are used to ensure that all
the actions ai occur before any can be repeated. If for all i ∈ [N ] di = true,
then the action a⊥ is enabled and it resets di to false.
It can be checked that the transitions are deterministic. For any q, q′ ∈ Q
with q.d = q′.d, we will show that Assumption 4.1 holds. For any i ∈ [N ],
action ai sets di to true and keeps all other components unchanged, hence
ai(q).d = ai(q
′).d. Also, the action a⊥ resets all variables di, hence a⊥(q).d =
a⊥(q′).d. Hence, this transition system satisfies Assumption 4.1.
For an instance of the system with N = 3, an example action sequence
can be τ = a0a2a1a⊥a1a0a2a⊥, where the reset action a⊥ is applied exactly
once after all of the other actions {a0, a1, a2} are applied once. Thus, the
linear transformations can be applied in any order and one application of
each constitutes a “round”. This can be viewed as an abstraction of iterative
consensus [100, 46], where N processes perform computations on a shared
state. We note that the system will remain satisfying Assumption 4.1 if we
replace Ai with a nonlinear transition function ai : Rn → Rn.
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4.3.2 Discrepancy Functions
As we discussed in Chapter 3 and the authors show in [27, 52], for comput-
ing reach set from an uncountable set of initial states, one can exploit the
sensitivity of the executions on initial states. In the context of labeled transi-
tion systems, discrepancy functions capture the distance between continuous
states after an action is applied to a pair of states.
Definition 4.2. For an action a ∈ A, a function βa : R≥0 → R≥0 is a
discrepancy function if for any pair of states q, q′ ∈ Q with q.L = q′.L,
(i) |a(q).X − a(q′).X| ≤ βa(|q.X − q′.X|), and
(ii) βa → 0 as |q.X − q′.X| → 0.
Roughly, discrepancy functions captures that executing action a from two
states that are close to each other should result in states that remain close.
With discrepancy functions, we can reason about distance between executions
that share the same trace using their initial distance.
Proposition 4.1. Fix any time bound T ≥ 0 and any action sequences
τ = a0a1a2 . . . aT equipped with discrepancy functions {βat}Tt=0. For any pair
of states q, q′ ∈ Q with q.L = q′.L, the last states of the pair of potential
executions ξ = ξq,τ and ξ
′ = ξq′,τ satisfy
ξ. lstate .L = ξ′. lstate .L, and
|ξ. lstate .X − ξ′. lstate .X| ≤ βaTβaT−1 . . . βa0(|q.X − q′.X|).
The proposition described above can be proved by applying the property
of discrepancy functions along the action sequence τ . This proposition al-
lows us to compute the distance between a pair of potential executions from
their initial distance. We will derive the discrepancy functions for the linear
transition systems in the following example.
Example 4.2. Consider an instance of the asynchronous linear transition
system presented in Example 4.1 with n = 3 and N = 3. We will use the
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standard 2-norm on the state space R3. Let the matrices Ai be
A0 =

0.2 −0.2 −0.3
−0.2 0.2 −0.1
−0.3 −0.1 0.3
 , A1 =

0.2 0.3 0.2
0.3 −0.2 0.3
0.2 0.3 0
 , A2 =

−0.1 0 0.4
0 0.4 −0.2
0.4 −0.2 −0.1
 .
We note that all the three matrices are stable. For any ai ∈ A and any state
q, q′ ∈ Q with q.L = q′.L,
|ai(q).X − ai(q′).X|2 ≤ |Ai|2|q.X − q′.X|2.
We note that the induced 2-norms of the matrices are |A0|2 = 0.57, |A1|2 =
0.56, |A2|2 = 0.53. For any v ∈ R≥0, the discrepancy functions of a0, a1, a2
are defined as follows,
βa0(v) = 0.57v, βa1(v) = 0.56v, and βa2(v) = 0.53v.
4.4 Independent Actions and Close Executions
Central to partial order methods is the notion of independent actions. In the
conventional sense, a pair of actions are independent if the resulting state is
exactly the same regardless of the order in which the actions are executed. In
this section, we extend this notion with an approximation parameter ε ≥ 0,
such that a pair of actions are ε-independent if the resulting states are within
ε distance after swapping the order of actions.
4.4.1 Approximately Independent Actions
Definition 4.3. For ε ≥ 0, two distinct actions a, b ∈ A are ε-independent,
denoted by a
ε∼ b, if for any state q ∈ Q,
(i) (Commutativity) ab(q).L = ba(q).L, and
(ii) (Closeness) |ab(q).X − ba(q).X| ≤ ε.
This notion of ε-independence has two extensions form the standard def-
inition of independent actions (see e.g. Definition 8.3 of [24]). The main
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extension is that the continuous states of ab(q) and ba(q) need not match up
perfectly. Instead, for a parameter ε ≥ 0, the continuous states are required
to be within ε distance. If the two actions a, b are ε-approximately indepen-
dent with ε = 0, Definition 4.3 becomes the commutative condition in the
standard definition of independent actions.
We note that this extension introduces a side effect that swapping indepen-
dent actions may disturb the enableness of the future actions. An example
is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Suppose action a and b are ε-independent with
ε = 0, as illustrated in Figure 4.3a. If ξq0,abc is an execution, then action
c is enabled at state q2. After swapping actions a and b the potential ex-
ecution ξq0,bac still visits q2 and action c remains to be enabled. However,
if ε > 0, as illustrated in Figure 4.3b, swapping actions a and b makes the
execution deviate from the state q2 to q
′
2. Then, whether action c would be
enabled at q′2 is unknown. Hence, if ξq0,abc is an execution, that does not
imply that the potential execution ξq,bac is also an execution. Later in this
chapter, we will compute a ball around an execution ξq0,abc such that the ball
over-approximate all potential executions derived by swapping ε-independent
action pairs of ξ. Due to this side effect, the tube may contains potential
executions that need not to be included. Despite that, in Section 4.6, we are
able to show that for small enough ε, this side effect can be made negligible
and the reach set can be over-approximated precisely.
(a) If a
ε∼ b with ε = 0, swapping actions a
and b does not affect future actions.
(b) If a
ε∼ b with ε > 0, swapping actions
a and b may change the enableness
condition of future actions.
Figure 4.3: The enableness condition guarantees that swapping
independent actions in an execution results in a valid execution. However,
the same property does not hold for approximately independent actions.
The second extension we made in Definition 4.3 is that action b is not
required to be enabled at state a(q). As a consequence, for a pair of ε-
independent actions a and b, if ξq0,ab is an execution, ξq0,ba may not be one.
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As we discussed in the previous paragraph, swapping ε-independent actions
does not maintain the enableness property of an execution any way. Hence,
making this extension does not introduce additional loss of precision.
In the notion of ε-independence, the parameter ε ≥ 0 captures the degree
of the approximation. For a smaller ε, the independent relation is more
restrictive. For an action sequence τ ∈ A∗ and an action a ∈ A, τ is ε-
independent to a, written as τ
ε∼ a, if τ is empty string or for every i ∈
[len(τ)], τ(i)
ε∼ a.
It is clear that the approximate independence relation is symmetric. How-
ever, it need not to be transitive. We give instances of both transitive and
non-transitive independence relations in the following example.
Example 4.3. We will discuss the approximately independent actions in
Example 4.2. Fix any i, j ∈ [N ] such that i 6= j and any state q ∈ Q. It can
be checked that the following holds:
aiaj(q).dk = ajai(q).dk =
 true, k ∈ {i, j}q.dk, otherwise.
Hence, we have aiaj(q).d = ajai(q).d and the commutativity condition of
Definition 4.3 holds for any pair of actions ai and aj.
We will examine the closeness condition with an instance of the system.
Notice that for any q ∈ Q, switching the order of ai, aj leads to
|aiaj(q).x− ajai(q).x|2 = |(AiAj −AjAi)q.x|2 ≤ |AiAj −AjAi|2|q.x|2. (4.1)
If the matrices Ai and Aj commute, then ai and aj are ε-approximately
independent with ε = 0. If Q is a compact set or the system has a bounded
invariant set, then |q.X|2 is bounded and there always exists a finite ε ≥ 0
such that ai
ε∼ aj. Consider the matrices A0, A1, A2 presented in Example 4.2.
We note that A0, A1, A2 are all stable matrices. Fix any state q and any
i ∈ [3]. The change in the squared 2-norm of the states after the transition
is
|ai(q).x|22 − |q.x|22 = q.x>A>i Aiq.x− q.x>q.x = q.x>(A>i Ai − I3)q.x.
It can be checked that, for each i ∈ [3], A>i Ai − I3 is a negative definite
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matrix. Hence |ai(q).x|2 ≤ |q.x|2 holds for each i ∈ [3] and any state q.
That is, the norm of the continuous state is non-increasing. Suppose initially
x ∈ [−4, 4]3 then the 2-norm of the initial state is bounded by the value
4
√
3. Since the norm of state is non-increasing in any transitions, we can
show that Inv = {x ∈ R3 : |x|2 ≤ 4
√
3} is an invariant of the system. Thus,
from Equation (4.1), we have |a0a1(q).x − a1a0(q).x|2 ≤ 0.1, |a0a2(q).x −
a2a0(q).x|2 ≤ 0.07, and |a1a2(q).x − a2a1(q).x|2 ≤ 0.17. Thus, with ε = 0.1,
it follows that a0
ε∼ a2 and a1 ε∼ a2. Here the ε∼ relation is not transitive. On
the other hand, if we choose ε = 0.2, then any pair of actions in a0, a1, a2 is
ε-independent, where
ε∼ is transitive.
Definition 4.3 implies that from any state q, executing two ε-independent
actions in either order, we end up in states that are within ε distance. In the
following proposition, we examine potential executions with different initial
states.
Proposition 4.2. For a pair of ε-independent actions a, b ∈ A, two states
q, q′ ∈ Q with q.L = q′.L, we have
(i) ba(q).L = ab(q′).L, and
(ii) |ba(q).X − ab(q′).X| ≤ βbβa(|q.X − q′.X|) + ε,
where βa, βb are discrepancy functions of a, b respectively.
Proof. Fix any pair of states q, q′ ∈ Q such that q.L = q′.L. Since a ε∼ b,
we have ba(q).L = ab(q).L. Using Assumption 4.1 twice, we have ab(q).L =
ab(q′).L.
Using triangular inequality, we have |ba(q).X − ab(q′).X| ≤ |ba(q).X −
ba(q′).X|+ |ba(q′).X − ab(q′).X|. The first term is bounded by βbβa(|q.X −
q′.X|) using the property of discrepancy functions. The second term is
bounded by ε by definition of approximate independent actions. Therefore
|ba(q).X − ab(q′).X| ≤ βbβa(|q.X − q′.X|) + ε.
4.4.2 Equivalent Action Sequences and Close Executions
For a set of ε-approximately independent actions, we define an equivalence
relation on the space of finite action sequences A∗.
58
Definition 4.4. For any ε ≥ 0, we define a relation R ⊆ A∗ ×A∗ such that
τRτ ′ iff there exists σ, η ∈ A∗ and a, b ∈ A such that
a
ε∼ b, τ = σabη, and τ ′ = σbaη.
We define an equivalence relation on traces
ε≡ ⊆ A∗×A∗ called ε-equivalence,
as the reflexive and transitive closure of R.
That is, a pair of traces τ, τ ′ ∈ A∗ is ε-equivalent if we can construct
τ ′ from τ by swapping consecutive ε-independent actions. In the following
proposition, we show that two potential executions with the same initial
discrete state (location) and equivalent trace share the same final locations.
Proposition 4.3. Fix any potential executions ξ = ξq0,τ and ξ
′ = ξq′0,τ ′. If
ξ and ξ′ have the same initial location and equivalent traces, then they have
the same final location. Precisely,
if q0.L = q
′
0.L and τ
ε≡ τ ′, then ξ. lstate .L = ξ′. lstate .L.
Proof. If τ = τ ′, then the proposition directly follows Assumption 4.1. Sup-
pose τ 6= τ ′, from Definition 4.4, there exists a sequence of action sequences
τ0, τ1, . . . , τk to join τ and τ
′ by swapping neighboring approximately inde-
pendent actions. Precisely the sequence {τi}ki=0 satisfies
(i) τ0 = τ and τk = τ
′, and
(ii) for each pair τi and τi+1, there exists σ, η ∈ A∗ and a, b ∈ A such that
a
ε∼ b, τi = σabη, and τi+1 = σbaη.
From Definition 4.3, swapping approximately independent actions maintains
the location in the final state. Hence for any i ∈ [k], ξq0,τi . lstate .L =
ξq0,τi+1 . lstate .L. Therefore, ξ. lstate .L = ξ
′. lstate .L.
Informally, a pair of potential executions that take equivalent action se-
quences should be close to each other. The following definition captures these
pairs of potential executions.
Definition 4.5. For δ, ε ≥ 0, a pair of potential executions ξ = ξq0,τ and
ξ′ = ξq′0,τ are (δ, ε)-close to each other, denoted by ξ
δ,ε≈ ξ′, if
q0.L = q
′
0.L, |q0.X − q′0.X| ≤ δ, and τ
ε≡ τ ′.
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That is, two potential executions ξ, ξ′ are (δ, ε)-close if their first states
lie in the δ-neighborhood of each other, and their traces are ε-equivalent. It
follows from Proposition 4.3 that the final locations of any pair of (δ, ε)-close
potential executions are the same. In Section 4.6, we quantify the distance
between (δ, ε)-close potential executions. Then, by bloating a single potential
execution, we can over-approximate the reach set of all potential executions
close to it.
Example 4.4. In Example 4.3, we show that a0
ε∼ a2 and a1 ε∼ a2 with
ε = 0.1. We consider the following two executions of the system:
ξ = q0, a2, q1, a1, q2, a0, q3, a⊥, q4, and ξ′ = q′0, a1, q
′
1, a0, q
′
2, a2, q
′
3, a⊥, q
′
4.
That is, the traces of the executions are trace(ξ) = a2a1a0a⊥ and trace(ξ′) =
a1a0a2a⊥. For ε = 0.1, we have a2a1a0a⊥
ε≡ a1a2a0a⊥ and a1a2a0a⊥ ε≡
a1a0a2a⊥. Since the equivalence relation
ε≡ is transitive, we have trace(ξ) ε≡
trace(ξ′). Suppose q0 ∈ Bδ(q′0), then ξ and ξ′ are (δ, ε)-close executions with
ε = 0.1.
4.5 Interleaving Independent Actions
In this section, we present several results that help partial order reduction
in model checking labeled transition systems. We will study the distance
between potential executions which are derived by inserting a single action
to the same execution at different positions. Building up on this result,
for any δ, ε ≥ 0 and an execution ξ, we develop an inductive method for
computing distance between ξ and its (δ, ε)-close executions. Throughout
this section, we study a simplified case where the actions are mutually ε-
independent. Later in Section 4.6, we generalize the this result to actions
defined with an arbitrary ε-independence relation.
We start with some definitions related to a set of discrepancy functions.
For a finite set of discrepancy functions {βa}a∈S corresponding to a set of
actions S ⊆ A, we define β = maxa∈S{βa} as the upper bound of discrepancy
functions. For an n ≥ 0 and a function β defined as above, we define a
function γn =
∑n
i=0 β
i. Recall from Chapter 2 that βi is the nested form
of β such that βi = ββi−1 for i ≥ 1 and β0 is the identity mapping. We
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note that for any n ∈ N, the function γn is uniquely specified by a set of
discrepancy functions {βa}a∈S. Using the properties of discrepancy functions
as in Definition 4.2, we can show the following properties of {γn}n∈N.
Proposition 4.4. Fix any finite subset of discrepancy functions {βa}a∈S
with S ⊆ A. Let β = maxa∈S{βa} be the maximum function. For any n ≥ 0,
γn =
∑n
i=0 β
i satisfies
(i) for any ε ∈ R≥0 and any n ≥ n′ ≥ 0, γn(ε) ≥ γn′(ε), and
(ii) limε→0 γn(ε) = 0.
Proof. (i) For any n ≥ 1, we have γn − γn−1 = βn. Since βn = maxa∈S{βa}
for some finite S, using Definition 4.2, βn takes only non-negative values.
Hence, the sequence of functions {γn}n∈R≥0 is non-decreasing.
(ii) Using the property of discrepancy functions, we have limε→0 β(ε) = 0.
By induction on the nested functions, we have limε→0 βi(0) for any i ≥ 0.
Hence for any n ∈ R≥0, limε→0 γn(ε) = limε→0
∑n−1
i=0 β
i(ε) = 0.
4.5.1 Insertion of Independent Action
We will quantify the distance of two potential executions with equivalent
traces using the function γn defined above. Our first step involves computing
the distance between two potential executions after inserting a single action
at different position. We study a simplified case where the inserting action
is independent to all other actions in the execution.
Lemma 4.5. Fix any ε ≥ 0, any initial state q0 ∈ Q, any action a ∈ A and
any action sequence τ ∈ A∗ with length n ≥ 1. If a and τ are ε-independent,
then the potential executions ξ = ξq0,τa and ξ
′ = ξq0,aτ satisfy
(i) ξ′. lstate .L = ξ. lstate .L, and
(ii) |ξ′. lstate .X − ξ. lstate .X| ≤ γn−1(ε), where γn−1 corresponds to the set
of discrepancy functions {βc}c∈τ for the actions in τ .
Proof. Part (i) directly follows from Proposition 4.3. We will prove part (ii)
by induction on the length of the action sequence τ .
Base: For any action sequence τ of length 1, ξ and ξ′ are of the form
ξ = q0, b0, q1, a, q2 and ξ
′ = q0, a, q′1, b0, q
′
2. Since a
ε∼ b0, it follows from
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Definition 4.3 that |q′2.X − q2.X| ≤ ε. Recall from the preliminary that
γ0(ε) = β
0(ε) = ε. Hence |q′2.X − q2.X| ≤ γ0(ε) holds for action sequence τ
with length n = 1.
Induction: Suppose the lemma holds for any τ with length at most n− 1.
Fixed any τ = b0b1 . . . bn−1 of length n, we will show the lemma holds for τ .
Let the potential executions ξ = ξq0,τa and ξ
′ = ξq0,aτ be of the form
ξ = q0, b0, q1, b1, ..., bn−1, qn, a, qn+1,
ξ′ = q0, a, q′1, b0, q
′
2, b1, ..., bn−1, q
′
n+1.
It suffice to prove that |ξ. lstate .X − ξ′. lstate .X| = |qn+1.X − q′n+1.X| ≤
γn−1(ε). We first construct a potential execution ξ′′ = ξq0,b0ab1...bn−1 by swap-
ping the first two actions of ξ′. Then, ξ′′ is of the form
ξ′′ = q0, b0, q1, a, q′′2 , b1, ..., bn−1, q
′′
n+1.
The potential executions ξ, ξ′ and ξ′′ are illustrated in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Executions ξ = ξq0,τa, ξ
′ = ξq0,aτ , and ξ
′′ which is constructed by
swapping the first two actions in ξ′.
We first compare the potential executions ξ and ξ′′. Notice that, ξ and ξ′′
share a common prefix q0, b0, q1. Starting from q1, the action sequence of ξ
′′
is derived from trace(ξ) by inserting action a in front of the action sequence
τ ′ = b1b2 . . . bn−1. Since τ ′
ε∼ a, applying the induction hypothesis on the
length n− 1 action sequence τ ′, we get
|qn+1.X − q′′n+1.X| ≤ γn−2(ε). (4.2)
Then, we compare the potential executions ξ′ and ξ′′. Since b0
ε∼ a, by
applying the property of Definition 4.3 to the first two actions of ξ′ and ξ′′,
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we have |q′2.X − q′′2 .X| ≤ ε. We note that ξ′ and ξ′′ have the same suffix of
action sequence from q′2 and q
′′
2 . Using Proposition 4.1 from states q
′
2 and q
′′
2 ,
we have
|q′n+1.X − q′′n+1.X| ≤ βb1βb2 . . . βbn−1(|q′2.X − q′′2 .X|) ≤ βn−1(ε). (4.3)
Combining Equations (4.2) and (4.3) with triangular inequality, we have
|qn+1.X − q′n+1.X| ≤ |qn+1.X − q′′n+1.X|+ |q′n+1.X − q′′n+1.X|
≤ γn−2(ε) + βn−1(ε) = γn−1(ε).
(4.4)
Therefore, the lemma holds for the action sequence τ with length n, which
completes the induction.
In Lemma 4.6, we analyzed distance between executions after inserting
one single action at different position, where the difference in the inserting
positions is n. We show that the distance between these executions increases
with n.
4.5.2 Permutation of Independent Actions
Using the results we presented in Section 4.5.1, we will compute an upper
bound of the distance between (δ, ε)-close potential executions. We start
with a formal definition of the quantity we are going to compute.
Definition 4.6. For any δ, ε, r ∈ R≥0 and any potential execution ξ = ξq0,τ ,
ξ is a (δ, ε, r)-representative potential execution if any potential execution ξ′
that is (δ, ε)-close to ξ satisfies
ξ′. lstate ∈ Br(ξ. lstate).
That is, for a (δ, ε, r)-representative potential execution ξ, the r-neighborhood
of its last state Br(ξ. lstate) contains the last states of all its (δ, ε)-close poten-
tial executions. The parameter r is the representative radius of the potential
execution ξ. In the rest of this chapter, we will present algorithms to compute
the representative radius and reach set.
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The following lemma states a inductive way of constructing representa-
tive potential executions. Roughly, it shows how the representative radius
r changes if an action a is appended to a potential execution ξ. We start
with a special case where the appended action a is ε-independent of all other
actions on ξ.
Lemma 4.6. Fix any δ, ε, r ∈ R≥0, any (δ, ε, r)-representative potential ex-
ecution ξq0,τ , and any a ∈ A such that τ ε∼ a. Then, ξ = ξq0,τa is a (δ, ε, r′)-
representative potential execution with
r′ = βa(r) + γlen(τ)−1(ε). (4.5)
Proof. Fix any ξ′ such that ξ′
δ,ε≈ ξ with initial state q′0 ∈ Bδ(q0). It follows
from Proposition 4.3 that ξ′. lstate .L = ξ. lstate .L. It suffice to prove that
|ξ′. lstate .X − ξ. lstate .X| ≤ r′.
Since trace(ξ′)
ε≡ τa, trace(ξ′) is in a form φaη with some φη ε≡ τ . We
construct a potential execution ξ′′ = ξq′0,φηa. The three potential executions
are illustrated in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Execution ξ, its ε-equivalent execution ξ′, and execution ξ′′ that
is constructed by swapping action a to the back of ξ′.
We note that the prefix (q0, τ, qn) of ξ is a (δ, ε, r)-representative potential
execution. Since φη
ε≡ τ and q′0 ∈ Bδ(q0), it follows from Definition 4.6 that
|qn.X − q′′n.X| ≤ r. Hence
|ξ. lstate .X − ξ′′. lstate .X| ≤ βa(|qn.X − q′′n.X|) ≤ βa(r). (4.6)
On the other hand, we observe that the traces of ξ′ and ξ′′ differ only in the
position of action a. Application of Lemma 4.5 on ξ′ and ξ′′ yields
|ξ′. lstate .X − ξ′′. lstate .X| ≤ γlen(η)−1(ε) ≤ γlen(τ)−1(ε). (4.7)
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Combining Equations (4.6) and (4.7) with triangular inequality, we have
|ξ. lstate .X − ξ′. lstate .X| ≤ βa(r) + γlen(τ)−1(ε).
In Lemma 4.6, we analyze how the representative radius changes after
appending a single action a to a potential execution ξq0,τ . Here we consider
the spacial case where action a is ε-independent to the entire trace τ . In the
next section, we generalize this results to any action a and trace τ , without
specific requirements on their independence condition.
4.6 Generalization of Executions
In this section, for any parameters δ0, ε ≥ 0 and any potential execution ξ
of length T , we will compute the representative radius δT for ξ, such that
ξ is a (δ0, ε, δT )-representative potential execution. Our method involves
computing a sequence of representative radii {δt}Tt=0 inductively such that δt
is the representative radius of the length t prefix of ξ.
Let action a be the t-th action on ξ and τ be the length t prefix of trace(ξ).
If action a is ε-independent to τ , then the representative radius δt can be
computed from δt−1 using Lemma 4.6. In this section, we generalize this
result to the case where action a is not necessarily ε-independent to the
whole sequence τ . First, we will introduce the notion of anchor position of a
in τ , which is the left most position of action a in all equivalent traces of τ .
4.6.1 Anchor Position
In the proof of Lemma 4.6, we use the fact that any ε-equivalent trace of
τa must be in a form of φaη. We observe that, the representative radius of
ξq0,τa depends on the length of φ and η, as presented in Equation (4.7). For
computing the representative radius, we need the maximum length of η, or
equivalently the minimum length of φ. We introduce the notion of anchor
position to capture this quantity.
For any sequence τ ∈ A∗ and an action a ∈ τ in τ , we define τ.lastPos(a)
as the largest index k such that τ(k) = a. The anchor position is the first
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possible position of a in any τ ′ that is equivalent to τ . We formally define
this quantity as follows.
Definition 4.7. For any action sequence τ ∈ A∗ and any action a ∈ A, the
anchor position of a on τ is
min
τ ′
ε≡τa
τ ′.lastPos(a).
For any trace τa, its ε-equivalent traces can be derived by swapping con-
secutive ε-independent action pairs. Hence, the anchor position of a is the
left most position it can be swapped to. Since any equivalent trace of τa can
be written in a form φaη with some φ, η ∈ A∗, an equivalent way of defining
the anchor position is as as following:
min
φaη
ε≡τa, a/∈η
len(φ).
In Algorithm 4.1, we find the anchor position of action a on an action
sequence τ . For any trace τ and action a, anchor(τ, a) constructs a trace
φ ∈ A∗. Initially φ is set to be the empty sequence. Iteratively, from the end
of τ , we add action τ(t) to φ if it is not independent to the entire trace φa.
We will prove that, length of φ gives the anchor position of action a on trace
τ . The time complexity of the algorithm is at most O(n2), where n is the
length of trace τ .
Algorithm 4.1 anchor(τ, a)
1: φ← 〈〉;
2: //let T be the length of τ
3: for t = T − 1 : 0 do
4: if ∃b ∈ φa, τ(t) 6 ε∼ b then
5: φ← τ(t)φ;
6: end if
7: end for
8: return len(φ);
Lemma 4.7. For any action a ∈ A and trace τ ∈ A∗, the function anchor(τ, a)
computes the anchor position of a on τ .
Proof. For a trace τ and an action a, algorithm anchor(τ, a) constructs a
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trace φ and returns its length. To prove that len(φ) gives the anchor position
(p) of a on τ , we show both len(φ) ≥ p and len(φ) ≤ p.
len(φ) ≥ p. It suffice to prove the statement by constructing a trace η
such that φaη
ε≡ τa and a /∈ η. Let η = τ\φ be the remaining subsequence
of τ after removing the actions in φ. We note that the ordering of actions
in η is the same as that in τ . For each action c ∈ η, line 5 is not executed.
Hence, for all actions b ∈ φa which is originally to the right of c, we have
b
ε∼ c. Therefore, action c can be swapped repeatedly to the right of action a.
Repeat this process for all actions in η, we derive trace φaη from the original
trace τa. Therefore φaη
ε≡ τa. In addition, we note that from Definition 4.3,
an ε-independent action pair consists of two distinctive actions, which implies
a 6 ε∼ a. Hence, for each occurrence a ∈ τ , line 5 is not executed, that is, a /∈ η.
Therefore, the statement holds.
len(φ) ≤ p. First, we convert any trace τa to a trace consists of only
distinctive actions. If otherwise some action b ∈ τa occurs more than once,
we replace the occurrences as distinctive pseudo-actions b0, b1, . . . , such that
each bi inherit the same independence relation from b and any pair of these
pseudo-actions is not independent. In this way, we map an arbitrary trace
τa to a trace consists of only distinctive actions. It can be checked that this
mapping is bijective. Without loss of generality, we assume that the actions
in τa are distinctive.
We prove len(φ) ≤ p by contradiction. Suppose len(φ) > p, then there
exist traces φ′, η′ such that (i) a /∈ η′, (ii) φ′aη′ ε≡ τa, and (iii) len(φ′) <
len(φ). From (iii), there exists an action c ∈ φ\φ′. If there are multiple
choices of such actions, we choose the rightmost action c in φ. From lines 4
and 5, action c is in φ iff there exists another action b ∈ φ to the right of c
such that c 6 ε∼ b. Since we choose action c as the rightmost action in φ that
is not in φ′, we have b ∈ φ′. Originally in trace τa, action b is to the right of
action c. As actions b and c are not ε-independent, in any equivalent trace
φ′aη′
ε≡ τa, the relative position of them should not be changed. Hence in
trace φ′aη′, action b is also to the right of action c. However, since b ∈ φ′ and
c /∈ φ′, we have action c is to the right of action b in trace φ′aη′. We derive
a contradiction. Therefore, if the actions in τa are distinctive, len(φ) ≤ p.
Example 4.5. In Example 4.3, we show that a0
ε∼ a2 and a1 ε∼ a2 with
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ε = 0.1. It can also be checked that a⊥ is not ε-independent to any actions.
Consider the anchor position of a0 on the trace τ = a⊥a2a1. We can swap a0
ahead following the sequence τa0 = a⊥a2a1a0
ε≡ a⊥a1a2a0 ε≡ a⊥a1a0a2. Since
neither of a⊥ and a1 is independent to action a0, it cannot be swapped any
further ahead. The anchor position of a0 is 2, corresponding to its position
on a⊥a1a0a2. Algorithm 4.1 construct a trace φ = a⊥a1, where the length of
φ gives the correct anchor position 2.
4.6.2 Generalization of an Individual Execution
In this section, we present an algorithm to compute a ball centered at the
final state of a potential execution ξ, such that the ball contains the final
states of all (δ0, ε)-close executions of ξ. Algorithm 4.2 takes inputs of an
execution ξ = ξq0,τ , two parameters δ0, ε ≥ 0, and a set of discrepancy
functions {βa}a∈A. For each t ∈ [len(ξ)], let a be the t-th action of ξ and τ
be the prefix before a. The algorithm first finds a lower bound of the anchor
position of a on τ , which is the leftmost position that action a can reach by
swapping consecutive ε-independent action on τ . Using the anchor positions,
we can compute a sequence of representative radii {δt}Tt=1 inductively. Our
computation guarantees that for each t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, the length t prefixes
of ξ is a (δ0, ε, δt)-representative potential execution.
Algorithm 4.2 Generalization(ξ, δ0, ε, {βa}a∈A)
1: β ← max{βa};
2: //let T be the length ξ
3: for t ∈ [T ] do
4: //let the length (t+ 1) prefix of trace(ξ) be τa
5: k ← anchor(τ, a);
6: if k = t then
7: δt+1 ← βa(δt);
8: else
9: δt+1 ← βa(δt) + γt−k−1(ε);
10: end if
11: end for
12: return BδT (ξ(T ));
We will establish the correctness of Algorithm 4.2. First, we will show that
the sequence of {δt}Tt=1 is valid representative radii for the prefixes of ξ.
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Lemma 4.8. For any t ≤ len(ξ), the length t prefix of ξ is a (δ0, ε, δt)-
representative execution.
Proof. For any t ≤ len(ξ), We prove the lemma by induction on t.
Base: For t = 0, the length 0 prefix of ξ is a single state q0. Any ξ
′ (δ0, ε)-
close to q0 is also a single state q
′
0 with q
′
0 ∈ Bδ0(q0). Hence the lemma holds
for t = 0.
Induction: Suppose the lemma holds for any prefix of ξ with length at most
t < len(ξ). We will prove the lemma holds for the length t + 1 prefix of ξ.
Let q0 be the initial state of ξ, τ be the length t prefix of trace(ξ), and a ∈ A
is the (t+ 1)th action. Then ξt+1 = ξq0,τa is the length t+ 1 prefix of ξ. The
execution ξt+1 is illustrated in Figure ??. Fix any ξ
′ that is ξ′ is (δ0, ε)-close
to ξt+1. From Proposition 4.3, ξ
′. lstate .L = ξt+1. lstate .L. It suffice to prove
that |ξ′. lstate .X − ξt+1. lstate .X| ≤ δt+1.
Since trace(ξ′)
ε≡ τa, action a is in the sequence trace(ξ′). Partition-
ing trace(ξ′) on the last occurrence of a, we get trace(ξ′) = φaη for some
φ, η ∈ A∗ with a 6∈ η. Since k is a lower bound of the anchor position, from
Definition 4.7, the position of the last occurrence of a on trace(ξ′) is at least
k. Hence we have len(φ) ≥ k and len(η) = t− len(φ) ≤ t− k. We construct
another potential execution ξ′′ = ξξ′. fstate,φηa. The executions ξ, ξ′ and ξ′′ are
illustrated in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Illustration of the potential executions.
From the inductive hypothesis, the length t prefix of ξt+1, which is the
execution ξt = q0, τ, at in the figure is an (δ0, ε, δt)-representative execution.
We note that the length t prefix ξ′′ is (δ0, ε)-close to ξt. Therefore, |qt.X −
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q′′t .X| ≤ δt. Using the discrepancy function of action a, we have
|qt+1.X − q′′t+1.X| ≤ βa(|qt.X − q′′t .X|) ≤ βa(δt). (4.8)
We will quantify the distance between ξ′ and ξ′′. There are two cases:
(i) If k = t and line 7 is executed. Then, len(η) ≤ t− k = 0, that is, η is an
empty string. Hence, ξ′ and ξ′′ are indeed identical and q′t+1 = q
′′
t+1. Thus
from Equation (4.8),
|qt+1.X − q′t+1.X| = |qt+1.X − q′′t+1.X| ≤ βa(δt).
Therefore if δt+1 is computed by line 7, the lemma holds for the length t+ 1
prefix of ξ. (ii) Otherwise k < 0 and line 9 is executed. From Lemma 4.5,
we can bound the distance between ξ′ and ξ′′ as
|q′t+1.X − q′′t+1.X| ≤ γlen(η)−1(ε) ≤ γt−k−1(ε).
Combining with Equation (4.8), we get
|qt+1.X−q′t+1.X| ≤ |qt+1.X−q′t+1.X|+ |qt+1.X−q′t+1.X| ≤ βa(δt)+γt−k−1(ε).
Therefore, if δt+1 is computed by line 9, the lemma holds for the length t+ 1
prefix of ξ, which completes the proof.
Using this lemma, we immediately establish the soundness of the algorithm
as follows.
Theorem 4.9. For any execution ξ′ such that ξ′ is (δ0, ε)-close to ξ, the last
state of ξ′ is in the returned set BδT (ξ(T )).
Proof. From Lemma 4.8, ξ is a (δ0, ε, δT )-representative potential execution.
From Definition 4.6, for any potential execution ξ′ that is (δ0, ε)-close to ξ,
we have ξ′. lstate ∈ BδT (ξ(T )).
In the following theorem, we show that the radius δT can be made arbitrar-
ily small for small enough initial radius δ0 and the approximation parameter
ε.
Theorem 4.10. For any t ≤ len(ξ), as δ0 → 0 and ε→ 0, the size of radius
δT goes to 0.
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Proof. From Proposition 4.4, for any n, γn(ε) → 0 as ε → 0. From Def-
inition 4.2, for any δt and discrepancy function β, β(δt) → 0 as δt → 0.
Therefore, either line 6 or line 8 in Algorithm 4.2 is executed, δt+1 → 0 as
δt → 0 and ε → 0. Iteratively applying this observation leads that, δT → 0
as δ0 → 0 and ε→ 0. Therefore the theorem holds.
For an execution ξ of length n, the worst case time complexity of Algo-
rithm 4.2 is O(n3), since finding the anchor position can take at most O(n2)
time. However, if all actions in ξ are mutually approximately independent,
the algorithm can over-approximate the final states of a number of O(n!) ex-
ecutions in the best case, which can lead to a dramatical saving in reach set
computation. In the coming section, we will use Algorithm 4.2 as a subrou-
tine to compute an over-approximation of the reach set of a labeled transition
system.
4.7 Reach Set Over-Approximation
In Section 4.6, we presented a function generalize() to over-approximate the
reach set of a group of (δ, ε)-close potential executions using a single potential
execution. Building upon this function, we will present an algorithm to
compute an over-approximation of the reach set of a labeled transition system
at a time T .
4.7.1 Equivalent Action Sequences
As we defined in Section 4.3.1, for any set of initial states S ⊆ Θ and time
bound T ≥ 0, Execs(S, T ) is the set of executions from S with length T ,
and Traces(S, T ) is the set of action sequences taken by these executions.
In concurrent systems, even with S being a singleton {q}, the size of action
sequences Traces(q, T ) can grow exponentially with T . Partial order reduc-
tion methods are developed to reduce the number of action sequences needed
to be explored. These methods exploit the equivalence relation on the set
of action sequences and divide Traces(S, T ) into equivalence classes. Then,
checking a representative action sequence suffices to cover the whole equiv-
alence class. Here we define the set of representative action sequences in a
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formal way.
Definition 4.8. Fix any time bound T ≥ 0, any equivalence relation ε≡ on
the set of length T action sequence AT and any set of state S ⊆ Q. The
T -representative action sequences from S is a set T ⊆ Traces(S, T ) such that
(i) any pair of action sequences in T are not ε-independent, and
(ii) an action sequence τ ∈ T is a T -representative sequence iff there exists
an action sequence τ ′ ∈ Traces(S, T ) such that τ ε≡ τ ′.
In another word, the T -representative action sequences T is the quotient
space of the set Traces(S, T ) by the equivalence relation
ε≡. Over the past
few decades, various partial order methods have been proposed to compute
the representative action sequences. Roughly, there are two main classes of
methods that have been proposed. For each state q, the ample/persistent set
techniques select an ample set as a subset of enabled actions from q, where
the missing actions are independent to those actions in the ample set [23].
Then execution sequences that take actions from the ample sets are the
representatives for equivalent classes. In contrast, the sleep set techniques
decide which action to explore on-the-fly [88]. The technique maintains a
sleep set as a set of actions that should not be explored immediately and
update the set based on the independence relation along the execution. In
our algorithm, we assume that the T -representative action sequences can be
computed for any compact initial set S.
4.7.2 Reach Set Over-Approximation
We propose an algorithm to compute an over-approximation of Reach(Θ, T ).
In this algorithm, we first compute a δ-cover Q0 of the initial set Θ such
that Bδ(Q0) ⊇ Θ. Then, in line 4, we compute the T -representative action
sequences from each cover Bδ(q0). Then, we use the algorithm Generalize()
to compute a ball R′ that over-approximate the set of states reached by a
group of executions from a cover following equivalent action sequences. Then
the algorithm returns a set R as a union of such balls R′.
We are able to show that, for any T ≥ 0, the set R over-approximate the
reach set of the system at time T .
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Algorithm 4.3 Reachability algorithm to over-approximate Reach(Θ, T )
1: Q0 ← δ-cover(Θ);
2: R ← ∅;
3: for q0 ∈ Q0 do
4: T ← Traces(Bδ(q0))/ ε≡;
5: for τ ∈ T do
6: R′ ← Generalization(ξq0,τ , δ, ε, {βa}a∈A);
7: R ← R∪R′;
8: end for
9: end for
10: return R;
Theorem 4.11 (Soundness). For the set R returned by Algorithm 4.3, we
have R ⊇ Reach(Θ, T ).
Proof. Fixed any ξ ∈ Execs(Θ, T ), it suffice to show that ξ(T ) ∈ R. Since
ξ(0) ∈ Θ and Q0 is a δ-cover, there exists a q0 ∈ Q0 such that ξ(0) ∈
Bδ(q0). For this q0, let T be the T -presentative action sequences from Bδ(q0)
computed in line 4 . From Definition 4.8, there must be a representative
action sequence τ ∈ T such that τ ε≡ trace(ξ). Since ξ is (δ, ε)-close to ξq0,τ ,
from Theorem 4.9, the R′ computed using Generalization() guarantees that
ξ. lstate ∈ R. Therefore the theorem holds.
We are also able to show that, we can compute the over-approximation up
to arbitrary precision.
Theorem 4.12 (Completeness). For any r > 0, there exist δ, ε > 0 such
that, the set R computed by Algorithm 4.3 satisfies R ⊆ Br(Reach(Θ, T )).
Proof. Fix arbitrary r > 0. The set R is a union of balls R′ computed in
line 6. Fix any such R′ centered at the last state of potential execution
ξ = ξq0,τ . It suffices to show that R′ satisfies R′ ⊆ Br(Reach(Θ, T )) for small
enough δ and ε.
Since τ ∈ T is a T -representative action sequence from the initial set
Bδ(q0), from Definition 4.8, there exists an action sequence τ ′ ∈ Traces(Bδ(q0),
T ) such that τ and τ ′ are ε-equivalent. Hence, there is an execution ξ′ ∈
Execs(Bδ(q0), T ) from the ball Bδ(q0) following the action sequence τ ′. By the
definition of reach set, we have ξ′. lstate ∈ Reach(Θ, T ). On the other hand,
ξ′ is (δ, ε)-close to the potential execution ξ. From Theorem 4.9, ξ′. lstate is
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in the ball R′. That is, the ball R′ and the reach set Reach(Θ, T ) intersect
at the state ξ′. lstate.
From Theorem 4.10, the radius of R′ can be made arbitrarily small as δ
and ε go to 0. We chose small enough δ and ε, such that the radius of R′ is
less than r/2. Therefore, the ball R′ is contained in the radius r ball of the
reach set Br(Reach(Θ, T )).
In this section, we proposed an algorithm to over-approximate the reach
set of label transition systems. In addition, we showed that the computation
can be made arbitrarily precise. We will apply our method to verification of
a linear transition system and a temperature control system.
4.8 Case Studies
4.8.1 Linear Transition Systems
We will first study the linear transition systems as presented in Example 4.1.
In Example 4.3, we constructed an instance of the system with N = 3,
and showed that a0
ε∼ a2 and a1 ε∼ a2. The instance of the system has three
continuous variables and three actions a0, a1, a2. We also showed that a0
ε∼ a2
and a1
ε∼ a2 with ε = 0.1. In Example 4.4 we further presented an execution
and its (δ, ε)-close executions.
For this system, we want to prove if the continuous states can converge to
a box [−0.5, 0.5]3 in three rounds. We illustrate an execution ξ = ξq0,τ with
q0.x = [2.5,−3.5, 1.2] and τ = a0a2a1a⊥a2a1a0a⊥a1a0a2a⊥ in Figure 4.7 (blue
curve). Using Algorithm 4.2, we compute a tube around the execution to
over-approximate all (δ, ε)-close potential executions (green curves). To give
an example of δ, ε-close potential executions to ξ, we compute a potential exe-
cution ξ′ = ξq′0,τ with q
′
0.x = [2.3,−3.2, 1] and τ ′ = a0a1a2a⊥a1a0a2a⊥a2a1a0a⊥
(red curve). The result validates that ξ′ lies in the tube computed using our
technique.
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Figure 4.7: A tube around an execution of a linear transition system. The
blue curve is the execution ξ. The green curves illustrate a tube around ξ.
The red curve is a (δ, ε)-close potential execution with δ = 0.5 and ε = 0.1.
4.8.2 Room Heating Problem
We present a building heating system in Figure 4.8. The building has N
rooms each with a heater. For i ∈ [N ], xi ∈ R is the temperature of room
i and mi ∈ {0, 1} captures the off/on state of the heater in the room. The
building measures the temperature of rooms periodically every T seconds and
save the measurements to yi. Based on the measurement yi, each room takes
action ai to decide whether to turn on or turn off its heater. The Boolean
variable di indicates whether room i has made a decision. These decisions
are made asynchronously among the rooms with a small delay h. For this
system, we want to check whether the temperature of the room remains in
an appropriate range.
automata Roomheating(N : Nat)
2 variables
x : RealN initially x[i] := 60;
4 y : RealN initially y[i] := 60;
d : BoolN initially d := f alseN ;
6 m : BoolN initially m := f alseN ;
8 transitions
oni, for i ∈ [N ]
10 pre !di ∧ yi <= 72
eff x := W (h)x+ b(h) + C(h)m;
12 di := true ∧mi := true;
2offi, for i ∈ [N ]
pre !di ∧ yi >= 68
4eff x := W (h)x+ b(h) + C(h)m;
di := true ∧mi := f alse;
6
8flow
pre ∧i∈[N ]di
10eff x := W (T )x+ b(T ) + C(T )m;
di := f alse for each i ∈ [N ];
12y := x;
Figure 4.8: Transition system of room heating.
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For i ∈ [N ], actions on i, off i capture the decision-making process of room
i on whether or not to turn on the heater. During the process, time elapses
for a (short) period h, which leads to an update of the temperature as an
affine function of current temperature x and the heaters state m. The affine
function is derived from the thermal differential equation presented in [98].
In this section, we use an instance of the system with the following matrices,
W (h) =

0.96 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.97 0.01
0 0.01 0.97
 , b(h) =

1.2
0
1.2
 , C(h) =

0.4 0 0
0 0.1 0
0 0 0.4
 . (4.9)
After a room made its decision, either on i or off i is taken, it sets the variable
di to true. After all variables di are set, action flow captures the time elapse
for a (longer) period T after the decision-making of rooms, and updates a
measure value y. We use an instance of this step with the following matrices,
W (T ) =

0.18 0.11 0.14
0.18 0.25 0.17
0.09 0.13 0.28
 , b(T ) =

34.2
24
30
 , C(T ) =

11.4 0 0
0 8 0
0 0 10
 .
(4.10)
For each i ∈ [N ] and a ∈ {on i, off i}, we will derive the discrepancy func-
tion for action a. For any q, q′ with q.L = q′.L,
|ai(q).x− ai(q′).x|
= |W (h)q.x+ b(h) + C(h)q.m−W (h)q′.x− b(h)− C(h)q′.m|
≤ |W (h)||q.x− q′.x|.
We note that |W (h)| = 0.99. Hence, we can define βa(|q.x−q′.x|) = 0.99|q.x−
q′.x| as the discrepancy functions of each a ∈ {on i, off i}i∈[3]. Similarly, we
derived that βflow(|q.x− q′.x|) = 0.52|q.x− q′.x|.
For any i, j ∈ [3] with i 6= j, a ∈ {on i, off i} and b ∈ {off j, off j}, we can
prove a
ε∼ b with ε = 0.6. Notice that, ai(q).x = W (h)q.x+b(h)+C(h)q.m =
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aj(q).x are identical, but ai(q).m and aj(q).m could be different.
|aiaj(q).x− ajai(q).x|
= |W (h)aj(q).x+ b(h) + C(h)aj(q).m−W (h)ai(q).x− b(h)− C(h)ai(q).m|
= |C(h)aj(q).m− C(h)ai(q).m| ≤ |C(h)||aj(q).m− ai(q).m|.
We note that |C(h)| = 0.4. We will give an upper bound on |aj(q).m −
ai(q).m|. Notice that ai(q).m and q.m can only differ in one bit (mi). Sim-
ilarly, aj(q).m and q.m can only differ in one bit (mj). Hence ai(q).m
and aj(q).m can be differ in at most two bits, and |ai(q).m − aj(q)′.m| ≤
|[1, 1, 0]| = 1.41. Therefore,
|aiaj(q).x− ajai(q).x| ≤ 0.4 ∗ 1.41 ≤ 0.6.
Thus for any pair of rooms, the on/off decisions are ε-approximately inde-
pendent with ε = 0.6. For a round, where each room makes a decision once
in arbitrary order, there are in total 3! = 6 ε-equivalent action sequences.
Figure 4.9: A tube around an execution of a room heating problem. The
blue curve is the execution ξ. The green curves illustrate a tube around ξ
over-approximating (δ, ε)-close potential execution with δ = 2 and ε = 0.6.
We present an execution ξ in Figure 4.9 as the blue curve, which ran for
eight rounds. There are a number of 1.6 million (68) (δ, ε)-close potential
executions of ξ with ε = 0.6 and δ = 2. We illustrate a tube computed by
our technique in green, which is proved to contain the final state of all these
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(δ, ε)-close potential executions.
4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a partial order reduction for infinite state tran-
sition systems. We proposed the notion of ε-independent actions as an ex-
tension of the conventional notion of independent actions, such that the
resulting states are within ε distance regardless of the order of executing a
pair of ε-independent actions. The conventional notion of independent ac-
tions is indeed a special case of ε-independent actions with ε = 0. With
this ε-independence relation, we are able to define an ε-equivalence relation
among traces by swapping consecutive ε-independent actions.
We derive the distance between two executions after inserting a single
action at different positions (Lemma 4.5). We observe that the distance be-
tween executions depends on the difference in the inserting positions. Based
on this result, we proposed an algorithm to compute over-approximated reach
set of all executions with ε-equivalent traces. In O(n3) time, the algorithm
can over-approximate a number of at most O(n!) executions. We applied
the algorithm to verify properties of a linear transition system and a heater
control system.
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Chapter 5
DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE
DISTRIBUTED CONTROL
The distributed control system is a class of cyber-physical system, where
agents cooperate to achieve individual and global objectives. In these sys-
tems, individuals desire to keep certain sensitive data private, while simul-
taneously sharing some information in order to benefit overall system per-
formance. Hence, there is a dichotomy between privacy and cost. Examples
of such systems include peak generation scheduling using consumption data
obtained from smart electric meters [39], traffic-aware navigation based on
location and destination data obtained from smart GPS [37, 38], and data
aggregation from sensor networks [40, 41].
At one extreme is the completely private society where the agents only
interact through their coupled dynamics. The other extreme is the com-
pletely non-private society. Agents share complete information, which allows
all agents to make accurate predictions (e.g., traffic or electricity demands)
and to make optimal decisions. Between these two extremes lies a multitude
of other possible communication strategies. The privacy-cost trade-off can
formalized as the cost of privacy measured by the difference between the cost
achieved through a given communication strategy and the cost achieved by
the completely non-private strategy.
5.1 Privacy-Performance Trade-Off in Distributed
Control
In this chapter, we present a general framework for studying cost of pri-
vacy for distributed control systems in which a collection of agents pursue
individual goals and communicate for the purpose of sensing their shared en-
vironment. Each agent i has a preference pi. These preferences capture, for
example, a sequence of waypoints for a vehicle or the electric power demand
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of a household. The evolution of an agent depends on (a) its dynamics, (b)
the control action it takes, and also (c) the environment or the aggregate state
of the other agents. If the communication strategy shares more information
about agents’ preferences, then all agents in the society can estimate the
environment more accurately and, therefore, make better control decisions.
On the other hand, such a communication strategy may leak information
about agent preference. The cost of an agent is defined by the deviation of
its trajectory from its preference.
In our formulation, once the underlying dynamics of the system, the in-
dividual preferences, and the communication strategy are fixed the overall
system is deterministic.1 In our formulation, we show (Proposition 5.1) that
knowing the preference for the agents and an observation of the system al-
lows an adversary to uniquely infer the complete state trajectory of an agent
over time. The inference process of the adversary is indeed summarized as an
inverse observation mapping (η−1), which associate the observation sequence
with a trajectory of agents.
To keep the sensitive data private, one common approach is to add noise
to the communicated information. The effectiveness of such an approach can
be measured by using the concept of ε-differential privacy which was first
introduced in studies on statistical data bases [101, 43, 44, 45]. Roughly,
ε-differential privacy ensures that the probability distribution of any obser-
vation does not change substantially with a change in the sensitive data
corresponding to any one agent. Hence, an adversary cannot infer the sen-
sitive data of agents from the observation. Differentially private algorithms
are developed for mechanism design [102], data mining [103] and machine
learning [104]. More recently, this notion of privacy is extended to dynami-
cal systems [46, 105] and find its application in optimization [106, 107, 108]
and consensus [46, 109, 110].
During the past decade, several varieties of differential privacy have been
proposed [101, 44, 46, 111, 112]. The definition of differential privacy used
in this chapter (Definition 5.3) is introduced in [112] which augmented the
most common definition of differential privacy [101, 44] with metrics. The
main technical adjustment to the conventional definition (see e.g. Definition
1 of [43]) is the introduction of a notion of distance on the continuous space
1If the communication strategy uses randomization, the the overall system is purely
probabilistic.
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of sensitive data. A consequence of the generalization is that greater changes
in the sensitive data of an agent now permit greater differences between the
corresponding probability distributions of observation sequences.
In this chapter, we develop a communication strategy for distributed con-
trol systems, which guarantees differential privacy. The main technical step
in our approach is to compute the sensitivity of a distributed control sys-
tem. Roughly, the sensitivity of a distributed control system captures the
distance between its trajectories with change in one agent’s preference. Then,
the noise to add follows Laplace distributions parameterized by the sensitiv-
ity. We prove that the resulting distributed control system is differentially
private. We study the privacy-performance trade-off for linear distributed
control systems. We show that the sensitivity of a distributed control system
decreases with the stability of its dynamics. Hence, the required standard
deviation of noise decreases with the stability of the dynamics. We establish
that the cost of differential privacy using our communication strategy up to
time T for a system with N agents is at most O( T
3
Nε2
) for stable systems.
The cost can also grow exponentially with T for unstable systems. This sug-
gests that the proposed strategy is more likely to be useful for stable systems
with short-lived participants (e.g., drivers with short commutes), and further
research is needed for strategies that scale better with time.
The rest of this chapter is organized as followng. Section 5.2 discusses
related research. Section 5.3 introduces the mathematical formalism we will
use throughout the chapter, namely, Markov chains with observations. A
Markov chain is essentially a transition system, like the one we studied in
Chapter 4, but associated with a probability space. Section 5.5 presents the
Laplace communication mechanism for general distributed control systems
and Section 5.6 develops specialized results for linear systems.
5.2 Related Works
Several varieties of differential privacy has been proposed in literature [101,
44, 46, 111, 112]. The common requirements for differential privacy is that
the change of an individual agent’s data can only result in unsubstantial
changes in the output distribution. Various mechanisms for achieving dif-
ferential privacy have been studied in the literature [102, 113, 114]. The
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Laplace mechanism requires adding Laplace noise to the query output and
was proposed in [42]. To satisfy the privacy condition, the distribution of the
Laplace noise is a function of the sensitivity of the query, which is defined as
the distance between output if an individual agent changes its data. Then an
exponential mechanism, as a generalization of Laplace mechanism, is intro-
duced to design a privacy-preserving auction [102]. To further improve the
accuracy of the mechanism measured by the second moment of the noise, one
can add a carefully designed noise, whose probability density is a staircase
function, instead of standard Laplace noise [115].
In [44], the notion of differential privacy is expanded to include stream-
ing and online computations in which the adversary can look at the entire
sequence of outputs from the analysis algorithm. In parallel, with distance
defined on the space of data sets, one can measure how much the data have
changed and design mechanisms with lower error bounds [116, 117]. Our def-
inition of differential privacy absorbs the extension of the above two lines of
work, which ensures that the streaming output distribution does not change
substantially if one agent changes its data with a small amount.
Recently, privacy-preserving mechanisms are developed for dynamical sys-
tems. In [46], we introduce the notion of differential privacy to a consensus
problem and present a Laplace mechanism for solving it. Later, the authors
of [110] present an algorithm for unbiased average consensus and quantify the
convergence rate. In [118], we proved that adding Laplace noise achieves a
minimized entropy of estimation among all differentially private mechanisms.
In [119], we used a similar technique to solve a privacy-preserving distributed
optimization problem where participants cooperate to minimize the sum of
individual costs without exchanging the exact individual cost functions.
Contemporaneously with our work, the authors of [120] adopt the notion
of differential privacy to dynamical systems, where an adversary cannot tell
the exact input by looking at its output stream. Laplace and Gaussian
mechanisms are presented for converting an ordinary dynamical system to a
differentially private one. Then, a Kalman filter is designed to estimate the
state of differentially private systems with minimized estimation error. The
sufficient condition of the minimization problem is established in the form of
linear matrix inequalities. This technique is applied to estimate traffic flows
with GPS data [121].
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5.3 Distributed Control System
In this section, we present a modeling framework for distributed control
systems. Like the labeled transitions system we discussed in Chapter 4, the
distributed control systems evolve through discrete transitions. However, in
contrast, here the transitions are associated with a probability distribution.
5.3.1 Continuous-State Markov Chain with Observations
The underlying model of a distributed control system is a Markov chain with
possibly uncountably many states.
Definition 5.1. A Markov chain is a tuple 〈X ∪ Y,F ,Θ, κ〉, such that
(i) X is a set of internal variables and Y is a set of observable variables,
Q = Val(X ∪ Y ) is the state space equipped with the standard Borel
measure µ and Val(Y ) is the space of observations,
(ii) F ⊆ 2Q is a σ-algebra on the state space Q,
(iii) Θ ∈ F is a set of initial state,
(iv) κ : Q × F → [0, 1] is the kernel function such that (a) for any q ∈ Q,
κ(q, ·) is a probability measure on the measurable space 〈Q,F〉, and
(b) for any S ∈ F , κ(·, S) is a measurable function.
The variables in X can be either real-valued or finite-valued. For any state
q and a measurable set of states S, the kernel of the Markov chain κ(q, S)
specifies the probability of transition from state q to any state in the set
S. We assume the kernel κ is differentiable in the second argument with
respect to µ, that is there exists a measurable function p : S × S → R≥0
such that κ(q, S) =
∫
s∈S p(q, s)dµ for any q ∈ Q and S ∈ F . The function
p is the kernel density of the Markov chain. Given a kernel density p, a
Markov kernel κ is uniquely specified. In this chapter, the state space Q are
Euclidean spaces and F is the standard Borel σ-algebra.
A trajectory (or execution) of the Markov chain of length k is a sequence
of states ξ = q0, q1, . . . , qk−1, such that q0 ∈ Θ. For any execution ξ =
q0, q1, . . . , qk−1, the probability density of ξ is defined as f(ξ) =
∏k−1
i=0 p(qi, qi+1).
That is, the probability density of an execution is the product of the kernel
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density on each step. The set of executions of length k is Qk. From Sec-
tion 2.4, the product σ-algebra with measure µk are well defined. Hence for
any measurable set of executions S ⊆ Qk, the probability of these sets of
execution P(S) =
∫
ξ∈S f(ξ)dµ
k is well defined.
For an execution ξ, the restriction of the execution on the set of observable
variables Y is denoted as η(ξ) = ξ ↓ Y . We denote O as the σ-algebra of
all measurable observations. It can be checked that, the projection function
η is measurable. Hence, for a measurable set of observation O ∈ O, the
probability of the Markov chain generating observations in O is well defined
as P(O) = P(η−1(O)).
5.3.2 Distributed Control Systems
In this section, we formally introduce distributed control systems. The be-
havior of the complete system is modeled as a Markov chain parametrized by
a quantity p. We begin by defining a distributed control system abstractly
(see Figure 5.1); Section 5.6 provides more concrete instantiations of these
definitions in terms of linear models. A system consists of N agents oper-
ating in a shared environment. Each agent i, i ∈ [N ], has a preference pi,
which captures its initial state and control objectives. The agent’s behavior
consists of a physical part which evolves according to some deterministic dy-
namics and a controller which computes the control inputs for the physical
dynamics. The agent uses a communication strategy to broadcast some noisy
version of its state to the other agents. The broadcasts are noisy to preserve
privacy and are used to estimate the state of the environment. These esti-
mates are used by the i’s controller for computing the inputs (along side its
own state). Fixing the vector of preferences p for all agents, the evolution of
the complete system becomes a Markov chain with observationsM(p). The
stochasticity arises from the noise values used in the communication strategy
of the individual agents.
The Markov chain modeling the distributed control system consists of N
agents. Each agent i, i ∈ [N ], has variables Xi, Ui, Yi which are the state,
input, and observable variables of the agent. For all i ∈ [N ], we write X =
Val(Xi) = Val(Yi) and U = Val(Ui), respectively as the state space and input
space of individual agents. Let Z be a set of environmental variables and Z˜
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Figure 5.1: Block diagram of a distributed control system.
be the set of estimated environmental variables with Val(Z) = Val(Z˜) = Z.
The preferences of each agent i (pi ∈ X ∗) consisting of a sequence of points
in the individual agent’s state space X which defines a path agent i wants to
follow. The kernel density of the Markov chain is specified by the following
functions: (a) A dynamics function f : X × U × Z → X which defines the
next state of an agent as a function of its current state, control input and
the environment’s state. (b) A control function g : X × Z × N → U which
defines the agent’s controller output as a function of its state, the estimated
environment state. (c) An aggregation function h : XN → Z which defines
the state of the environment as a function of the agents’ states. And finally
(d) A observation probabilistic density r : X × X × N → R≥0 such that
for any x ∈ X and t ∈ N, r(x, ·, t) is a probability density. The value of
r(x,y, t) gives the probability density of selecting y as observable at time t
if the actual state is x.
A state of agent i is a point in X 2×U and its three components are the true
agent state (denoted by xi), the observed agent state (yi), and the control
input (ui), respectively. The state of the environment is Z2 and the two com-
ponents are the (true) environment state (z) and the observed environment
state (z˜). The dynamics functions f and the aggregation function h capture
the physical behavior of the system and the coupling between agents—as the
control designers, we cannot change them. In this chapter, we assume that
the controller function g is obtained through existing control theoretic tech-
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niques (see Section 5.2 for a discussion of related work). The only component
up for design is the observation density r. In defining the Markov chain be-
low, we will use r to probabilistically update a state component of the agent
(called x˜i below) which is produced as an observation. This simplifies our
model by keeping the observation function η deterministic.
Thus, the state space of the Markov chain modeling the complete system
is Q = (X 2×U)N ×Z2. For any state q ∈ Q, we write q.xi, q.ui, respectively
as the valuations of variables Xi, Ui. We denote q.x and q.u as the aggregate
vector 〈q.x0, . . . , q.xN−1〉 and 〈q.u0, . . . , q.uN−1〉, respectively. For a sequence
of states q0, q1, . . . , we write the corresponding states as x(0),x(1), . . . as the
states are clear in the context. The space of observations for the Markov
chain is Y = XN ×Z. For each i ∈ [N ] we denote the valuations of variables
Xi at time t ∈ N as xi(t). The valuations ui(t),yi(t), z(t), z˜(t) are defined
similarly. The kernel density of the Markov chain at time t ∈ N is defined
by the following sequence of equations:
ui(t) = g(xi(t− 1), z˜(t− 1)), (5.1)
xi(t) = f(xi(t− 1),ui(t), z(t− 1)), (5.2)
yi(t) ∼ r(xi(t), ·, t), (5.3)
z(t) = h(x0(t), . . . ,xN−1(t)), (5.4)
z˜(t) = h(y0(t), . . . ,yN−1(t)). (5.5)
The first three equations define values of the control input (ui), the agents
state (xi), and the environment state (zi), for each i ∈ [N ]. The value of
yi(t)’s is chosen according to the probability distribution r(xi(t), ·, t).
The observation function η of the Markov chain is defined as follows: for
any state q ∈ Q,
η(q) = 〈y0, . . . ,yN−1, z˜〉.
In other words, an observation is simply the projection of the state on the Y
and Z˜ components. The initial state q0 is specified by the global preference
vector p and the aggregate function h. For each agent, the initial state is
defined by the first point of its preference xi(0) = pi(0). Then the aggregate
state is z(0) = h(x0(0), . . . ,xN−1(0)). The initial control inputs (ui(0)) and
the initial observed agent state (yi(0)) and initial observed environment state
(z˜(0)) are set to 0. We denote Execs(p) as the set of all executions of M(p).
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The only sources of uncertainty in the behavior of a control system are (a)
the preferences of the agents (p) and (b) the randomized observation map (r),
which is used to disseminate noisy private information for the sake of better
performance. Thus, given a preference vector and an observation sequence,
and the knowledge of the parameters f , g, h, it is possible to infer a unique
execution of M(p). We formalize this notion in Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.1. For any distributed control system M(p), given a pref-
erence vector p and an observation sequence β of length k, η−1M(p)(β) is a
singleton set.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of β.
Base. If β is of length one then η−1(β) is the single starting state θ. As we
mentioned previously, the agent i’s state matches the first point of pi, that
is xi(0) = pi(0), which is specified by p. Also, z(0) = h(x0(0), . . . ,xN−1(0)).
And other variables are initialized as 0. Thus, the start state θ is fixed.
Induction. Suppose β = β′b be an observation of length k+1, where η−1(β′)
is the unique execution ξ′ ending with last state qk = 〈u(k),x(k),y(k), z(k),
˜z(k)〉. It suffices to show that for the given state qk and the observation
y, there is a unique state qk+1 which makes ξ
′qk+1 = η−1(β). From Equa-
tion (5.1), it follows that for each i ∈ [N ], ui(k + 1) is uniquely defined
as g(xi(k), z˜(k)). This and Equation (5.2) imply that xi(k + 1) is uniquely
defined. Similarly, the ui’s and the xi’s together with Equation (5.4) imply
that z(k + 1) is also uniquely defined. Finally, yi(k + 1) and z˜(k + 1) are
specified by the last state b of β. Hence, the states at k + 1 step are fully
specified.
Thus, fixed an observation sequence β, an execution ξ is fully specified by a
global preference p. Fix an observation sequence, if the adversary has a high
confident guess of the preference vector p, then the agents’ whole trajectory
corresponding to such a p is also of high validity. Otherwise, if the preference
vector is protected, the evolution of the agents is hidden. So it suffices to
consider privacy of the preference vector p.
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5.4 Privacy and Cost in Distributed Control
For formulating privacy of a distributed control system, we first define com-
parable and adjacent preference vectors. For a pair of preference vectors p
and p′, the corresponding Markov chainsM(p) andM(p′) are comparable if
the observable spaces are identical, that is, OM(p) = OM(p′).
Definition 5.2. A pair of preference vectors p and p′ in (XN)∗ are adjacent
up to time T , written as T -adj(p, p′) in short, if there exists a k ∈ [N ], such
that for all t ≤ T , such that (i) |pk(t) − p′k(t)| ≤ 1, and (ii) for all i 6= k
pi(t) = p
′
i(t).
The norm used in the definition is the standard `p-norm for arbitrary
p ∈ [1,∞] chosen by the user. In other words, two preference vectors are
T -adjacent if they differ only in the preferences of a single agent up to time
T , and the difference in terms of the `p-norm is at most unity at each time.
We adapt the standard definition of differential privacy to this framework
of control mechanisms, where the protection of the individual agent’s prefer-
ences have to be balanced with the benefits of information sharing for control
in a shared environment.
Definition 5.3. The randomized control mechanism M is ε-differentially
private up to time T , if for any two T -adjacent preference vectors p and
p′ and any set of finite observation sequences Obs, M(p) and M(p′) are
comparable and
PM(p)[η−1M(p)(Obs)] ≤ eεPM(p′)[η−1M(p′)(Obs)]. (5.6)
This definition of differential privacy is similar to the one appears in [44]
with two technical differences. First, we restrict the preferences to be adja-
cent up to a time bound. Secondly, owing our choice of the definition ofM(p)
which allows all the components of M(p) to possibly depend on p, for pri-
vacy of individual agent’s preferences with respect to observation sequences
produced from to Markov chains, it is required that the output spaces of
the corresponding chains are the same. This requirement is incorporated by
making the chains comparable.
Performance of a distributed control system is measured by a cost function.
It is standard to consider the following quadratic cost in optimal control
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theory. Given an execution of length T + 1, α = q0, q1, . . . , qT , the cost of
control for an individual agent i up to T time is the sum of squared distance
between the agent’s state and its preferred state. That is, costM(p),i(α)
∆
=∑T
t=1 |xi(qt)−pi(t))|22. The summation starts with t = 1 because by definition
xi(q0) = pi(0) and no cost is paid at time t = 0. The cost function of agent i
is the expectation of the function costM(p),i(α) over the space of executions
of length T ,
costM(p),i(T ) = E
[
T∑
t=1
|xi(qt)− pi(t))|22
]
.
We give an example of a distributed control problem.
Example 5.1 (Private Nevigation). This example captures the routing
of N agents on a 2-D plane whose motion is affected by the center of gravity
of all the agents. The agent i’s state xi ∈ X ⊆ R2 has two components,
which are the x and y coordinates of agent i. Each agent has a preference
which is a path pi ∈ (R2)∗. The individual agent’s state at time t is affected
by three factors: the previous state xi(t − 1), the aggregate state, which is
the center of the mass of the herd (z(t − 1)), and the individual’s control
input ui(t). The update law of the ith agent’s state at time t+ 1 follows:
xi(t) = 1.5xi(t− 1) + cz(t− 1) + ui(t). (5.7)
The aggregate state z ∈ Z ⊂ R2 is the center of gravity of the herd,
z(t) =
1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
xi(t).
Designing a controller for the i-th agent, which cancels out the influence of
the aggregate state on individual agent and drives it toward the goal pi(t+1),
needs the actual states of all other agents. With the precise information of
others, agent i can achieve its desirable individual cost by using some optimal
control technique. For example, the following controller may be used:
ui(t) = −cz(t− 1)− 1.3xi(t− 1) + 0.8pi(t). (5.8)
Combined Equations (5.8) and (5.7), we get the update rule for the whole
close-loop system:
xi(t) = 0.2xi(t− 1) + 0.8pi(t). (5.9)
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The current state xi(t) is a linear combination of the previous state xi(t− 1)
and the current preference pi(t). If the sequence of preference pi is fixed for
a few rounds, the state xi converges to it geometrically. Otherwise if the
sequence of preference is changing, the state xi keeps tracking it. The cost
of the individual agent is defined by the sum of squared distance between its
state xi and pi, that is,
cost(p, T ) =
T∑
t=1
|xi(t)− pi(t)|22.
In Section 5.6, we introduce a mechanism that guarantees differential privacy
for this example.
We define the cost of a randomized control mechanismM as the difference
in the cost of two nearly identical Markov chains with observationsM(p) and
M′(p), where M(p) is the differentially private Markov chain and M′(p) is
identical except that its observation map discloses perfect information about
the agents’ states. Formally, given M(p) defined by the parameters f, g, h,
and r, the perfectly observable version M′(p) is defined by the parameters
f, g, h and r′, where for any t ∈ N, r′(x, y, t) = δ(y − x) with δ(·) being the
Dirac delta distribution. Then, the cost of privacy is defined as the difference
in the costs of M(p) and M′(p).
Definition 5.4. For any ε > 0 and time bound T ∈ N, and an ε-differentially
private randomized control mechanism M, the Cost of Privacy (CoP) up to
time T , is defined by the supremum of the difference between any individual’s
cost in M(p) and the corresponding perfectly observable chain M′(p) over
all preference vector p:
CoP (ε,M, T ) = sup
p,i
(
costM′(p),i(T )− costM(p),i(T )
)
.
We will discuss the cost of privacy of Example 5.1 in Section 5.6.2
5.5 Laplace Observations of Differential Privacy
In this section, we introduce a strategy for creating observation maps that
guarantees differential privacy of the agents’ preferences. For the remainder
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of this chapter let n = |Xi| be the length of local state xi. In this design,
at time t, each agent reports yi(t) by adding a noise ωi(t) on its actual state
xi(t), that is
yi(t) = xi(t) + ωi(t), (5.10)
where ωi(t) is a vector that consists of n independent random noises drawn
from Laplace distribution Lap(Mt). If we combine the two step, we have
y(t) = h(y(t)) = h(x(t) + ω(t)). (5.11)
For brevity, we denote x(t) and ω(t) as the global state and the global noise
vector.
Before proposing an actual design of Mt, we first define the sensitivity
of the system. Fix an observation sequence β ∈ Y T up to time T and
a preference vector p. As we mentioned in Proposition 5.1, η−1M(p)(β) is a
singleton set. Then, x(η−1M(p)(β)(t)) is the global state at time t corresponding
to the execution η−1M(p)(β). To quantify the maximal difference of the system’s
global state at time t resulted from a pair of adjacent preference vectors p
and p′, we introduce the sensitivity of the system.
Definition 5.5. For a mechanismM, we define the sensitivity ofM at time
t ∈ N as
∆(t) = sup
β∈Ot
sup
t-adj(p,p′)
|x(η−1M(p)(β(t)))− x(η−1M(p′)(β(t)))|1.
Sensitivity captures the L1 distance between executions with adjacent pref-
erence vectors. We assume that ∆(t) is bounded for any t ∈ N throughout the
chapter. The sensitivity can be computed explicitly for distributed control
systems with linear dynamics and control, and can be estimated numeri-
cally for nonlinear systems. Using the sensitivity, we develop a noise-adding
strategy to achieve differential privacy.
Theorem 5.2. At each time t ∈ [T ], if each agent adds a noise vector ωi(t)
which consists of n independent Laplace noise Lap(Mt) such that
∑T
t=0
∆(t)
Mt
≤
ε, then the distributed control system is ε-differentially private up to time T .
Proof. Fix any pair of T -adjacent preference vectors p, p′ ∈ X TN , and any
set of observation sequence Obs ⊆ OT . We will denote the sets of executions
91
η−1M(p)(Obs) and η
−1
M(p′)(Obs) by A and A
′, respectively. First, we define a
correspondence B between the sets A and A′. For ξ ∈ A and ξ′ ∈ A′,
B(ξ) = ξ′ if and only if they are the observation sequence up to time T .
That is, η(ξ(t)) = η(ξ′(t)) for all t ∈ [T ]. From Proposition 5.1, for any
observation sequence β ∈ Obs there is a unique execution ξ ∈ Execs(p) that
can produce the observation. Similarly, ξ′ is also unique in Execs(p′). So
B is indeed a bijection. We relate the probability measures of the sets of
executions A and A′,
PM(p)[η−1M(p)(Obs)]
PM(p′)[η−1M(p′)(Obs)]
=
∫
ξ∈A PM(p)[ξ]dµ∫
ξ′∈A′ PM(p′)[ξ′]dµ′
. (5.12)
Changing the variable using the bijection B we have,
∫
ξ′∈A′ PM(p′)[ξ
′]dµ′ =
∫
B(ξ)∈A′ PM(p)[B(ξ)]dµ
=
∫
ξ∈A PM(p)[B(ξ)]dµ.
(5.13)
From Equations (5.1)-(5.5) and the definition of r,∫
ξ∈A
PM(p)[ξ]dµ =
∫
ξ∈A
PM(p)[ξ.y|ξ.x]dµ,
where x(t) is the vector of N agents’ states at t along execution ξ. Each
xi(t) is a vector of length n. We denote the k-th state component of xi(t)
by x
(k)
i (t). As y(t) is obtained by adding n×N independent noise values to
x(t), from the distribution Lap(Mt), it follows that the probability density
of an execution is reduced to
PM(p)[y(ξ)|x(ξ)] =
∏
i∈[N ],k∈[n]
t∈[T ]
pL(ξ(t).y
(k)
i − ξ(t).x(k)i |Mt), (5.14)
where pL(x|b) is the probability density function at x with parameter b. Then,
we relate the distance at time t between the states of ξ and B(ξ) with the
sensitivity ∆(t). Let β = η(ξ) be the observation sequence corresponding to
ξ. By the Definition 5.5, we have
|ξ(t).x− ξ′(t).x|1 ≤ ∆(t).
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The norm in the above equation is L1-norm. The global state x(t) consists
of N local states xi(t), each of which has n component. So ξ(t).x and ξ
′(t).x
lives in space RnN . By definition of L1-norm:
N∑
i=1
n∑
k=1
|ξ(t).x(k)i − ξ′(t).x(k)i | = |ξ(t).xi − ξ′(t).xi|1 ≤ ∆(t).
By the definition of bijection B, the observations of ξ and B(ξ) match, that
is, y(ξ(t)) = y(B(ξ)(t)). From the property of Laplace distribution,
∏
i∈[N ]k∈[n]
pL(ξ(t).y
(k)
i − ξ(t).x(k)i |Mt)
pL(B(ξ)(t).y
(k)
i −B(ξ)(t)x(k)i |Mt)
≤
∏
i∈[N ],k∈[n]
exp
( |ξ(t).y − ξ(t).x−B(ξ)(t).y +B(ξ)(t).x|
Mt
)
=
∏
i∈[N ],k∈[n]
exp
( |ξ(t).x(ξ(t))−B(ξ)(t).x|
Mt
)
=exp
 ∑
i∈[N ],k∈[n]
|ξ(t).x−B(ξ)(t).x|
Mt

≤e∆(t)Mt .
(5.15)
Combining Equations (5.12), (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15), we derive
PM(p)[η−1M(p)(Obs)]
PM(p′)[η−1M(p′)(Obs)]
≤
∫
ξ∈A PM(p)[ξ.y|ξ.x]dµ∫
ξ∈A PM(p)[B(ξ).y|B(ξ).x]dµ
≤
∏
t∈[T ]
e
∆(t)
Mt ≤ e
∑
t∈[T ]
∆(t)
Mt .
If Mt satisfy
∑T
t=0
∆D(t)
Mt
≤ ε, then ∏t∈[T ] e∆(t)Mt ≤ eε. Thus the theorem
holds.
We can also derive the following corollary from Theorem 5.2.
Corollary 5.3. At each time t ∈ [T ] if each agent adds an vector of inde-
pendent Laplace noise Lap(Mt), where Mt =
∆D(t)T
ε
to its actual state, then
the distributed control system is ε-differentially private.
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In this mechanism, the noise added is proportional to the sensitivity of
the system and the time bound of the system T . Roughly, an adversary can
examine a number of T observations of an individual agent. The parameter
of the Laplace noises added is proportional to the length of the observation
and the sensitivity of the system.
5.6 Differentially Private Linear Distributed Control
In this section, we will specialize the general framework of Section 5.3 to
linear control systems. Linear models for the physical dynamics and linear
controller functions are the predominant models studied in control theory
literature. In this setup, the optimal controller design problem can be for-
mulated and solved effectively using convex optimization. We assume that
agent i’s state (xi), its observed state (yi), its control input (ui), the envi-
ronment state (z), and the observed environment state (z˜) are all points in
Rn, for some natural number n. Agent i’s preference is an infinite (possi-
bly repeated) sequence of points in Rn. Next, we define the remaining four
parameters of the control system. The linear dynamics function for the i-th
agent is:
f(xi, z,ui) = Axi + cz + ui,
where A ∈ Rn×n is the dynamics matrix and c ∈ R is a coupling constant.
The linear aggregation function h computes the average of the agents’ states,
which is defined as
h(x) =
1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
xi.
For this type of dynamics, a linear feedback controller suffices to drive the
agent to any fixed preference point. We choose a general linear feedback
control function of the form:
g(xi, z, t) = (K − A)xi + (I −K)pi(t)− cz˜,
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where K ∈ Rn×n is a stable matrix and I is the identity matrix. Finally, the
form of the observation map is
yi = xi + ωi(t),
where ωi(t) is drawn from a time-dependent probability distribution to be
defined below.
As in the general case (Section 5.3), given a preference vector p, the above
parameters define the Markov chain M(p) which captures the evolution of
the system. The system of equations defining the transitions of this Markov
chain, corresponding to Equations (5.1)-(5.5), can be written as follows: At
time t ∈ N,
ui(t) = (K − A)xi(t− 1) + (I −K)pi(t)− cz˜(t− 1), (5.16)
xi(t) = Axi(t− 1) + cz(t− 1) + ui(t), (5.17)
yi(t) = xi(t) + ωi(t), (5.18)
z(t) =
1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
xi(t), (5.19)
z˜(t) =
1
N
∑
i∈[N ]
yi(t). (5.20)
Combining the above equations, the closed-loop dynamics of agent i is:
xi(t) = Kxi(t− 1) + (I −K)pi(t)− c
N
∑
i∈[N ]
ωi(t− 1). (5.21)
Agent i’s state at time t can be written as a function of its preference sequence
{pi(s)}s≤t and the sequence {ωi(s) : i ∈ [N ], s ≤ t} of noise vectors added in
all previous rounds. By iteratively applying Equation (5.21), we obtain:
xi(t) =K
tpi(0) +
t∑
s=1
Kt−s(I −K)pi(s)
− c
N
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1
∑
i∈[N ]
ωi(s).
(5.22)
Remark 5.1. By taking expectation on both sides of Equation (5.21), we
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can write x(t)− p(t) = K(x(t− 1)− p(t)). Given a stable the matrix K, for
agent i, after update at time t, the new state gets closer to the preference
pi(t). The more stable K is, the better tracking x(t) performs toward p(t).
For representing the dynamics of the complete system with N agents, we
define two nN × nN matrices
K
∆
=

K
. . .
K
 and C ∆= cN

I . . . I
...
. . .
...
I . . . I
 ,
where K is a block diagonal matrix with K matrices as its diagonal blocks
and C is a block matrix with all the blocks set to c
N
times the identity matrix
I. Combining the Equation (5.21) for all the N agents we obtain:
x(t) = Kx(t− 1) + (I −K)p(t) + Cx(t− 1)− z˜(t− 1)
= (K + C)x(t− 1) + (I −K)p(t)− z˜(t− 1). (5.23)
Given a preference vector p and an observation sequence β, by Proposi-
tion 5.1, we know that there is a unique execution η−1M(p)(β). The vector of
agents’ states at time t ≥ 0, along this execution is x(η−1M(p)(β)(t)). Iteratively
applying Equation (5.23) we obtain:
x(η−1M(p)(β(t))) = (K + C)
tp(0)−
t−1∑
s=0
(K + C)t−sz˜(β(t))
+
t∑
s=1
(K + C)t−s(I −K)p(s).
5.6.1 Sensitivity of Linear Distributed Control
In this section, we state Theorem 5.4 which establishes bound on the sensi-
tivity ∆(t). For proving this theorem, we fix two Markov chains of the system
(Equations (5.16)-(5.20)) with adjacent preference vectors p and p′ and com-
pute the difference between two chains. Recall that p and p′ are identical
except the preference of one agent (i). Then, the difference between the two
Markov chains has two components: (1) the change in agent i’s state, and
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(2) the sum of changes in other agents’ states. The sensitivity is then com-
puted as a bound of the sum of above two components. With this bound on
sensitivity, we introduce a Laplace mechanism defining the observation map
(r) in Corollary 5.5 and then show that the mechanism achieves differential
privacy of the linear distributed control system.
Theorem 5.4. For the linear distributed control system, for all t ∈ N the
sensitivity ∆(t) is upper-bounded by κ(t), where
κ(t)
∆
= |Gt −Kt|+ |Kt|+ |H|
t−1∑
s=0
(|Gs −Ks|+ |Ks|),
with G
∆
= cI +K and H
∆
= I −K.
Proof. We fix a time t, a pair of t-adjacent preferences p and p′, and a
sequence of observations β = 〈z˜(0), x˜(0)〉, 〈z˜(1), x˜(1)〉 . . .. Then, by Equa-
tion (5.23) we get
|x(η−1M(p)(β)(t))− x(η−1M(p′)(β)(t))|
= |(K + C)t(p(0)− p′(0))
+
∑t
s=1(K + C)
t−s(I −K)(p(s)− p′(s))|.
(5.24)
Equation (5.24) is independent of the observation sequence because β affects
the two executions η−1M(p)(β) and η
−1
M(p′)(β) identically and cancels out. For
the remainder of the proof we write x(t) and x′(t) for x(η−1M(p)(β)(t)) and
x(η−1M(p′)(β)(t)). It follows from Definition 5.5 that ∆(t) = supT -adj(p,p′) |x(t)−
x′(t)|.
We will first expand the term (K + C)s on the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (5.24). In block matrix form,
(K + C)s =


K
. . .
K
+ cN

I . . . I
...
. . .
...
I . . . I


s
. (5.25)
The matrix (K + C) has two types of blocks: (1) K + c
N
I as the diagonal
blocks and (2) c
N
I as the off-diagonal blocks. As K and I are commutative,
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applying binomial expansion of the Equation (5.25) and after some lengthy
but elementary linear algebra the product matrix (K + C)s becomes
(K + C)s =

Ps Qs . . . Qs
Qs
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . Qs
Qs . . . Qs Ps

, (5.26)
where Qs =
1
N
(Gs − Ks), Ps = Qs + Ks, and G = cI + K. From Equa-
tion (5.26), we also obtain:
(K + C)s(I −K) =

P ′s Q
′
s . . . Q
′
s
Q′s
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . Q′s
Q′s . . . Q
′
s P
′
s

, (5.27)
where Q′s = QsH, P
′
s = Q
′
s +K
sH, and H = I −K. With Equations (5.26)
and (5.27), we bound the right-hand side of Equation (5.24). Recall that
from Definition 5.2, t-adj(p, p′) if and only if there exists some i ∈ [N ], for
all s ≤ t, (a) |pi(s)− p′i(s)| ≤ 1, and (b) for all j 6= i, pj(s)− p′j(s) = 0. That
is, for any s ≤ t,
p(s)− p′(s) =
[
0, . . . , 0, [pi(s)− p′i(s)]>, 0, . . . , 0
]>
, (5.28)
has n non-zero entries corresponding to the preferences of some agent i, and
all other entires are 0. Then, (K+C)s(p(s)−p′(s)) is a vector, where the i-th
component is Ps(pi(s) − p′i(s)) and other components are Qs(pi(s) − p′i(s)).
Similarly |(K+C)s(I−K)(p(s)−p′(s))| is a vector, where the i-th component
is P ′s(pi(s) − p′i(s)) and other components are Q′s(pi(s) − p′i(s)). Therefore,
the term inside the norm on the right-hand side of Equation (5.24) is a vector
where the i-th component is
Pt(pi(0)− p′i(0)) +
t∑
s=1
P ′t−s(pi(s)− p′i(s)), (5.29)
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and all the other N − 1 components are
Qt(pi(0)− p′i(0)) +
t∑
s=1
Q′t−s(pi(s)− p′i(s)). (5.30)
Substituting Equations (5.29) and (5.30) into Equation (5.24), combining
with |(pi(s)− p′i(s)| ≤ 1, we have
|x(t)− x′(t)| ≤ (N − 1)(|Qt|+
t−1∑
s=0
|Q′s|) + |Pt|+
t∑
s=1
|P ′s|. (5.31)
It follows that ∆(t) ≤ (N − 1)(|Qt| +
∑t−1
s=0 |Q′s|) + |Pt| +
∑t
s=1 |P ′s|. Us-
ing Equations (5.26) and (5.27), we represent Ps, P
′
s by Qs, Q
′
s, K and H.
Therefore,
(N − 1)(|Qt|+
∑t−1
s=0 |Q′s|) + |Pt|+
∑t
s=1 |P ′s|
≤ (N − 1)(|Qt|+
∑t−1
s=0 |Q′s|) + |Qt|+ |Kt|
+
∑t
s=1 |Q′s|+
∑t
s=1 |Ks||H|
= N(|Qt|+
∑t−1
s=0 |Q′s|) + |Kt|+ |H|
∑t
s=1 |Ks|.
(5.32)
Again from Equations (5.26) and (5.27), substitute Qs and Q
′
s by H,G and
K, we get
N(|Qt|+
t−1∑
s=0
|Q′s|) + |Kt|+ |H|
t∑
s=1
|Ks|
≤|Gt −Kt|+ |H|
t−1∑
s=0
|Gs −Ks|+ |Kt|+ |H|
t∑
s=1
|Ks|
=κ(t).
(5.33)
Chaining Equations (5.31), (5.32) and (5.33), it follows that, for all t-adjacent
p, p′, |x(t)− x′(t)| ≤ κ(t). Thus the lemma follows.
Remark 5.2. The upper bound on the sensitivity at time t, κ(t) has two
components:
(a) |Kt|+ |H|∑ts=1 |Ks| over-approximates the change in agent i’s state (xi)
if its own preference changes by at most unity at each time up to t, and
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(b) |Gs−Ks|+|H|∑t−1s=0 |Gs−Ks| over-approximates the sum of the changes
in other agents’ states given agent i’s preference changes by at most unity
up to t.
Remark 5.3. κ(t) is independent to the number of agents (N). It only
depends on matrix K, the coupling constant c and time t. K is specified by
the individual’s control function as in Equation (5.16), which assumes to be
stable. The more stable matrixK is, the faster |Kt| decays to 0. The coupling
constant c quantifies the influence of the aggregate on each individual agent.
The matrix G = cI+K captures the combined dynamics under the influence
of the environment and the dynamics of the individual agents. The weaker
physical coupling is, the smaller |Gt| is. Therefore, we conclude that, as
the individual agent dynamics becomes more stable or the physical coupling
between agents becomes weaker, the sensitivity of the system decreases.
Remark 5.4. The dependence of κ(t) on time t changes based on the sta-
bility of the K and G matrices. If G is stable, κ(t) converges to a constant
as t→∞. Otherwise if G is unstable, κ(t) grows exponentially with t.
Theorems 5.2 and 5.4 immediately suggest an observation map (r) which
guarantees differential privacy of the distributed linear control system.
Corollary 5.5. For any time bound T and privacy parameter ε > 0, for
Mt
∆
= Tκ(t)
ε
and ωi(t) chosen as noise vector of length n drawn independently
from the distribution Lap(Mt), the resulting observation map makes the linear
distributed control system ε-differentially private up to time T .
Example 5.2. Now we can apply the strategy explained above to Exam-
ple 5.1, where K = 1
5
I is a 2 by 2 matrix. G = (c + 1
5
)I in this case. By
Theorem 5.4, the sensitivity is
∆(t) ≤ κ(t) = Gt + (I −K)∑t−1s=0Gs,
= 4+20c
20−25c +
16−45c
20−25c
(
c+ 1
5
)t
.
As we stated in Remark 5.3, the sensitivity is independent of N . If G is
stable, that is |c + 1
5
| ≤ 1, the sensitivity ∆(t) is bounded and converges to
a constant as t→∞. Otherwise, if |c+ 1
5
| > 1, κ(t) diverges. We choose the
noise to be Mt =
κ(t)T
ε
. By Corollary 5.5, the system guarantees ε-differential
privacy up to time T .
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5.6.2 Cost of Privacy in Linear Distributed Control
The observation map of Corollary 5.5 adds independently drawn Laplace
noise to the state of agent i observation at time t from the distribution
Lap(Mt). The noise parameter Mt depends on the individual’s dynamics
rather than the number of agents. In this section, we discuss the cost of
privacy for this mechanism (see, Definition 5.4) compared to a perfectly ob-
servable system using the same controller.
Theorem 5.6. The cost of privacy of the ε-differentially private mechanism
M of Corollary 5.5 is inversely proportional to the number of agents N and
the squared privacy parameter ε2. In addition, if matrix G is stable, it is
proportional to T 3. Otherwise if G is unstable, the cost of privacy grows
exponentially with T .
Proof. Given the ε-differentially private mechanismM, the perfectly observ-
able systemM′ is obtained by setting the noise values to be 0. We denote by
x¯i(t) the state of agent i for M′ at time t. From Equation (5.22), by fixing
ωi(t) ≡ 0, we get
x¯i(t) = K
tpi(0) +
t∑
s=1
Kt−s(I −K)pi(s).
We define a n × nN matrix B ∆= c
N
[I, . . . , I]. Let xi(t) be agent i’s state
corresponding to some execution of M(p). Again from Equation (5.22), the
state of an individual agent i is
xi(t) = x¯i(t)−
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bω(s).
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The cost of the mechanism M can be written as
costM,i(T ) = E
[
T∑
t=1
|xi(t)− pi(t)|22
]
= E
[
T∑
t=1
|x¯i(t)−
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bω(s)− pi(t)|22
]
=
T∑
t=1
E[|x¯i(t)− pi(t)|22 + |
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bω(s)|22
−2(x¯i(t)− pi(t))>
t−1∑
s=0
Kt−s−1Bω(s)].
The first term on the right-hand side is the cost of the system with perfect
observations, that is, costM′,i(T ). The last term on the right-hand side is the
expectation of a linear combination of zero-mean noise terms, and therefore,
equals 0. By Definition 5.4,
CoP (ε,M, T ) = supp,i[costM(p),i(T )− costM′(p),i(T )]
=
∑T
t=1 E
[|∑t−1s=0Kt−s−1Bω(s)|22] . (5.34)
In our Laplace mechanism, for different time steps s, τ , ω(s) and ω(τ) are
independent. Thus,
E[ω(s)>ω(τ)] = E[ω(s)]>E[ω(τ)] = 0.
Then, the right-hand side of Equation (5.34) reduces to
T∑
t=1
E
[
t−1∑
s=0
ω(s)>B>(Kt−s−1)>Kt−s−1Bω(s)
]
.
Recall that each ω(s) consists of a noise vector ωi(s) for each agent i ∈ [N ],
and each of these vectors have n independent and identically distributed noise
values drawn from Lap(Ms). Each pair of vectors in ω(s) are independent.
Denote ω(k)(s), k ∈ [nN ], be the k-th element of the vector ω(s).
It follows that (a) for k 6= j ∈ [nN ], E [ω(k)(s)ω(j)(s)] = 0, and (b) for any
k ∈ [nN ], E [ω(k)(s)ω(k)(s)] = 2M2s . Thus, the above expression is reduced
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to
T∑
t=1
t−1∑
s=0
2M2sTr(B
>(Kt−s−1)>Kt−s−1B), (5.35)
where Tr(A) stands for the trace of matrix A. Recall that B
∆
= c
N
[I, . . . , I].
It follows that
Tr(B>(Kt−s−1)>Kt−s−1B)
=
c2
N
Tr((Kt−s−1)>Kt−s−1) =
c2
N
|Kt−s−1|22.
Substituting the above equation into Equation (5.35) yields
CoP (ε,M, T ) = 2c
2
N
T∑
t=1
t−1∑
s=0
M2s |Kt−s−1|22.
By interchanging the order of summation we get
CoP (ε,M, T ) =2c
2
N
T−1∑
s=0
T∑
t=s+1
M2s |Kt−s−1|22
=
2c2
N
T−1∑
s=0
M2s
T−s−1∑
t=0
|Kt|22.
(5.36)
Recall that in Corollary 5.5, Ms =
Tκ(s)
ε
. Combining this with Equation (5.36),
we have
CoP (ε,M, T ) = 2c
2T 2
Nε2
T−1∑
s=0
κ(s)2
T−s−1∑
t=0
|Kt|22.
From the above expression it is clear CoP (ε,M, T ) is inversely proportional
to N and ε2. As the matrix K is stable,
∑T−s−1
t=0 |Kt|22 converges to some
constant as T → ∞. By Remark 5.4, if G is stable then κ(s) converges
to some constant as s→∞, ∑T−1s=0 κ(s)2 grows linearly with T and we have
CoP (ε,M, T ) ∼ O(T 3). Otherwise if G is unstable, κ(s) grows exponentially
with s and CoP (ε,M, T ) grows exponentially with T .
Example 5.3. Continuing with the system described in Example 5.1, we
now establish the cost of privacy associated with the communication strategy
of Equation (5.36). In this example, K = 0.2I. We choose the coupling
parameter c to be 0.4. Then, the close-loop system is stable. Therefore, the
sensitivity is bounded by κ(t) = 1.2− 0.2× 0.6t. The cost of privacy of the
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system with N agents at time T follows 0.24T
3
Nε2
+O( T
2
Nε2
).
Example 5.4. We conclude with a simulation-based analysis of the traffic
control Example 5.1. Consider a linear distributed control system in which
each agent is a point on the plane moving toward a randomly chosen desti-
nation with dynamics described in Example 5.3 and control strategies given
in Example 5.3. The cost of each agent is defined by the distance between its
position to its destination. The coupling between agents is the repulsive force
in the direction of the center of mass (CM) of the population. Thus, if the
control of an individual fights the force too strongly without the knowledge of
the CM then a higher cost is incurred. We numerically simulated the system
with different levels of privacy and different distributions of destinations and
make the following observations.
Figure 5.2 shows the relative costs of control with (blue) no communica-
tion and (green) private communication, with respect to cost of control with
complete (or broadcast) communication. First of all, if both the initial po-
sitions and the destinations are chosen with 0 mean, then the CM of the
population hovers around the origin and in that case, the contribution of the
coupling is small. As a result, there is not much to be gained through com-
munication and we see (Figure 5.2) that the cost of the system with privacy
is comparable to the cost of the system with no communication. When the
destination comes from some distributions slightly biased from 0, we start
to see that the cost of control with private communication starts to become
smaller compared to those of systems with no communications.
Figure 5.3 shows that for the same distribution of initial positions and
destinations the cost of privacy changes as predicted by Theorem 5.6. First
of all, a higher level of privacy comes with a higher cost (Figure 5.3a). As
ε changes from 0.2 to 2, the CoP changes from 10 to 0.1. Secondly, larger
number of agents (N) gives lower cost of privacy (Figure 5.3b). As N changes
from 10 to 100, the CoP decreases from 4 to 0.4. And finally a longer time
horizon (T ) translates to higher costs (Figure 5.3c). The simulation results
suggest that the cost of privacy roughly has the order of O( T
3
Nε2
).
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Figure 5.2: Increase in cost with biased sampled destinations. The blue and
green lines capture the relative cost of control with no communication and
private communication with respect to the cost of control with broadcast
preferences, respectively.
(a) Cost of privacy vs.
privacy level ε.
(b) Cost of privacy vs.
number of agents N .
(c) Cost of privacy vs.
time horizon T .
Figure 5.3: Cost of privacy for different privacy level, number of agents and
time horizon.
5.7 Summary
We presented a general framework for studying cost of differential privacy
for distributed control systems. We proposed a communication strategy by
which individual agents can share noisy information about their states which
preserves ε-differential privacy while aiding the estimation of the aggregate
environment and therefore improving control performance. The distribu-
tion of the noise depends on the sensitivity with respect to the individual’s
data. Specializing to linear systems with quadratic costs, we showed that the
sensitivity and therefore the standard deviation of the required noise is inde-
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pendent of the number of participating agents. The sensitivity also decreases
with the stability of the dynamics and with the weakening the environment’s
influence on an individual. For stable controllers, for preserving privacy over
indefinite time horizons, the variance of the noise to be added is also inde-
pendent of time. For unstable dynamics, on the other hand, the sensitivity
can grow exponentially with time. The cost of ε-differential privacy for the
proposed communication strategy up to time T for a system with N agents
is at most O( T
3
Nε2
) for stable systems. This suggests that the proposed com-
munication strategy is best suited for distributed control systems with many
short-lived participants.
The proposed framework should enable us to study more sophisticated
communication strategies that incur smaller costs for more persistent agents.
Another direction for future research will be to establish lower bounds on
the best cost of privacy that can be achieved through any communication
strategy, not just the form proposed here.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
The objective of this thesis is to develop techniques that provably guarantee
safety and privacy for cyber-physical systems (CPS). For different formalisms
of CPS, we compute the bound on sensitivity of the system with respect to
different parameters and use them in two ways. For invariance verification,
bounds on sensitivity are used to generalize a single trajectory to get a tube
that contains all neighboring trajectories. We show that checking these tubes
suffices to prove invariance for the system. For privacy preservation, we
compute sensitivity with respect to user data. Bounds on sensitivity are
used to decide the noise distribution that obscures the exact user data. We
will briefly summarize our main results and discuss possible future directions.
6.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, we present three techniques for invariance verification and pri-
vacy preservation. Figure 6.1 illustrates the main concepts we introduced in
this thesis and how they are connected. There are three streams of technical
contributions.
In Chapter 3, we present a verification algorithm to prove invariance prop-
erties for networked dynamical networks with delayed interconnection. We
propose the notion of IS discrepancy functions for subsystems which bounds
the distance between trajectories with respect to the initial states and inputs.
With IS discrepancy of subsystems, our approach syntactically constructs a
reduced model of the whole network. The trajectory of the reduced model
bounds the distance between trajectories of the entire network. Using the
above results, we present an algorithm to over-approximate reach sets for net-
worked dynamical systems. We further show that the over-approximations
can be made arbitrarily precise. Therefore our verification algorithm is sound
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Figure 6.1: Concept graph of the thesis.
and relatively complete.
In Chapter 4, we develop a partial order reduction technique for infinite-
state labeled transition systems. We propose the notion of ε-independent
actions, such that the resulting states are within ε distance after executing
a pair of ε-independent actions in any order. We define two executions to
be (δ, ε)-close if their initial states are within δ distance and their action
sequences are identical modulo swapping ε-independent actions. For any ex-
ecution ξ, we present an algorithm for upper-bounding the distance between
ξ and its (δ, ε)-close executions, namely the representative radius. With this
algorithm, we can precisely over-approximate reach set of all (δ, ε)-close ex-
ecutions by examining one representative, which may lead to an exponential
reduction in the number of paths that need to be explored for verifying a
concurrent cyber-physical system.
In Chapter 5, we present a communication strategy that preserves dif-
ferential privacy of participating agents. Central to this technique is the
concept of sensitivity with respect to the private data. We show that, if
each agent adds carefully designed noise—with a distribution depending on
the sensitivity—to its communication, the ε-differential privacy of agents is
protected. We present a framework for studying the privacy-performance
trade-offs. We show that, for linear systems with stable dynamics, the cost
of ε-differential privacy for the proposed communication strategy up to time
T for a system with N agents is at most O( T
3
Nε2
). Hence, the cost decays to
0 as the number of participants increases.
108
6.2 Future Directions
Broadly speaking, the research on sensitivity-based verification of cyber-
physical systems is relatively advanced. Several available tools implement
the algorithms using different strategies and software libraries. These tools
have been used to demonstrate applicability of these techniques on some
realistic benchmark problems. The research on privacy of distributed cyber-
physical systems is still in its early stages. There is considerable ongoing
work on exploring different definitions for privacy and formulations for pri-
vacy preserving mechanisms.
6.2.1 Locally Independent Actions
In Chapter 4, we presented a reach set over-approximation methods exploit-
ing the approximate commutativity property of ε-independent actions. There
is a trade-off in efficiency and precision. Choosing large approximation pa-
rameter ε increase the number of ε-independent action pairs and expands
the equivalent classes of action sequences. This way, our partial order reduc-
tion method is more efficient. However, a large ε leads to over-conservative
over-approximation of the reach set.
In Definition 4.3, ε-independent actions are required to be approximately
commutative globally. That is, from any state q, the resulting states after
executing ε-independent actions in any order are within ε distance. The
current definition ignores those action pairs that are approximately commu-
tative only locally over parts of the state space. Hence, to make such a pair of
actions ε-independent, the current method can lead to an over-conservative
choice of the approximation parameter ε.
As a natural next step, the notion of approximate independent actions
could be relaxed to actions that approximately commute locally. One pos-
sible technique involves splitting locally independent actions. Consider for
example a pair of actions a and b that are only ε-independent over a subset
of states S but nowhere else. If we split actions a and b respectively into
two pairs of actions (a0, a1) and (b0, b1) such that actions a0, b0 are enabled
in S and a1, b1 are enabled otherwise, then the new actions a0 and b0 are
ε-independent. With techniques like this, we could choose tighter parame-
ter ε and still preserve approximate independency for actions in some part of
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state space. Hence, the precision of reach set computation could be improved
without any loss of efficiency.
6.2.2 Verification of Hybrid Automata
In this thesis, we presented sensitivity-based invariant verification techniques
for both discrete and continuous models of CPS. A natural next step is to ex-
tend these techniques to hybrid automata [10, 11, 12]. Hybrid automata can
be viewed as a combination of transition systems and differential equations,
where the states can update through either continuous evolution or discrete
transitions.
In Chapter 3, we introduced an invariant verification algorithm for dy-
namical systems using IS discrepancy. To extend this approach to hybrid
automata, one need techniques to handle discrete transitions. In [122, 52],
the authors presented routines to detect possible discrete transitions and
over-approximate states after transitions. Combing this technique with our
IS discrepancy-based reachability analysis, one could possibly develop an in-
variant verification method for hybrid automata.
In Chapter 4, we presented a partial order reduction method for labeled
transition systems. To extend the technique to hybrid automata, a straight-
forward approach is through abstraction. In model checking hybrid au-
tomata, it is standard to construct discrete abstraction [57], where our partial
order reduction method can directly apply. However, accurate abstraction of-
ten requires excessive state space partitioning preventing this approach scal-
ing to large models. For partial order reduction, abstraction is only required
in some parts of the state space where commutative discrete transitions can
occur. Hence, one interesting direction is to develop efficient abstraction
technique for partial order reduction.
6.2.3 Differential Privacy with Nonlinear Dynamics
In Theorem 5.2, we presented a general sufficient condition for a differentially
private mechanism in terms of the sensitivity to user data. With this suffi-
cient condition, we developed a differentially private communication strategy
for linear systems. A direct next step is to extend this result to systems with
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nonlinear and hybrid dynamics. The main challenge in this direction is to
compute sensitivity for these systems. There is no general techniques for
computing the exact sensitivity. Several existing techniques estimate sensi-
tivity by sampling [123, 66], however, they do not provide provable guaran-
tees. More recently, techniques are developed to soundly over-approximate
sensitivity to initial states [124, 48], however, whether they can be used for
differential privacy remains to be explored. Furthermore, for many systems
where user privacy is a major concern, exact global states are sometimes
inaccessible. Hence, an interesting direction is to compute global sensitivity
using only local information.
6.2.4 Tools and Applications
In the past few years, several end-to-end verification tools based on sensitivity
(or discrepancy) analysis are developed, such as C2E2 [52], Breach [27], and
Strong [125]. The main challenge for these tools is to compute sensitivity
of large models efficiently. We have presented two techniques for computing
sensitivity in Chapters 3 and 4. For our techniques to make a greater impact,
future effort should be on building a robust implementation and connecting
with existing verification tools.
Another direction is to apply our techniques to verify other examples of
networked cyber-physical systems. Biological systems are naturally compo-
sitional, making them suitable examples for our invariant verification tech-
niques. Examples of this type include pacemaker-heart interfaces [33, 126],
surgical robots [127, 128], and neural systems [129, 130]. Our techniques
could also aid verifying distributed and swarm robots, in applications such
as flocking [131], connection maintenance [132], and collision avoidance [133,
134]. Power networks also need high assurance of safety [135, 136]. Some of
these systems evolve according to nonlinear differential algebraic equations,
which require theoretical developments for sensitivity analysis.
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